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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The purpose of the study was to explore and describe the experience of a nurse in a 
private sector hospital after contracting a highly pathogenic novel haemorrhagic fever from 
a patient and to explore the context of the environment in which she was cared for. 
 
Patients with complications from severe acute febrile diseases are admitted to intensive 
care units. During 2008, two patients with an unidentified disease were airlifted from 
Zambia and admitted to a private sector hospital in Johannesburg, South Africa. Four of 
five  patients  died  in  the  outbreak  before  a  diagnosis  of  Lujo  virus  was  confirmed. 
Countries to the North and West of South Africa are known to be endemic areas of Viral 
Haemorrhagic Fevers (VHF). This puts South Africa at risk for imported VHF and future 
outbreaks. The sole survivor was able to share useful advice for future implementation 
from experiences during the period of her illness. Unique challenges of the management 
and environment of this outbreak may assist in future outbreaks. 
 
A bounded single case study design using mixed multiple qualitative approaches including 
phenomenology was used to underpin and guide the study of the participant’s experience. 
The participant’s reflection was subjected to in-depth analysis using Colaizzi’s framework. 
Triangulation using the reflection of the contents of the “Outbreak diary” – a journal kept 
by  members  of  the  managing  team  and  clinical  nursing  records  was  undertaken. 
Emerging themes were grouped into four main themes: Initial contact with the source; 
Admission is inevitable; Moments of care and Always involved, which have been discussed 
in depth. The information gleaned from these themes can be applied to practice in future. 
 
The safety of patients and staff in an outbreak depends on attention to detail. History 
taking was identified as crucial for appropriate infection prevention methods to be put in 
place. Contact tracing and monitoring is key to containing an outbreak. The definition of 
contacts is based on the risk profile. Successful management requires coordination by a 
team of multi-skilled senior persons who have the authority to make decisions. 
 
As with all critically ill patients, the participant experienced many emotions. The lack of 
ability to control situations and care appeared to be important. Feelings of guilt still remain. 
A different meaning of kindness was exposed. 
 
Infection prevention and isolation is part of routine nursing practice and should be applied 
if there is an index of suspicion of a contagious disease. Care of patients with VHF is not 
routinely taught however maintaining basic principles may prevent spread and thus further 
cases. Support of and communication with all staff in the hospital is important for 
commitment. The setting in this study was a hospital in the private sector. 
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The revelations of this case study can be used in future research to develop guidelines for 
use by the outbreak management team. They are intended to improve the management 
and emotional support of the health care workers as well as the victims and can be 
applied to outbreaks of any nature. 
 
Keywords: Arenavirus, Viral Haemorrhage Fever, Outbreak, Reflection, Experience 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.0      INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation intends to explore the experience of a nurse who contracted a deadly 
novel viral haemorrhagic fever whilst nursing a patient admitted with a fever. It also seeks 
to identify some of the unique challenges for management and the care team that arise 
from the admission of such patients to a hospital. The outcomes of this study will be used 
by outbreak management teams to improve the gap in knowledge of holistic nursing care 
required by these patients. 
 
 
 
Patients with complications from severe acute febrile diseases are frequently admitted to 
intensive care units particularly when the diagnosis is not confirmed and differential 
diagnoses are a possibility. These patients may be contagious. If so, their admission 
exposes the health care team and other patients to the risk of secondary transmission of 
nosocomial infections (Hu, Zhang, Li et al. 2012). Viral haemorrhagic fevers (VHF) are not 
the first consideration as a possible diagnosis unless there is a strong medical history 
linking the patient to either the geographical area or contact with a host. Malaria and 
African  tick  bite  fever  are  diagnoses  far  more  likely  to  be  considered  until  proved 
otherwise. The health care workers are at risk during this period as the isolation and 
standard precautions differ depending on the diagnosis. Those who work in closest 
proximity  to  the  patient,  the  nurses,  carry  the  highest  risk  of  transmission.  Fear, 
uncertainty and inadequacy are some of the feelings described by nurses in the SARS 
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outbreak in Hong Kong (Chung, Wong, Suen et al. 2005). When caring for a contagious 
patient without a confirmed diagnosis, even the most experienced person becomes a 
novice. This may well increase the feelings of uncertainty by those who depend on the 
knowledge  and  advice  of  the  experts.  Using  a  social  constructivist  paradigm,  which 
focuses upon the person’s view of themselves (Atwater, 1996), a bounded case study, 
using exploratory and descriptive methods will collect and analyze data to ensure a rich 
narrative account of the phenomenon: the experiences of a nurse who contracted one of 
the deadliest VHF’s and survived and the environment and context in which she was 
cared for. 
 
 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the study. The problem statement, purpose of the 
study, research objectives and questions and the significance of the study will be 
described. The assumptions of the researcher are be discussed and conceptual terms 
defined. A brief overview will be given of the methodology, measures of trustworthiness of 
the study and ethical procedures adhered to. These will be discussed in greater detail in 
chapter three. 
 
 
 
The  Harvard  Reference  Style  is  used  in  this  dissertation.  Because  many  of  the 
publications contain multiple authors of ten or more, in the initial citing the researcher will 
include the first three authors. In subsequent citings only the name of the primary author 
will be used. 
All authors will be included in the referencing at the end of the dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
1.1      BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
Because VHF’s are deadly infections with high mortality rates, it is important that the 
spread of the viral disease is contained and limited to as few patients as possible. In order 
to ensure that these infections do not become global pandemics, the United Nations (UN) 
and more specifically the World Health Organization (WHO), a part of the UN, are tasked 
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with the responsibility of monitoring and putting processes in place to prevent the further 
spread of the disease. The presence of a suspected case in an area where it has not 
previously occurred, or in greater numbers than usual, constitutes an outbreak. Since 
Johannesburg, South Africa, is not an endemic area for VHF this was declared an 
outbreak.  Management according to the WHO guiding document for response to an 
international outbreak was implemented. 
 
 
 
The VHF’s are caused by a number of viruses that are endemic to certain parts of the 
globe, generally the tropical regions, since the natural hosts are found in the tropical belt. 
The tropical regions of Africa include the countries that lie between the Tropic of Cancer in 
the north and the Tropic of Capricorn in the south and include countries such as Guinea, 
Sierra Leone and Liberia in the east to Ethiopia in the west, Mali, Niger, Chad and Sudan 
in the north to Angola and Zambia in the south. South Africa is not part of a tropical 
region. These Viral Haemorrhagic Fevers are life threatening with mortality rates from 
30%-90% (Ergönül, 2006; Jansen van Vuren, Weyer, Kemp et al. 2012) 
 
 
 
 
The VHF’s are divided into four families and include Old World Arenaviruses (Lassa virus 
and Lujo virus), New World Arenaviruses (Chapare virus, Guanarito virus, Junin virus, 
Machupo virus, and Sabia virus), Filoviruses (Ebola virus, Marburg virus) Bunyaviruses 
(Crimean-Congo virus and Rift valley fever virus) and Flavivirus (Dengue virus). 
Geographically, they are restricted to areas where the host species live. Humans are not 
the natural reservoirs. The Old World Arenaviruses originate in sub-Saharan Africa and 
Asia whilst the New World Arenaviruses originate in South America. 
 
 
As early as the 12th  century, a syndrome resembling VHF was described in the area we 
know today as Tajikistan (Ergönül, 2006).  During 1944 –1945, in the wake of World War 
II, Crimean haemorrhagic fever, now called Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF), 
was identified as a clinical syndrome (Ergönül, 2006). The first outbreak of Ebola linked to 
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hospitals  and  clinics  occurred  amongst  Belgian  missionaries  and  patients  in  the 
 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, previously known as Zaire) in 1976. 
 
 
 
 
Only CCHF and Rift Valley Fever (RVF) are endemic to South Africa, with RVF first 
reported during an outbreak in 1950 (Jansen van Vuren et al. 2012). Between 2008 and 
2011,  over  2000  blood  samples  were  submitted  for  laboratory  confirmation  of  RVF 
(Jansen van Vuren et al. 2012). During a similar time frame 19 cases from a total of 49 
patients with CCHF died. (Communicable Diseases Surveillance Bulletin, 2012). 
 
 
 
The CCHF and RVF are not the only type of VHF’s to have occurred in South Africa. 
Outbreaks of Marburg, Lassa, Ebola, Dengue Haemorrhagic Fever and the novel 
Arenavirus, Lujo, are a constant reminder of the potential risk from imported cases to the 
South African health care system. These patients generally require resuscitative measures 
that include intubation and placement of intravenous catheters. These procedures expose 
the personnel to blood and other body secretions thus increasing the risk for acquiring 
nosocomial transmission. 
 
 
 
This risk results in the exposure of the entire team of health care workers, to diseases that 
are associated with a high incidence of mortality. This creates a major challenge of 
nosocomial transmission to the health care system. (Salama, Jamal, Al Moosa et al. 
2013). Because of this, there may be anxiety, fear and feelings of inadequacy amongst 
the personnel caring for these patients. These concerns are magnified when dealing with 
an unknown cause. 
 
 
 
During the second half of 2008, two patients with an unidentified disease were airlifted 
from Zambia and admitted to the intensive care unit of a private sector hospital in 
Johannesburg, South Africa. The admitting diagnosis of the initial or index patient was 
suspected African tickbite fever. Commonly, Malaria or tick bite fevers are the admitting 
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diagnoses and the patients are likely to be placed in an intensive care unit due to the 
severity of the condition on transfer. 
 
 
 
The second patient, admitted a week later, was the paramedic who carried out a traumatic 
intubation on the index patient before transport to SA. According to protocol, both patients 
were isolated on admission to the ICU. Patients three and four also sustained secondary 
infections. Patient three was a nurse who attended the index patient and patient four was 
a member of the cleaning staff who was responsible for cleaning the isolation ward after 
the death of the index patient. Patient five, a nurse attending the paramedic on the first 
three days of admission was the only patient to sustain tertiary infection. Four of the five 
patients died. 
 
 
 
Confirmation of a novel pathogenic arenavirus was only released well into the disease 
process of patient five. The source of the exposure of the index patient to the arenavirus 
remains  unknown  (Bird,  Dodd,  Erikson  et  al.  2012).  Lujo  (LUJV)  named  from  the 
presumed geographic origin of Lusaka, Zambia and Johannesburg, South Africa, has 
been confirmed as a new member of the Arenaviridae (Briese, Paweska, McMullen et al. 
2009). This is the first time in 30 years that a new arenavirus has been identified. 
 
 
 
 
To sum up, patients with febrile conditions and unconfirmed diagnoses are often admitted 
to intensive care units. In the South African setting these patients may be travellers from 
the tropical regions north of the South African border and could have been in contact with 
one of the communicable diseases endemic to these regions. Worse still, this could be a 
VHF. If suspicion and investigations for VHF do not occur and appropriate infection 
prevention measures are not put in place, the result is costly both financially and in human 
resources. This study intends to use the experience of a survivor, who happened to be a 
nurse, to make recommendations that could be applied in the future. 
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1.2      PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
 
 
 
Critically ill patients with various infectious disorders and acute febrile conditions are 
admitted  to  intensive  care  units.  These  febrile  conditions  may  have  a  number  of 
differential diagnoses in the South African setting including VHF. Mortality from VHF is 
high, ranging from 30%-90%. Because they occur rarely in the industrial western world, 
little is written about the hospitalization and care of these patients. What is known is the 
potential to cause epidemics through nosocomial introduction in the health care settings, 
with potential loss of health care workers. 
 
 
 
The  researcher  had  been  a  member  of  the  core  outbreak  management  team  for  a 
previous outbreak of the Ebola virus in South Africa. She is considered to be an expert in 
the field of outbreak management. This resulted in her being called upon to assist in the 
Lujo outbreak. Presently, research of viral haemorrhagic fever epidemics and outbreaks 
has concentrated on epidemiological aspects, clinical manifestations and medical 
management, whilst psychological, nursing and support aspects receive little or no 
attention. There is thus an interest in and responsibility to learn from the experience and 
put measures in place to improve the overall management should they be needed in 
future. In an effort to improve the management, nursing care and emotional support of the 
victims of such outbreaks, the researcher will focus on the experience of a critical care 
nurse who survived an outbreak of a novel VHF with a mortality rate of 80% and provide 
an in depth description of the management of her care. 
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1.3      RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
 
 
 
What was the experience of a nurse, who contracted a deadly viral haemorrhagic fever, 
from the time of contact until recovery and what unique challenges were faced by the care 
team and management during this outbreak? 
 
 
 
1.4      PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of the study is to explore and describe the experience of a nurse in a private 
sector hospital after contracting a highly pathogenic novel haemorrhagic fever from a 
patient and to provide a detailed description of the management of the person and 
environment through the stages of her illness. The outcomes of this case study will be 
used to develop recommendations for use by outbreak management teams during 
outbreaks of any nature. 
 
 
 
1.5      OBJECTIVES 
 
 
 
 
The objectives of the study are: 
 
 To explore the experience of a nurse during the monitoring, admission, disease 
and recovery phases, of a novel arenavirus outbreak. 
 To triangulate the information with 
 
- Documented nursing care of this patient using nursing records and daily 
documents. 
- Analysis of the “outbreak diary”, compiled by the hospital coordinating team. 
 
 To consider the relevance of the experience during an episode of critical illness 
 
and its importance in rendering support to health care workers in similar situations. 
 
 To make recommendations for the care of a patient who has contracted or is 
suspected of having contracted a VHF 
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1.6      SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
Present publications on outbreaks particularly outbreaks of Viral Haemorrhagic Fevers 
focus on tracing the host and causative organisms (Isaacson, 2001; Gubler and Clark, 
1995) the genetic detection, (Bird et al. 2012; Briese et al. 2009), epidemiological and 
infection prevention management (Hu et al. 2009; Jansen van Vuren et al. 2012) and 
lastly the medical management (Handy, 2004). 
 
 
 
This study contributes knowledge for use by intensive care professionals since these 
patients generally require intensive care and others. It also should be of assistance to 
health professionals responsible for infection prevention as well as those involved with 
managing emotional and social support during outbreaks. Lastly it provides information 
that willl  inform policy makers who will be responsible for maintaining and protecting 
health care workers and patients who succumb to similar outbreaks in future. 
 
 
 
This particular case study has gathered information on the experience from both the 
perspective of the health care workers tasked with caring for patients critically ill with VHF, 
as well as the patient who has survived a highly infectious and lethal disease. The 
participant in this case study is a highly trained nurse with many years’ experience, who 
contracted Lujo, a novel arenavirus with 80% mortality rate and survived. Reflecting on 
the experience of this nurse will allow for policy makers to include special attention to the 
emotional needs of patients and their health professionals rendering care in extreme 
isolation situations. It will inform intensive care nurses of particular aspects of care that 
become important to the patient when cared for with minimal contact. Health professionals 
who are responsible for infection prevention will gain insight into daily concerns of the 
personnel who are exposed to these deadly infections. Since there is no literature with 
advice on the daily administrative management of an outbreak, or the specific needs of 
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this type of patient the information gained will hopefully serve as lessons learned and 
assist in future outbreaks. 
 
 
 
1.7      PARADIGMATIC PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
 
 
Paradigms  are  considered  to  be  perspectives  of  the  real  world,  in  other  words, 
worldviews. (Polit and Beck, 2012). This allows us to make sense of and give meaning to 
the things of the world (Patton, 2002). All research needs to be placed in a paradigm as it 
guides the direction and subsequent phases of the study. The paradigmatic perspectives 
of this study include meta-theoretical, theoretical and methodological assumptions, which 
are discussed in the next section. 
 
 
 
1.7.1   Meta-theoretical Assumptions 
 
Meta-theoretical assumptions are axiomatic statements not intended to be tested by the 
study. The meta-theoretical assumptions of nursing comprise the person, environment, 
health and nursing, particularly applied to the speciality critical care nursing in the field of 
infection prevention. 
Roy’s adaptation model (Roy, Andrews, 2008) is a systematic logical theory that lends 
itself to application in the field of intensive care. The model describes the person’s 
interaction with a changing environment and the person’s ability to adapt. Adaptive mode 
processes may be integrated, compensatory or compromised. (Chan, 2004) The nurse 
assists with and promotes patient adaption by maintaining or removing stimuli depending 
on the patient’s response. (Polit and Beck, 2012). This model provides a framework that is 
in line with the nursing process commonly used by most intensive care units in South 
Africa. 
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 The Person 
 
The person is considered a bio-psycho-social being in constant interaction with the 
changing environment. (Chan,2004). Four modes of adaptation are considered. These 
include:  physiological  function,  self-concept,  role  function  and  interdependence.  In 
addition, Roy describes a person as “having a zone of adaptation” (Chan, 2004). Chan 
(2004) explains that changes in health that fall within this zone result in a positive 
adaptation whilst those changes that fall outside the zone will cause ill health. 
The patient in this study is critically ill and is vulnerable since the zone of adaptation 
described by Roy (2008) has been violated in all of the modes of adaptation. 
 
 
 
 Environment 
 
The environment refers to factors resulting in potential changes as being both within the 
person or internal as well as from without or external. Both the internal and external stimuli 
have the possibility of affecting the state of health of the person (Chan, 2004). In this 
study the environment is a normal ward that has been converted into a specially prepared 
isolation suite that includes an intensive care cubicle. The stressors associated with 
isolation and intensive care treatment would play a role in this study. 
 
 
 
 Health 
 
Health and maladaptive behaviour are the two extremes of the adaptation continuum with 
health suggesting a state of positive adaptation whilst maladaptive behaviour indicates the 
inability to maintain health thus ill health ensues. Since this patient was critically ill and 
well outside her zone of adaptation, she falls into the realm of maladaptive behaviour. 
 
 
 
 Goal of Nursing 
 
Roy’s adaptive model of nursing explains that humans are systems that are able to 
change by means of adaptation (Polit and Beck 2008). The role of the nurse, when 
interacting with a patient, is thus to assist the patient to achieve positive adaptation in 
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each of the four adaptive modes (Chan, 2004) in order to develop the means to be at one 
with the environment. Nursing interventions are directed at enhancing the chances of 
positive adaptation. 
 
 
 
 Nursing activities 
 
Roy’s adaptation model goes on to identify the systematic manner in which nursing care is 
delivered. Six steps make up this process. They include: First level assessment, Second 
level assessment, Problem identification, Goal setting, Intervention and finally Evaluation. 
(Chan, 2004). Nursing activities promote positive adaptive responses by manipulation of 
certain stimuli. In this study nursing predominantly takes place in the isolation environment 
however intensive nursing is a pivotal part of this nursing care. 
 
 
 
1.7.2 Theoretical Assumptions 
 
Theoretical assumptions can be defined as perspectives that position the researcher 
within the research. Theoretical assumptions are inclusive of theories and concepts used 
as a point of departure in the study. Creswell (2009) likens this to a lens through which the 
theoretical platform forms the picture. References to words and phrases form the pillars to 
which the research is anchored. Qualitative researchers must address the fact that the 
data or evidence they collect cannot be separated from the implicit or theoretically explicit 
assumptions they hold about the nature of the social world, and which therefore will guide 
the methods they choose to generate their data. 
 
 
 
1.7.2.1 Terms of reference 
 
The following concepts are clarified in order to understand how they are applied in the 
study. 
 
 
 
 Outbreak 
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As defined by the World Health Organisation (WHO), the presence of a suspected or 
confirmed  case  of  a  communicable  disease  in  an  area  where  it  has  not  previously 
occurred, or in greater numbers than usual, constitutes an outbreak. In VHF infections one 
case in a new area constitutes an outbreak. The VHF in this study is a novel arenavirus 
that infected five persons thus it constitutes an outbreak. 
 
 
 
 Acute febrile diseases 
 
A term used for an onset of a non – specific illness accompanied by a fever. (Concise 
 
Dictionary of Modern Medicine, 2002). 
 
 
 
 
 Index patient 
 
The index patient, also referred to as patient zero, is the initial patient in the population of 
an epidemiological investigation who shows symptoms of the disease under investigation. 
(Centers for Disease Control and prevention, 2014; Concise Dictionary of Modern 
Medicine, 2002). This term is frequently used in outbreaks of communicable diseases. 
The index patient in this study is a female who was airlifted from Zambia to Johannesburg 
with an acute febrile disease. The diagnosis of VHF was confirmed post mortem after four 
more patients presented with the same clinical picture. Patient number five survived and is 
the centre of this study. 
 
 
 
 Health care workers 
 
In terms of  Health Act 61 of the Republic of South Africa of 2003, health care workers 
include nurses, physicians, physiotherapists and radiographers. 
 
 
 
 Coordinating team 
 
Gittell (2002) states that coordination is “fundamentally a process of interaction among 
participants”.   Regular, precise and analytical communication is key to the success of 
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coordination. Coordination however also includes the relationships “of shared goals, 
shared knowledge, and mutual respect” (Gittell, 2002) between the participants. In this 
study coordination includes communication, shared knowledge and respect between the 
members listed below, whose responsibility it is to manage this outbreak of an unidentified 
VHF. Teams include cooperatively functioning groups of participants whose duty it is to 
organize and oversee the entire planning and running of all aspects of an outbreak. The 
coordinating team in this study was divided into a number of smaller teams. These 
included: 
 a  hospital  management  team  who  maintained  and  continued  with  hospital 
activities, 
 a team of the personnel who dealt with media and production of information flyers, 
 
 a technical team, 
 
 a client services team to assist with public queries, 
 
 a contact and monitoring team. 
 
 a group of representatives from WHO and CDC, 
 
 the team who was responsible for patient safety and care. This included 
 
the treating physician, the hospital infection prevention nurse, the researcher and 
the hospital manager. This team reported directly to head office 
 
 
 
Organizing an outbreak and care of patients and contacts involves guiding and organizing 
of personnel and other resources needed to carry out all required patient care activities, 
and is best managed by the exchange of information among team members responsible 
for different aspects of care. This occurs alongside the regular business of the hospital. 
In particular in this instance was the difficulty of not having a confirmed diagnosis with 
which to work. The team responsible for the patient care assumed the worst and managed 
the outbreak as though it was a  VHF. This was only confirmed well into the outbreak. 
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 Private hospital 
 
In South Africa there are two health care provider models. The Private sector hospitals are 
owned by three large companies and cater for patients who are covered by medical 
insurance, or private paying patients. 
The largest sector is Government owned and serves the majority of the population. 
 
 
 
 
 Infectious and Contagious. 
 
Infectious diseases are caused by microscopic bacteria or viruses that enter the body. 
Some infectious diseases spread directly from one person to another. Infectious diseases 
that spread from person to person are said to be contagious. (Pearse, 1997) 
 
 
 
1.7.3   Methodological Assumptions 
 
Methodological  assumptions  reflect  the  researcher’s  belief  about  the  nature  of  the 
research process. It is also influenced by the nature of the research topic or problem, the 
researcher’s own personal involvement and interest and the scientific body that would 
have an interest in the study (Creswell, 2009).  Creswell (2009) suggests that research is 
influenced by the researcher’s “general orientation to the world”.  It is the researcher’s 
perspective on the complexities of life and is representative of their philosophical stance. 
(Polit and Beck, 2012). Creswell (2009) describes four different worldviews into which 
research can be positioned. Polit and Beck (2008) and others refer to these as paradigms. 
They include 
 Postpositivism 
 
 Constructivism 
 
 Advocacy/Participatory 
 
 Pragmatism 
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Burns  and  Grove  (2009)  classify  two  broad  approaches  of  research  for  nursing 
(quantitative and qualitative). Creswell (2009) includes a third approach. (Quantitative, 
qualitative and mixed methods). 
 
 
 
Qualitative research is an inquiry approach employed by different academic disciplines, 
traditionally in the social sciences. Qualitative aims to gather an in-depth understanding of 
human behaviour and the reasons that govern such behaviour. The qualitative design 
investigates the why and how of decision making, not just what, where and when. The 
focus of the investigation is broad and holistic. Smaller but focused samples are more 
often used in qualitative studies than larger samples. Qualitative research asks broad 
questions and collects word data from phenomena or participants. The researcher looks 
for themes and describes the information in themes and patterns exclusive to that set of 
participants (Creswell, 2009). The final report is supple and adaptable. Within the 
qualitative research a number of strategies or methods are used. These include 
phenomenological research, grounded theory research, ethnographic research, historical 
research, philosophical inquiry, critical social theory and case studies. (Burns and Grove, 
2009). Qualitative research was chosen since the experience of the nurse will be explored 
and described in the context of the management of this illness in a private hospital setting 
in Johannesburg. In this study context is vital therefore particular attention has been given 
to details of the setting. 
 
 
 
The paradigm selected for this study lies within the worldview of naturalism or 
constructivism. Constructivists believe the world is independent of human minds, but 
knowledge of the world is a human and social construction. They oppose the philosophy 
of objectivism, which enhances the belief that a human can come to truth about the 
natural world not mediated by scientific approximations, with different degrees of validity 
and accuracy. They pay attention to deep understanding rather than generalizations 
(Patton, 2002 pp. 96-99). According to constructivists there is no single methodology in 
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science, but rather a diversity of useful realities. In other words there are multiple means 
of exploring different “truths” of realities. (Burns and Grove, 2009). Social constructivism 
contends that categories of knowledge and reality are actively created by social 
relationships and interactions. Social activity presupposes human beings inhabit shared 
forms of life, and in the case of social construction, utilizing semiotic resources with  
reference to social structures and institutions. 
 
 
 
I have chosen to follow a qualitative approach in this case study, in order to ensure the 
drawing out and understanding of the experience of a nurse who contracted a deadly 
disease. I have selected constructivism as the paradigm for this case study. Individuals 
form subjective constructions about their experience (Creswell, 2009). These perceptions 
become the views and beliefs of the individual (Creswell, 2009). The goal of this research 
is to rely on the participant’s views and perceptions of her experience together with 
exploring the management of this outbreak to provide recommendations for future use. 
This is a complex case study. The view of the participant is vital to the interpretation and 
understanding of the experience. 
 
 
 
1.8      OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 
 
 
The overview of the research method identifies the type of research design selected and 
introduces the methods used. In this research a case study design is considered the most 
appropriate and makes use of qualitative phenomenology in an attempt to gather details 
of the experience of the nurse. This will be set out in detail in chapter three. 
 
 
 
1.8.1   Research Design 
 
The research design is a case study design guided by a constructivist paradigm. 
Exploration and description are linked to the context of this unique study. Within a case
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study design, qualitative methods are used to address the research questions. Each 
aspect of the design is discussed. 
 
 
 
This research is a case study, since a bounded single case study will be used in order to 
capture the experience of the participant. It is considered the most appropriate type of 
research since in this instance, the case, an infected nurse, is the central point. (Polit and 
Beck, 2010). In an attempt to improve the understanding and support of personnel in 
similar situations in future, the researcher will focus on what this nurse experienced during 
her role as the “nurse” and her time as the patient. 
 
 
 
Qualitative research allows the researcher to learn (Patton, 2002). With learning comes 
deeper understanding that aids the researcher in obtaining information that can be used 
when planning programs for future use. Phenomenological research attempts to describe 
the experiences of the study participants (Burns and Grove, 2005). It requires the 
participants to reflect upon and speak about the phenomenon (Beeby, 2000). The 
experience allows the researcher to attach meaning to the participant’s experience as 
perceived by the individual participant. These meanings can then be grouped to identify 
and understand the perceptions of the participant to the phenomena. 
 
 
 
This study is contextual, as the researcher intends to use the sequence of events as they 
occurred in the study setting. The study setting is a hospital in one of the three largest 
private sector hospital groups. This hospital is a referral hospital for international patients 
who have medical insurance privately or through their employer. This particularly applies 
to patients from Africa who require expert medical treatment and nursing care. In spite of 
no confirmed diagnosis, the National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD) was 
notified as two patients who had been in contact with each other, had died with similar 
clinical symptoms. 
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A single case study cannot be assumed to represent the entire population of health care 
workers therefore cannot be used as a generalization, however qualitative research is not 
about generalizations but rather about uniqueness, obtaining richness of data and 
understanding of the phenomenon (Burns and Grove, 2009) 
However this study intends to produce recommendations that can be used to inform future 
management of outbreaks of VHF as well as the policies that guide practice. 
 
 
 
1.8.2   Research Methods 
 
The target population included all health care workers who contracted the Lujo virus. 
Nonprobability sampling will be enforced since there was only one survivor, thus the 
sample is limited to a single person, the nursing documents related to her admission and 
a diary which was maintained by members of the core outbreak team. 
 
 
 
In-depth unstructured interviews were used, as the researcher had no preconceived 
views of the information that will be offered. Using an informal conversation technique the 
questions were open ended.  The informal conversational interview is the most open-
ended approach to interviewing (Patton 2002). The intention is to understand the 
experience in the participant’s own words. People’s accounts are reconstructions of their 
experience influenced by their perceptions  (Beeby, 2000).  The conversation is 
transcribed and verified at a future interview session as required by Colaizzi’s method of 
data analysis. 
 
 
 
In addition, the case notes documented on a daily basis by the nursing staff caring for the 
patient were analyzed for confirmation of the accounts and to identify any factors that 
might have played a role in the experience. Lastly the outbreak diary, a document 
compiled on a twenty-four hour basis by members of the coordination team, was used as 
reflection of how the outbreak played out. 
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Thematic content analysis was used. As Colaizzi’s framework has been used in two  
 
Studies examining the experiences of health personnel during an outbreak of SARS in 
Hong Kong(Chung et al. 2005) and the H1N1 influenza pandemic in Australia (Corley, 
Hammond and Fraser, 2010), the researcher uses his framework. Emerging themes will 
be grouped in keeping with Colaizzi’s framework. This allows for comparison of 
experiences during outbreaks and these themes can then be transformed into practice 
recommendations for future application.  
 
1.9      MEASURES OF TRUSTWORTHINESS 
 
 
Guba’s model, as described in Lincoln and Guba (1989), for ensuring validity and 
trustworthiness of qualitative research will be applied. The four main aspects of 
trustworthiness applied to this study are credibility (truth value), dependability 
(consistency), transferability (applicability) and confirmability (neutrality). 
 
 
 
In order to enhance credibility, method triangulation was applied. “Triangulation refers to 
the use of multiple referents to draw conclusions about what constitutes truth.” (Polit and 
Beck, 2010).   Method Triangulation uses two or more methods of collecting data in 
respect of the same phenomenon in order to obtain a true and comprehensive 
understanding.  Recordings of conversations with the participant together with the clinical 
nursing data of the period of admission will be used to enhance credibility.    In addition, 
the data was augmented with excerpts from the written “outbreak diary”, thus ensuring 
data source triangulation as well. 
 
 
 
Dependability refers to evidence that is consistent and stable (Polit and Beck, 2012). It 
refers to reliability that is enhanced by the credibility of the process of data collection. The 
concept of transferability or “the extent to which qualitative findings can be transferred to 
other  settings”  (Polit  and  Beck,  2012)  is  improved  by  increasing  the  contextual 
information. This is achieved in this study by thick description.  In  order  to  ensure  rigor  
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or  confirmability,  the  study  must  reflect  the  participant’s experiences and not the 
researcher’s. Since the nurse who experienced the condition will give the account, it will be 
considered a true reflection of her experience and therefore credible. Tape recording and 
accurate transcription will provide a record. Probing and crosschecking will be used to 
confirm her perceptions of the experience. Meanings obtained from the conversation with 
the participant were confirmed at a further meeting an amended as necessary.  
 
1.10    ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 
 
 
As a registered nurse one adheres to the ethical principles of a profession. The 
International Council for Nurses (ICN) contains four elements in their code of ethics for 
nurses. Similarly the South African Nursing Council (SANC) has also published a list of 
Ethic Principles that have to be “upheld at all times by all Nursing Practitioners” (South 
African Nursing Council: Code of Ethics for Nursing Practitioners in South Africa. 2013). 
 
 
 
 The  proposal  for  this  research  was  submitted  for  peer  review  within  the 
Department of Nursing Education before being submitted to the Human Research 
Ethics Committee of the University of Witwatersrand. 
 
 
 
 Ethical approval has been obtained from the Human Research Ethics Committee 
of the University of Witwatersrand. 
 
 
 
 This proposal was submitted to the Faculty of Health Sciences Post Graduate 
 
Committee and permission was granted to continue with the study. 
 
 
 
 
   Permission to carry out the research and use of the data has been obtained  in 
writing from the participant. 
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 Written  consent  has  been  obtained  from  the  Management  of  the  hospital 
concerned, for use of the data. 
 
 
 
 Because of the nature of such an outbreak and the concurrent media reports, total 
anonymity cannot be obtained. The participant will however remain anonymous in 
the research documents and any publications that follow. 
 
 
 
 Anonymity and confidentiality will be afforded to the health care team who were 
involved with both the management of the outbreak and the care of the participant. 
 
 
 
 The management and storage of all data collected will be held in confidence with 
both the computer and backup devices being password protected. 
 
 A Psychologist has been arranged for consultations should the participant require 
counselling. 
 
 
 
1.11 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
Proposed chapter layout of the thesis is as follows: 
Chapter One: Overview of the study 
Chapter Two: Literature review 
Chapter Three: Research methods 
Chapter Four: Findings 
Chapter Five: Discussion, recommendations, limitations and conclusions 
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1.12    SUMMARY 
 
 
 
 
This chapter has presented an overview of the study. The problem statement, purpose of 
the study, research objectives, and significance of the study has been described. The 
assumptions of the researcher have been discussed and the operational terms defined. 
An overview has been given of the research methods, validity and trustworthiness of the 
study and the ethical procedures adhered to. 
 
 
 
The following chapters will include a review of the literature, the methods, data analysis, 
the description and interpretation of research findings. The final chapter will present 
limitations of the study, as well as a summary of the study findings, conclusions and 
recommendations, for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
In  the  previous  chapter  a  general  overview  of  the  study  was  provided.  It  Included  the 
background to the study, the problem statement, the research question, the purpose of the 
study, the research objectives, significance of the study and the paradigmatic perspectives.  It 
also described the theoretical framework and the meta-theoretical assumptions, research 
methods and ethical considerations briefly. 
 
 
 
In this chapter a summary of literature on this topic will be discussed. Previous research was 
examined. This literature contains predominantly the epidemiology and genetic tracing of VHFs. 
A few publications discussed different aspects of the management of VHF but only two Lyon, 
Mehta, Varkey et al. (2014) and Sewlall, Richards, Duse et al. (2014) examine clinical progress 
and the patients’ response to daily treatment. 
 
 
 
The literature is organized into three sections listed below. 
 
 What we know about viral haemorrhagic fevers (VHF) 
 
 Clinical and Nursing management 
 
 Outbreak management 
 
o infection prevention and isolation. 
 
o contact tracing and monitoring 
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2.2 SEARCH METHODS 
 
 
 
 
An electronic literature search was conducted using CINAHL, EBSCO, Ovid Medline, Science 
Direct, Pubmed, Scopus and MeSH. In addition key articles and reports were searched for 
relevant references. Key words for data searching included: Viral haemorrhagic fever; Lujo 
fever; Ebola fever; Crimean Congo fever; Lassa Fever; personal protective equipment; infection 
control and prevention; nosocomial infections, critical care experience; outbreak management 
and lessons learned. The search was limited to English articles. Initially the timeframe of 1990 
to 2013 was selected. Due to the scarcity of current literature on experience of health care 
workers or patients, earlier articles on VHF outbreaks and particularly the outbreaks of Marburg 
Fever and Ebola both in Johannesburg, were included. Later, due to the biggest outbreak ever 
of Ebola in West Africa, relevant publications from 2014-15 were added The decision to include 
articles was based on the relevance to the study. 
 
 
 
2.3     WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT VIRAL HAEMORRHAGIC FEVERS 
 
 
 
 
Viral Haemorrhagic Fevers are caused by a number of viruses that are endemic to certain parts 
of the Globe, generally the tropical regions. They are life threatening with mortality rates from 
30%-90% (Ergönül, 2006; Jansen van Vuren et al. 2012). VHF’s are divided into four families 
and include 
 
 
 
Arenaviruses – Old World (Lassa virus and Lujo virus), 
 
- New World (Chapare virus, Guanarito virus, Junin virus, 
Machupo virus, and Sabia virus) 
 
 
 
Filoviruses (Ebola virus and Marburg virus) 
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Bunyaviruses   (Crimean-Congo virus and Rift valley fever virus) and 
 
 
 
 
Flavivirus (Dengue virus). 
 
 
 
 
VHFs   are   small-enveloped   RNA   viruses   (Paweska,   Sewlall,   Ksiazek   et   al.   2009). 
Geographically, they are restricted to areas where the host species live. Humans are not the 
natural reservoirs. The Old World Arenaviruses originate in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia whilst 
the New World Arenaviruses originate in South America. This study will only address the Old 
World Arenaviruses, Filoviruses, Bunyaviruses and Flaviviruses. 
As early as the 12th  century, a syndrome resembling VHF was described in the area we know 
 
today as Tajikistan (Ergönül, 2006).  The hosts of VHF vary from ticks and mosquitoes to rats 
and bats and some remain as yet unknown (Bird et al. 2012; Paweska et al, 2009; Sewlall et al. 
2014). A breakdown of the four families together with the natural host is tabulated below. (Table 
 
2.1) 
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Table 2.1 Classification of Old World Viral Haemorrhagic fevers 
 
Virus Family Fevers Endemic area Host Most important 
reference/s 
Arenavirus Lassa virus West Africa: 
     Liberia, 
Sierra Leone 
    Nigeria 
Mastomys  mouse Jansen van Vuren 
et al. 2012 
 Lujo virus 
(LUJV) 
Unknown (2015) Unknown (2015) Bird et al. 2012; 
Paweska et al, 
2009; Sewlall et 
al. 2014 
2014 Bunyavirus Crimean-Congo 
 
fever (CCHF) 
South Africa, 
 
Central Africa 
 
Asia 
Hyalomma tick 
 
(Bontepootluis) 
Ergönül, 2006. 
Paweska et al, 
2009 
 
 Rift Valley Fever 
 
(RVF) 
South Africa 
 
Egypt,  
Saudi Arabia  
Sudan  
Senegal 
 Yemen 
Aedes Mosquitoes 
 
and ticks(secondary) 
Fyumagwa et al. 
2011.  
Jansen van Vuren 
et al. 2012. 
 
Filovirus Ebola Virus 
Disease 
 
(EVD) 
Africa: 
 
Democratic Republic 
of Congo,  
Uganda  
Gabon  
Zaire 
African Fruit Bat Hall, Hall and 
Chapman, 2008. 
 
  Richards, Murphy, 
 Jobson, et al. 
 2000. 
 
 Marburg Fever Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo, Angola 
Kenya,  
African green 
 
monkey; Bats 
Borchert,  Boelaert,  
Sleurs  et  al.  
2000.  
Ftika and 
Maltezou, 2013. 
 
Flavivirus Dengue 
 
Haemorrhagic 
Fever 
(DHF) 
Asia 
 
Africa 
 
North Australia 
Aedes aegypti 
 
mosquitoes 
Centers for 
Disease Control 
update, 2015. 
*Data included in this table are from many articles, all listed in the references. 
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Only Crimean Congo Haemorrhagic Fever (CCHF) and Rift Valley Fever (RVF) are endemic to 
 
South Africa.   RVF was first reported during an outbreak in 1950 (Jansen van Vuren et al. 
 
2012). Between 2008 and 2011, over 2000 blood samples were submitted for laboratory 
confirmation of RVF (Jansen van Vuren et al. 2012). The first case of CCHF to be diagnosed in 
South Africa was in 1981 when a young school going male died after being bitten in the North 
West Province (Gear, 1989). During a time frame of 4 years from 2008 and 2011, 19 cases from 
a total of 49 patients with CCHF, died. (Communicable Diseases Surveillance Bulletin, 2012). In 
2014,  five  cases  of  CCHF  were  confirmed  mainly  in  the  Northern  Cape  and  Namibia. 
 
(Communicable Diseases Communique, 2014). CCHF and RVF are not the only VHF’s to have 
occurred in South Africa. Outbreaks of Marburg, Lassa, Ebola, Dengue Haemorrhagic Fever  
and  the  novel  Arenavirus,  Lujo,  are  a  constant  reminder  of  the  potential  risk  from 
imported cases, to the South African health care system. 
I will give a brief overview of each of the VHF’s that have occurred in the South African setting 
 starting with the two that are endemic to South Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 CRIMEAN-CONGO HAEMORRHAGIC FEVER (CCHF) 
 
 
 
 
During 1944 –1945, in the wake of World War II, Crimean haemorrhagic fever was identified as 
a clinical syndrome (Bird et al. 2012; Paweska et al, 2009; Sewlall et al. (2014). Ergönül (2006) 
reports that in 1956 a similar and indistinguishable virus was identified in the Belgian Congo. 
This resulted in the virus being renamed Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF). CCHF is 
known to be transmitted by the Hyalomma species of ticks commonly known as the 
“bontepootluis” in South Africa. These ticks feed on animals and therefore come into contact with 
humans. 
In the South  African context,  since 1981 there have been reports involving  human cases 
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annually (Jansen van Vuren et al. 2012). During 1985, an outbreak of CCHF occurred at 
Tygerberg Hospital in the Western Cape (van Eeden, van Eeden, Joubert et al. 1985). Nine 
patients contracted CCHF in this outbreak. Two died. Some medical management is discussed 
in this publication however no nursing management was included in any of the four part 
publication.  In 1996 an outbreak of CCHF occurred in Oudtshoorn in the Eastern Cape in which 
17 workers from an abattoir were found to be positive for CCHF (Msimang, Weyer, Leman et al. 
2013). Passive surveillance has proved a total of 187 laboratory –confirmed cases in the last 30 
years (Jansen van Vuren et al. 2012) mainly in the Northern Cape and Free State. In a recent 
article, Mertens, Schmidt, Ozkul et al. (2013) describe CCHF as “one of the major emerging 
disease threats spreading to and within the European Union”.  Mertens et al. (2013) go on to 
say that over 30 countries have reported cases of CCHF. Ftika and Maltezou (2013) add that in 
the past ten years the incidence of CCHF has increased in South-east Europe and a number of 
other African and Russian countries. They mention that the first human cases in Turkey were 
confirmed in 2002. More recently ticks in Spain have been found to carry the CCHF virus. 
Endemic areas in South Africa include Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, Western Cape, North 
West and the Free State. (Jansen van Vuren et al. 2012). 
 
 
 
 RIFT VALLEY FEVER 
 
 
 
Rift Valley Fever is a  VHF that is generally associated with animals. An arthropod borne 
disease, it affects domestic livestock that are frequently in close contact with humans. This 
disease, named after the Rift Valley in Kenya, was first recognized in 1913 (Fyumagwa, Ezekiel, 
Nyaki et al. 2011).   The incidence among animals increases during periods of heavy rainfall 
(Fyumagwa et al. 2011; Centres for  Disease  Control  and  Prevention  and World  Health 
 
Organization, 2015). Mosquitoes infect  animals such as cattle, sheep and goats. During the 
 
slaughtering and skinning of the animals, humans become contaminated. 
 
The RVF is found in “most countries of sub-Saharan Africa” (Centres  for  Disease  Control  
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and  Prevention  and World  Health  Organization, 2015). Southern and Eastern regions of Africa 
are affected. 
 
Rift Valley Fever was first reported in South Africa in 1950 (Jansen van Vuren et al. 2012). 
Regular outbreaks have occurred in South Africa. No infection to humans was reported in a few 
instances however most outbreaks confirmed human cases with few fatalities occurring during 
the outbreaks. Jansen van Vuren et al. (2012) report a widespread outbreak of RVF that 
occurred between February 2010 and March 2011 in which 302 human cases were confirmed. 
Twenty five of these patients died. Over 80% of the confirmed cases had exposure to animals. 
(Jansen van Vuren et al. 2012). Prior to that, a large outbreak occurred in Kenya killing as many 
as 300 people (Fyumagwa et al. 2011). RVF generally has a low fatality rate of approximately 
1% in humans. General guidelines for VHF should be followed in the event of the admission of a 
patient with RVF. There is no specific treatment for patients testing positive for RVF. Medical 
management includes administration of Ribavirin, an antiviral drug or nucleoside inhibitor. 
Fyumagwa et al. (2011) are a group of animal and wildlife researchers particularly interested in 
RVF in livestock. They have included the interface between livestock and humans in their 
publication in an attempt to examine the challenges and opportunities gained in an outbreak in 
2007. They report that in spite of experiencing a fairly large outbreak of RVF in Tanzania, 
having the technology and the knowledge, does not result in Tanzania being prepared should 
another outbreak occur. In their opinion lack of finances and the reluctance of the policy makers 
to engage with the professional experts are reasons for this. It is more than likely that Tanzania 
is not alone in this and that many African countries suffer the same dilemma. 
 
 
 
 LUJO FEVER 
 
 
 
 
In  September  and  October  of  2008,  an  outbreak  of  an  undiagnosed  haemorrhagic  fever 
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occurred in a hospital in the Northern suburbs of Johannesburg. Unidentified until day three of 
admission of the fifth patient, this new arenavirus was responsible for the deaths of three 
healthcare workers as well as the index patient who was evacuated by air from Zambia. The 
fifth patient who is the participant in this study is the only survivor. Lujo is a novel arenavirus and 
is one of two pathogenic arenaviruses found in Africa (Sewlall et al. 2014). It is the first deadly 
arenavirus to be discovered on the African continent in 40 years (Briese et al. 2009; Paweska et 
al. 2009; Sewlall et al. 2014). The mortality rate is 80% with four of the five patients dying. This 
is substantially higher than Lassa Fever, the second arenavirus in Africa, at 20-50%. The fact 
that  no  confirmed  diagnosis  was  available  probably  contributed  to  this,  since  infection 
prevention in line with VHF was not put in place in cases one, two and four. Case three was 
nursed with standard precautions and barrier nursing. Case five was admitted to an isolation 
suite prepared for VHF.  Although unknown at this point in time (Bird et al. 2012; Paweska et al. 
2009; Sewlall et al. 2014), the host is thought to be a rodent since the Mastomys mouse is the 
host in Lassa Fever. The clinical presentation was similar to Lassa Fever and other VHF’s 
(Sewlall et al. 2014). Lujo differs from Lassa Fever in that the onset is abrupt. In line with Lassa 
Fever, haemorrhage “was not a prominent feature” (Sewlall et al. 2014). Ribavirin was 
administered orally initially and then intravenously. 
 
 
 
 EBOLA 
 
 
 
 
The  first  outbreak  of  Ebola  linked  to  hospitals  and  clinics  occurred  amongst  Belgian 
missionaries and patients in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, previously known as 
Zaire) in 1976. In this outbreak 318 cases contracted Ebola with 280 deaths. One of the 
difficulties with identifying this epidemic was the similarity of the symptoms to Lassa Fever and 
yellow fever. The community had identified the mission hospital as the source of the infection. 
History taken from 85 of the cases indicated that they had been given an injection at the hospital 
within three weeks of presenting with symptoms. “Less than 1% of unaffected family members 
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received injections” (Breman, Piot, Johnson et al.1978.) Another large outbreak occurred the 
same year in Sudan with 284 cases reported. In this outbreak, nursing the patient, whether at 
 home or in the hospital was closely linked to contracting the disease. In fact Breman et al. 
(1978) state that 91 of 213 patients contracted this disease in hospital in Maridi, Sudan. 
Seventy two were hospital workers who contracted Ebola during the course of duty. Further 
outbreaks have continued to occur. The 1995 Kikwit Ebola outbreak is one of the best studied 
and best reported outbreaks of Ebola to date (Hall, Hall and Chapman, 2008). According to Hall et 
al. (2008) this epidemic had 164 reported cases with 134 deaths. Health care workers made up 
38% of the deaths. 
This Kikwit outbreak was to result in the first Ebola case being imported into South Africa in 
 
1996 and the subsequent death of a nurse who was in contact with the index patient from 
Gabon (Gradon, 2000; Richards, Murphy, Jobson, et al. 2000). This outbreak occurred in a 
private hospital where I was the nursing manager. This was the first Ebola case in South Africa 
and in a western setting where first class medicine is practiced. My position at the time afforded 
me the opportunity to get firsthand experience on managing an outbreak in a hospital situation. 
These outbreaks however pale into insignificance when compared to the present West African 
Ebola outbreak in which over 23,000 cases have been reported, 14,028 laboratory confirmed 
and over 9,000 deaths have occurred (Centers for Disease Control update, 2015). It should be 
remembered that West Africa is not an endemic area for filoviruses. 
Five subtypes of the virus exist, Ebola Zaire, Ebola Sudan, Ebola Bundibugyo, Ebola   Cote 
 
d’Ivoire (now called Tai Forest ebolavirus) and Ebola Reston which does not affect humans 
 
(www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola; King, 2008 updated November 2014). The first three are responsible 
 
for all the Ebola cases in Humans seen on the African continent. 
 
 
 
 
 MARBURG FEVER 
 
 
 
 
Marburg Haemorrhagic Fever belongs to the same family as Ebola, the Filoviridae family. The 
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first  recorded  outbreak  occurred  in  Marburg,  Germany  and  Serbia  (formally  Yugoslavia) 
simultaneously in 1967 (Borio, Inglesby, Peters et al. 2002; Ftika and Maltezou, 2013).   The 
virus takes its name from this German town. Thirty two laboratory workers who had handled 
African Green monkeys that had been imported from Uganda were infected in this outbreak. 
Seven of these patients died. Since then infrequent outbreaks have occurred in Central Africa and 
South Africa. Primates are not considered the host as they develop the disease themselves 
(Borchert,  Boelaert,  Sleurs  et  al.  2000).  The  host  is  the  cave  dwelling  African  Fruit  Bat, 
Rousettus aegyptiacus. The first case in South Africa occurred in 1975 when a young Australian 
male, traveling through Zimbabwe with his partner, presented at the Johannesburg General 
Hospital with a fever and an acute haemorrhage (Gear, Cassel, Gear et al. 1975). [I worked in 
the   renal   unit   together   with   a   nursing   colleague   who   contracted   the   disease   after 
haemodialysing this patient during his illness. This was my introduction to VHF.]  The most 
notable outbreaks occurred in Durba, Democratic Republic of Congo from 1998 to 2000 and 
Uige Province, Angola in 2004 to 2005. Collectively over 400 persons contracted the disease in 
both these outbreaks and mortality rates were reported as 83% and 90% respectively. 
 
 
 
 LASSA FEVER 
 
 
 
 
Lassa Fever, the second of the Arenaviruses in Africa, was first discovered in 1969 in Lassa, 
Nigeria. As is common practice, the virus was named after the town in which the first cases 
presented.  Both  patients  were  missionary nurses  working  in  northern Nigeria.  Many West 
African  countries including  Sierra  Leone,  Guinea  and  Liberia  continue  to report  outbreaks 
(Fisher-Hoch, Tomori, Nasidi et al.1995) and the presence of the disease. The host is a rodent 
known as the Mastomys mouse (Fisher-Hoch et al.1995; Handy, 2004). The two most widely 
reported outbreaks occurred in Nigeria in 1989 (Fisher-Hoch et al.1995) and 2012 (World Health 
Organization Global Alert 2012).   Fisher-Hoch et al. (1995) carried out a retrospective 
investigation analyzing the records of patients who had died from December 1988 in two 
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hospitals where the outbreak had occurred. The researchers were able to trace surviving staff 
and patients. Bloods were tested for Lassa Fever. In this outbreak that lasted from January to 
March 1989, thirty four patients were presumed to have Lassa Fever. Twenty two died including 
three doctors from the two hospitals. A notable observation from the records associated the 
presence of the disease with the administration of an injection. The researchers commented on 
the absence of the illness in the community. Sharing of needles was common practice in many 
African countries.  Breman et al. (1978) describe how “Five syringes and needles were issued to 
the nursing staff each morning for use at the outpatient department, the prenatal clinic and the 
inpatient wards. These syringes and needles were sometimes rinsed between patients in a pan 
of warm water. At the end of the day they were sometimes boiled”. Members of teams returning 
from fighting the present Ebola outbreak confirm the poor infection prevention practices and the 
lack of adequate equipment. 
In 2012 the Ministry of Health in Nigeria notified WHO of an outbreak of a disease, later 
confirmed as Lassa Fever in 108 patients. A total of 623 cases of suspected Lassa Fever 
(World  Health  Organization  Global  Alert  2012)  were  documented  across  Nigeria.  Seventy 
deaths were confirmed. 
There is no published information about Lassa Fever outbreaks in South Africa, however in 
 
2007, the news and print media ran an article detailing the case of a Nigerian medical doctor 
who was admitted to a private hospital in Pretoria and tested positive for Lassa Fever. News24 
(11 November 2010) announced the “breaking news” of a South African Engineer who became 
infected and died whilst in Sierra Leone in November 2010. 
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2.4 TREATMENT AND NURSING CARE OF PATIENTS WITH VHF 
 
 
 
 
Much of the available literature specific to viral haemorrhagic fevers deals with identification of the 
genomic details of the viruses and the microbiological details (Briese et al. 2009; Bird et al. 
2012). Generally the publications describe the historical facts and the epidemiology. Paweska et 
al. (2009) describe the clinical and epidemiological aspects of this Lujo virus outbreak and include 
some aspects of infection control precautions. Richards, Sewlall and Duse (2009) have published 
their concerns on the lack of availability of drugs for the treatment of VHF and the ensuing 
exploitation in terms of costs, by the pharmaceutical company when approached for a supply. 
There is some literature available on the attempts to identify the host of Lujo, the novel virus 
eventually identified in this case study, although to date, the host remains unknown (Bird et al. 
2012; Sewlall et al. 2014) 
 
 
 
There  are  a  limited  number  of  publications  that  describe  how to  manage  VHF  outbreaks 
although more are expected in the near future from the West African Ebola experience. At 
present there are very few publications (Borio et al. 2002; Bühler, Roddy, Nolte et al. 2014; Ftika 
and Maltezou, 2012; Lyon et al. 2014; Risi, Bloom, Hoe et al. 2010; Sewlall et al. 2014) containing  
information  or  advice  on  clinical,  hospital  or  nursing  management.  The six publications 
mentioned each describe different aspects of VHF management. 
 
 
 
Borio et al. (2002) deal with the treatment and isolation in the event of use of VHF as a 
biological weapon. Risi et al. (2010), concerned about the construction of Biosafety level three 
and four laboratories in Montana, USA, describe how a training programme at the local hospital 
decreases the level of fear of VHF and increases the willingness of the healthcare workers to 
accept the responsibility of caring for patients with VHF. Ftika and Maltezou (2012) are in 
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agreement that healthcare workers responsible for management of patients with VHF should be 
 
“specifically trained”. 
 
 
 
 
Bühler et al. (2014) report an important aspect of Filovirus outbreaks. They are concerned about 
the unavailability of evidence due to the lack of documentation of clinical manifestations and 
evaluation of treatment. This limits the information available for further understanding and 
research of Filoviruses The experiences and preferences of healthcare workers are examined in 
this research and recommendations are suggested. 
 
 
 
Lyon et al. (2014) and Sewlall et al. (2014) describe the clinical management of patients with 
VHF.  Lyon et al. (2014) describes the symptoms and subsequent management of two patients, 
one a physician and the second, a missionary, who contracted Ebola during the period when 
they were assisting in the West African outbreak. Details of early presentation and initial 
treatment and care until transfer back to the USA are documented. Both the patients received 
the ZMapp™ antibody cocktail. An improvement was noted in both patients after receiving 
ZMapp™.   Sewlall et al. (2014) describe the clinical management of the Lujo outbreak from 
which the participant in this study is the sole survivor. The Simplified Acute Physiology Score II 
 
[predicted mortality score] was carried out on the five patients included in this study 24 hours 
after admission. The clinical management includes signs and symptoms and laboratory findings, 
infection control and supportive therapy. . 
 
 
 
2.5 INCUBATION AND COMMON SIGNS OF VHF 
 
 
 
 
The incubation periods differ slightly for each individual VHF but they range from two to twenty 
one days (Isaäcson, 2001). Ergönül (2006) suspects that this wide range is related to the route 
of infection and the viral dose. 
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The signs and symptoms are similar in each of the four families of VHF. They are common non- 
specific flu–like symptoms and thus a number of differential diagnoses particularly Malaria 
should be excluded. 
 
 
 
With the exception of Lassa Fever in which the onset is gradual and RVF that is sometimes 
asymptomatic, the onset of fever is abrupt. Ebola and Marburg Fever appear to have a higher– 
grade fever with temperatures of 40°C frequently monitored (Ftika and Maltezou 2013) Four of 
the five patients diagnosed with Lujo Fever had temperatures over 38°C. It was believed that 
the fifth patient was unable to mount an increase in temperature as she was severely immuno- 
compromised (Sewlall et al. 2014). 
 
 
 
The  clinical  picture  frequently  commences  with  headaches,  malaise,  fatigue,  sore  throat, 
nausea, vomiting and diarrhoea (Bah, Lamah, Fletcher et al. 2015; Ergönül, 2006; Isaäcson, 
2001; Richards et al. 2000). These non-specific manifestations mask the early diagnosis of 
Ebola since it is difficult to differentiate between VHF and one of the many other infectious 
diseases or malaria. The haemorrhagic manifestations are often far less dramatic than the 
name implies. They range from a petechiael rash progressing to maculopapular rash, 
conjunctival bleeds, bleeding from long line and injection sites (Bah, et al. 2015; Ergönül, 2006; 
Ftika and Maltezou, 2013; Isaäcson, 2001; Richards et al. 2000; Sewlall et al. 2014). Both 
Isaäcson, 2001 and Sewlall et al. 2014 describe the devastating multi-organ failure that 
frequently follows in the second week of illness. This organ failure may progress to death. 
 
 
 
With the exception of Lyon et al. (2015) the literature from the West African outbreak continues 
to detail the geographical areas and the incidence (Reaves, Mabande, Thoroughman et al. 
2014) of Ebola as well as the clinical symptoms (Bah et al. 2015). The gap in the literature not 
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only applies to the bedside nursing, it includes lack of consideration of the effects on the staff 
and the emotional care and concerns of the patient (Sewlall et al. 2014). 
 
 
 
In an attempt to partially close this gap the researcher has turned to other literature containing 
information on diseases that constitute contagious, potentially deadly outbreaks.  Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Avian Flu (H5N1) are among diseases that call for outbreak 
management similar tin the ICU settings VHF outbreaks. Literature describing these endemics 
has been sourced and referred to. Literature from experiences with the West African Ebola 
outbreak is beginning to be published and will hopefully decrease the scarcity of information 
guiding practice in this field. 
 
 
 
2.6 OUTBREAK MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 INFECTION PREVENTION AND ISOLATION 
 
 
 
Contagious diseases and the resultant increase in both mortality and morbidity are a constant 
challenge to the health care system of any country particularly if the patient is admitted in the 
ICU setting. (Daugherty, Perl, Needham et al. 2009).  VHF’s lie at the upper end of the scale of 
deadly infections and therefore require immediate attention and proper management if 
nosocomial transmission is to be avoided. Standard precautions should be applied for any 
admission. Ippolito, Fusco, Di Caro et al. (2009) look at the recent experiences of highly 
infectious diseases occurring in Europe since 2000. Aside from 32 cases of SARS, they mention 
that 15 cases or suspected cases of VHF have been reported. The VHF cases were mainly 
Lassa Fever, however a number of cases of CCHF have been reported from Bulgaria and 
Greece.  Sewlall et al. (2014) state that although the transmission of Lujo is probably similar to 
that of Lassa Fever, lack of “barrier nursing practices” may contribute to spread of the disease. 
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The authors believe that until the importance of infection prevention has been studied in greater 
depth, precautions used for other VHF diseases should be implemented. Ftika and Maltezou, 
(2013)  state that standard precautions are sufficient in the early stages of the disease. Sewlall 
et al. (2014) endorsed this practice. It is important to note that VHF’s are not considered to be 
airborne. Rather they are spread by direct contact with blood and body fluids (Fyumagwa et al. 
2011; Jarrett, 2015; Paweska et al. 2009; Sewlall et al. 2014). Table 2.2 outlines the Standard 
and contact precautions. 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 Categories of Infection Control 
 
Standard Precautions 
 
Hand Hygiene: washing (40-60 seconds) with soap before and after contact with patients, 
whether or not gloves are worn. 
Gloves, gowns mask and eye protection if exposure to body fluids and blood is expected. 
Change gloves after contact with infectious material. A mask (N95 if airborne infection is 
present) that must be correctly sized and well fitted. A visor or goggles to protect the eyes. 
Gowns to protect skin and clothing. They should be impermeable to water. 
Aprons may be worn over the gowns for added protection. If VHF is a consideration, use long 
aprons. 
Disposable overshoes or theatre boots should be worn to protect shoes. 
 
Needles and sharp instruments should be disposed of in special containers which can be sealed 
when full. 
Soiled linen should be placed in impermeable bags and labeled if infection control coding is not 
used. The bag should be kept in the patient’s room until collection to prevent transfer of 
pathogens. 
Treat blood, urine, faeces and laboratory waste according to the policies. In some instances 
(e.g. VHF) decontamination with sodium hyperchloride (Bleach) is required before disposal. 
Contact Precautions 
Isolation of patients in a single room or together with patients who have the same confirmed 
 
infection. 
 
Gloves and gown should be worn if direct contact with the patient is expected. A distance of 2 
39  
meters is considered direct contact. 
 
Remove all protective clothing before exiting the isolation room. 
 
Droplet Precautions 
 
Each patient should be isolated in a single room. 
 
Facemask that fits correctly. N95 masks are not necessary for droplet infections although 
recommended by some institutions. 
Eye protection is advised if there is the possibility of contact with blood or secretions. 
 
Airborne Precautions 
 
Patient should be placed in single rooms that are equipped with negative air pressure units. A 
mask that has a particle filtering function such as N95 must be worn. The mask must fit 
correctly and staff should have been fitted for the mask size before entering the isolation room. 
Goggles or a visor are recommended particularly if the patient has a lot of secretions, is 
coughing or is intubated. 
 
 
 
Early diagnosis becomes imperative and isolation of the patients should be commenced. Van 
der Wal, Joubert, van Eeden et al. (1985) briefly describe the creation of an area of isolation 
and triaging of contacts suspected of having CCHF.  Ftika and Maltezou (2013) consider the 
impact of VHF in the healthcare settings. They point out the ease with which VHF can be 
imported and the potential for person-to-person transmission. They go on to say “Unrecognised 
VHF cases constitute the main source for spread of infection to other patients and HCWs, 
almost always in the context of gaps in infection control”.   Handy, (2004) describes the 
implications of VHF in the intensive care setting and advises that notification of Infection Control 
Consultants, isolation and “strict infection control precautions” are required. Ippolito et al. (2009) 
point out that the patients in their study were initially admitted to a general ward where there 
were not sufficient isolation facilities. As they needed to be transferred to strict or “high-level” 
isolation facilities later, this caused a period of risk to HCWs and was considered to be a 
weakness in the management. 
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VHF outbreaks need to be managed in the community setting as well as hospital settings, in 
poverty stricken countries such as West Africa as well as highly technical state of the art 
Academic and Private Hospitals in cities with sophisticated medical approaches. Isolation in the 
community setting during large outbreaks consists of the conversion of entire wards or sections 
of the local hospital being converted to accommodate the outbreak patients either for treatment 
or for quarantine (Kerstiëns and Matthys.1999). Whilst this may be the best approach in rural 
community settings, patients who present to an acute care hospital or who are transported to 
tertiary hospitals present other concerns (Jarrett, 2015).  This may include admission to an 
intensive care unit. Jarrett (2015) suggests applying hospital policies and procedures. These, 
she argues should be used in conjunction with the CDC recommendations. Unfortunately many 
of the hospitals in the endemic areas do not have policies pertaining to VHF infections or other 
highly infectious diseases. Jarrett (2015) goes on to mention that in the present Ebola outbreak, 
“Western African hospitals lack sufficient equipment and protective gear to manage the 
outbreak”. The CDC recommendations generally apply to situations in the United States of 
America or other First World settings. 
 
 
 
The real problem remains the risk of admitting a patient with VHF under a different diagnosis as 
occurred with the first two cases in the Lujo Outbreak  (Paweska et al. 2009; Sewlall et al. 2014) 
as well as the Johannesburg case of Ebola described by Richards et al.(2000).   Gürbüz, 
Sencan, Öztürk et al. (2009) endorse the concern that the risk of transmission to HCWs working 
with patients who have CCHF is high. Gürbüz et al. (2009) however claim that transmission 
from patient to patient has not been documented. They describe such a case of transmission of 
CCHF from one patient to another in an outbreak in Turkey in 2006. In contrast, in the African 
context, person to person transmission drives the outbreaks. Kerstiëns et al. (1999) explains 
how stigmatization of Ebola infected patients in Kikwit resulted in patients being nursed at home 
by family members. Even when the ill were admitted to hospital, Hall et al. (2008) in their 
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publication on lessons learned from the Kikwit outbreak, describe how the routine needs of 
patients such as feeding, remain the responsibility of the family thus exposing them to infection. 
The authors continue to explain that some family members “often slept in the bed with the 
infected patient”. Clearly a single policy on containment of an outbreak would not suit all 
circumstances and should be drawn up in such a manner that the principles of management 
could be implemented in a variety of settings. 
 
 
 
 CONTACT TRACING AND MONITORING 
 
 
 
 
The incubation period of VHF differs from virus to virus. Handy, (2004) lists the individual 
incubation period for Lassa Fever, Ebola, Marburg and CCHF. Ebola has the earliest 
presentation with 2-21 days. The others are CCHF 5-13 days, Marburg 5-10 days and Lassa 
Fever 7-21 days. CDC Ebola Guidance for Airlines state that monitoring of health should take 
place for 21 days following exposure. Surveillance of all persons in contact with a confirmed 
case of VHF should be traced and monitored for a period of 21 days. Kerstiëns et al. (1999) 
write about an “active surveillance system” although no details of the system are discussed. The 
purpose of the surveillance was to identify “households” who were known to be at risk or who 
would not bring family members suspected of having Ebola to hospital. These households were 
then given a “household kit” that contained masks, chloramine tablets to disinfect the water and 
rubber gloves amongst other items.  Mailles, Blanckaert, Chaud et al. (2013) describe how the 
contact tracing was carried out during an outbreak of Middle East respiratory Syndrome 
Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in France. All persons who had been in contact with the identified 
patients, both as HCW or lived in the same household or room were included on the contact list. 
This was similar to the contact tracing used in the Lujo outbreak. Since MERS-CoV has a 
incubation period of 10 days, contacts were followed up for this period of time. 
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2.7 WHAT ARE WE MISSING? 
 
 
 
 
Few authors however have reported any studies of the personal experience of the patients 
affected. Hall et al, (2008) identified that 80% of the survivors of the 1995 Kikwit Ebola outbreak 
shared their anxiety and concerns about contracting the Ebola virus with their family before 
confirmation of the diagnosis. Hall et al, (2008) maintain that health care professionals should 
be sensitive to the frame of minds of patients during viral outbreaks, as well as considering their 
own responses to the stress. 
 
 
 
There are a few publications referring to both the influenza A (H1N1) outbreak in New Zealand 
(Honey and Wang, 2012) and the SARS outbreaks in Canada (Maunder, Hunter, Vincent et al. 
2003) and Hong Kong (Chung et al. 2005) in which perceptions of staff and psychological impacts 
were studied. Fear, uncertainty and inadequacy are some of the feelings described by nurses in 
the SARS outbreak in Hong Kong (Chung et al. 2005).  There remains however very little 
information on the actual experiences of either the patients or the health care professionals 
during an outbreak of VHF. 
 
 
 
2.8 SUMMARY 
 
 
 
This chapter has presented a summary of literature on this topic. Previous research was 
examined and the results and recommendations have been highlighted. There is a gap in the 
literature with respect to the experience of the patients who find themselves removed from their 
normal environment and isolated for the duration of an illness that is surely one of the most 
frightening groups of diseases on record. There is also a dearth of information regarding the 
nursing  care  of  patients  with  life  threatening  viral  haemorrhagic  diseases.  This  study  will 
examine the experience of a nurse who cared for a patient with VHF before succumbing to the 
same disease herself.   In addition, the research will attempt to add value to the existing 
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knowledge by exploring aspects previously neglected, in order to make care of patients and 
health care workers more inclusive and thus less traumatic. 
 
 
The next chapter explains the research design, the population and sample, the research setting 
and the data collection technique selected for this research. A case study design with a 
qualitative multi-method exploratory and descriptive approach is used. Colaizzi’s seven-step 
method is employed for analysis of the data. The chapter will also address trustworthiness and 
ethical considerations. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 
 
 
3.1      INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, the literature was discussed. The purpose of this chapter is to 
explain the research design, the population and sample, the research setting and the data 
collection technique selected for this research. A case study design with a qualitative 
multi-method of exploratory and descriptive approach is used.  Colaizzi’s seven-step 
method   is   employed   for   analysis   of   the   data.   This   chapter   will   also   address 
trustworthiness and ethical considerations. 
 
 
 
3.2      AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of the study is to explore and describe/report the experiences of a nurse in a 
private sector hospital after contracting a highly pathogenic novel haemorrhagic fever from 
a patient and to explore the environment and context in which she was cared for. 
 
 
 
To allow for consistency, the objectives of the study are repeated. 
The objectives of the study are: 
 To explore the experience of a nurse during the monitoring, admission, disease 
and recovery phases, of a novel arenavirus outbreak. 
 To triangulate the information with 
 
- Documented nursing care of this patient using nursing records and daily 
documents. 
- To  analyse  the “outbreak  diary”,  compiled by the hospital coordinating 
 
team. 
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 To consider the relevance of the experience during an episode of critical illness 
and its importance in compiling a programme for the support of health care 
personnel in similar situations. 
 To make recommendations for the care of a patient who has contracted or is 
suspected of contracting a VHF. 
 
 
 
The professional practice of nursing is becoming ever more dependent on evidenced- 
based practice in order to provide current meaningful care. Patient conditions are more 
complex and there are emerging diseases with pathophysiologies yet to be explained. 
Because evidenced-based practice implies that it is the best clinical evidence, there needs 
to  be  evidence  embedded  in  and  tested  by  research.  A  first  hand  account  of  the 
experience of a nurse in a private sector hospital who contracted a highly pathogenic 
novel viral haemorrhagic fever from a patient and survived the ordeal, supplies evidence 
that supports clinical practice carried out in this event. So too does an account of the care 
proffered. This evidence can be used in future outbreaks. 
 
 
 
3.3      RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
 
 
An overview of the research design and methods used in the study will be discussed. 
 
 
 
 
3.3.1 Research design 
 
“Research is a systematic enquiry that uses disciplined methods to answer questions or 
solve problems”. (Polit and Beck, 2012) This study is guided from a naturalistic or 
constructivist paradigm. The constructivist paradigm “holds that there are multiple 
interpretations of reality” (Polit and Beck, 2012). The interpretation of this reality is 
embedded within context and the close engagement between the researcher and the 
participant will enhance the findings. The meanings are numerous and varied. Creswell 
(2009)  advises  against  reducing  the  meanings  excessively  since  in  doing  so  the 
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complexity of views may be lost. The participants’ views of the phenomena are of 
paramount importance to constructivist researchers. In order to obtain depth in the 
responses, questions should be open ended and broad. This allows the researcher to 
interpret the meanings within the context. Constructivist researchers acknowledge that the 
interpretation is fashioned by their own experiences and background. 
Each  individual  study  will  determine  the  best-suited  methodology  according  to  the 
research  question.  A  case  study  is  considered  the  best  approach  to  the  research 
question: What was the experience of a nurse who contracted a deadly viral haemorrhagic 
fever from the time of contact until recovery? Case study research produces awareness 
and understanding of the phenomenon since it provides a thick rich account of the event 
within it’s own context (Rule and John, 2011) 
In case study design either quantitative or qualitative research may be applied. 
 
 
 
 
In this instance qualitative research was selected since it encourages exploration and an 
open mind approach.  In qualitative research the research design must correspond with or 
fit the research question (Henning, van Rensburg and Smit, 2004). It denotes the plan that 
is to be used to obtain the answers to the research question.  Qualitative researchers 
generally start with a broad plan and sharpen the plan as the circumstances unfold. Data 
are collected in the real-world naturalistic setting (Polit and Beck, 2012). Since the 
experience of the participant is of principal importance, multiple qualitative approaches 
including a  phenomenological interview approach are used to underpin and guide the 
study of the participant’s experience. 
 
 
 
Phenomenology pays attention to the meaning of life experiences of people (Polit and 
Beck, 2012). Leedy (in de Vos, Strydom, Fouche et al 2005) believes that a 
phenomenological study offers a description of the phenomena through the “eyes of 
people who have seen it at first hand”.   A nurse who admitted a patient with a lethal 
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unknown disease before contracting and surviving the disease herself must surely have 
experiences that could be of assistance to managers of outbreaks. 
 
 
 
A methodologic assumption, or how evidence is best obtained (Polit and Beck, 2012) is 
defined from a naturalistic paradigm as an inductive process that seeks in-depth 
understanding. “The emerging insight is grounded in the participants’ experience”. (Polit 
and Beck, 2012). The participants construct the reality since it is their experience alone. 
Knowledge is greatest when the distance between the researcher and the participants is 
reduced to a minimum. Interaction between the researcher and the participants create the 
product or findings. 
 
 
 
Data for the study is from multiple sources including documents, interviews and a diary. 
The documents include nursing records, company policies and medical notes. The diary is 
a management record of actions and concerns that emerged during the outbreak and was 
complied by all who served on the coordinating team.    Merging of the data collection 
strategies or triangulation was included to obtain depth and richness. Triangulation of data 
also enhances validity and trustworthiness. 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Case Study 
 
Case study research is a well-described form of research particularly in social sciences. 
Case studies allow the researcher to obtain depth and breadth of information regarding 
the case under scrutiny. In the words of Rule and John (2011 p 4) “it belongs to a larger 
category of occurrences: it is a case of something”. In addition to ‘case’ Rule and John 
(2011) also examine the meanings of the word ‘study’. The noun ‘study’ refers to learning 
or reporting. To ‘study’ a person, event or a system requires deep investigation from many 
angles using a systematic approach.  Rule and John (2011) believe a study is ‘a particular 
instance in its context’. 
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The unit of analysis or the case itself must be considered (Baxter and Jack, 2008).   What 
exactly is under study? The case may consist of a single person or event, or even a single 
system. It may also be persons, events or systems that share a commonality or difference 
that is of interest to the researcher and is worthy of investigation. Provided that the case is 
a specific entity and not a generalization, it may be considered a case study. This does 
not mean, however that it is necessarily a stand-alone event. In this case study the 
phenomenon is the experience of the nurse who survived a deadly disease. Whilst 
determining what the case is, it is equally important to consider what the case is not 
(Baxter and Jack, 2008). In an attempt to ensure that the case is well defined Stake 
(1995) suggests placing boundaries on the case. Baxter and Jack (2008) suggest that 
cases may be bound according to time and place, Creswell, (2009) time and activity and 
by definition and context (Miles and Huberman 1994). Boundaries may “be derived from 
the implicit boundaries of time, geography, place, and event, and are thus almost pre- 
existing, real and empirically bound” (Ragin, in Luck, Jackson and Usher, 2006).   This 
case study is bound in time and place. The incident took place at a point in time and 
timeframes such as admission, duration of illness and recovery indicate the periods under 
investigation. The ‘place’ is an intensive care unit in a private hospital in the Northern 
suburbs of Johannesburg. 
 
 
 
Two important theorists who guide case study methodology are Robert Stake (1995) and 
Robert Yin (2009). Their methods are quite different however. Both seek to make certain 
that the research topic is appropriately examined in depth and “that the essence of the 
phenomenon is revealed” (Baxter and Jack, 2008). Stake (1995) offers three categories of 
case studies, intrinsic, instrumental and collective. On the other hand “Yin categorizes 
case studies as explanatory, exploratory or descriptive”. (Baxter and Jack, 2008). 
 
 
 
In addition to considering what the case is and the type of case study to embark upon, a 
single or multiple case study design must be identified. Some phenomena only present in 
49 
 
a single case whereas in other instances phenomena are better understood when 
considering the phenomena across multiple cases. A single case study strategy was 
enforced in this instance since only one patient survived this viral outbreak. Yin (2003) in 
Polit and Beck, (2008) confirms that a single case study is appropriate when “it represents 
an extreme or unique case”. 
 
 
 
Yin (2009) stated that case study research has five components, one of which is the 
propositions. Propositions are used in case study research to maintain the limits of the 
study (Baxter and Jack, 2008). They give direction during the research and assist with 
guiding the researcher’s search for data. They may come from literature, theories or 
personal experience (Baxter and Jack, 2008). 
Examples of propositions used in this study are: 
 
 Viral Haemorrhagic Fevers are contagious; 
 
 Health Care Professionals are at risk of contamination; 
 
 Infection prevention is the role of the nurse and 
 
 A deeper understanding of the critically ill isolated patient’s experience. 
Propositions may be likened to hypotheses in quantitative research. They differ in that 
they do not form  part of  the case study write-up but are merely used to guide the 
researcher. Both Yin and Stake suggest that propositions, or issues as Stake refers to 
them, “are necessary elements in case study research” (Baxter and Jack, 2008). 
 
 
 
While a case study allows for intimate assessment and judgment using a wide variety of 
data, it limits or prevents the researcher from generalizing the results. However Polit and 
Beck  (2008)  agree  “intensive  probing  that  characterizes  case  studies  often  leads  to 
insights concerning previously unsuspected relationships”. 
Case studies allow the researcher to interrogate an event, program, activity or process 
involving one or more persons (Creswell, 2009). A case study approach contributes 
uniquely  in  attempting  to  understand  the  phenomena  by  means  of  viewing  the 
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phenomenon from various standpoints using a variety or multiple data sources. In this 
study data sources included interviews, medical and nursing records and a diary 
Polit and Beck (2010) consider that it is appropriate to place the participants at the central 
point of the research and a case study creates this opportunity. 
 
 
 
3.3.3 Qualitative Phenomenology Research 
 
Qualitative research  is  a  systematic  enquiry.  According to  Jolley  (2010)  qualitative 
research is “logically determined (well planned) and focused”. It tries to explore and find 
meaning in something and usually addresses areas of human behaviour and existence. 
Human behaviour cannot be understood in isolation. Reference to the meanings and 
purposes of the behaviour require knowledge and consideration of the circumstances and 
the time during which the behaviour occurred. 
 
 
 
Qualitative research is associated with naturalistic enquiry in an attempt to explore the 
ability of humans to build and direct their own experiences within the reality of the situation 
as they are living it. Qualitative methods facilitate the study of issues in depth and detail 
(Patton,  2002)  and  in  this  case  allows  for  probing  in  order  to  obtain  the  depth  of 
knowledge that leads to richness in understanding the experience. 
 
 
 
The principles of phenomenological enquiry including descriptive exploration are used. 
The origins of phenomenology are closely linked to Greek philosophy. Edmund Husserl 
considered the founder of the phenomenological movement (Dowling, 2007) developed 
descriptive phenomenology and applied it in an attempt to understand the meaning of a 
person’s everyday experience. Heidegger, a student of Husserl and also a leader in 
phenomenology differs from Husserl in that Heidegger advocates the use of interpretation 
in exploring the lived experience. The purpose of using phenomenology principles in the 
interviews is to obtain a deep understanding of the situation to which this nurse was 
exposed. This can then be translated into a dense description. This is not however a 
phenomenological study as the multiplicity of data falls outside the realm of 
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phenomenology.  I n  add i t i on ,  a  neutral stance is taken by the researcher in an 
attempt, as far as possible, to put all perceptions, opinions and prior knowledge of the 
participant and the circumstances during her infection, diagnosis, treatment and recovery 
aside. This requires the researcher to withdraw or disengage from the usual and common 
understanding of the phenomenon. In research this is achieved by bracketing 
 
3.3.4   Context 
 
According to Rule and John, (2011) the research context refers to the specific 
circumstances within which the event took place. It has relevance to the event since the 
event is either enclosed within the context or influences the context. It contributes to the 
uniqueness of the event. In case study research a “case cannot be understood without 
reference to its context’ (Rule and John, 2011). 
 
This event took place in an internationally accredited hospital in the private sector in 
Johannesburg.  Johannesburg is the largest city in South Africa. It is the economic and 
business capital of the country and hosts many international visitors on a daily basis. It is 
also considered to be one of the cities with the most sophisticated health service on the 
continent. Large sophisticated hospitals managed by the Department of Health, as well as 
many smaller but state of the art hospitals owned and managed by various private sector 
groups, provide for the health care needs of over 3.6 million (South African Demographics 
Profile, 2013) people who live and work in the greater city. Knowledge of the medical 
successes and expertise practised in this city has reinforced its popularity as a referral 
base for patients requiring sophisticated and advanced medical treatment. Patients from 
Africa who require expert medical treatment and nursing care are referred to expert 
Physicians and Surgeons in Johannesburg on a regular basis. 
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3.3.5   Exploratory 
 
Exploratory research commences with examining the phenomena of interest (Polit and 
 
Beck, 2012). The examination includes a full investigation into t he  phenomenon. 
Observing and describing the phenomenon is not sufficient. Exploratory research will 
provide insight into the various aspects of the phenomenon (Polit and Beck, 2012). 
 
 
 
3.3.6   Descriptive 
 
Description is important in research (Polit and Beck, 2012).  Descriptive research requires 
detailed  and  in-depth  depiction  of  the  participant’s  feelings,  experience  and  the 
phenomena that emerge. A descriptive design was most fitting since this case study 
attempts to examine the experience of a nurse who finds herself in the role of a patient, 
infected with an unknown disease from which others have died. 
 
 
 
3.4      RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 
 
 
Research methods are techniques used by researchers to structure, gather and analyse 
information relevant to the research questions. The research methods used in this study 
include selection of the target population, sampling techniques, data collection and data 
analysis. 
 
 
 
3.4.1   Population and Sample 
 
The population is considered as the entire group of persons or cases in which the 
researcher is interested (Polit and Beck, 2012). This would include any persons who 
contracted the Lujo virus and survived the event. 
 
 
 
The population in this study consisted of all health personnel who contracted the Lujo 
virus. This included the index patient, a paramedic, two qualified intensive care nurses 
and a cleaner, totalling five (N=5). 
Sampling is the selection of a portion that will represent the entire population. Small non- 
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randomized sampling is frequently used in qualitative research (Polit and Beck, 2012). 
Since qualitative researchers strive to interpret and put meaning to results, generalization 
is not the prime aim.   What is important is the appropriateness and adequacy of the 
sample. An appropriate sample will ensure that a level of richness is obtained. Adequacy 
of sampling ensures that sufficient data are obtained from the sample so as to provide a 
detailed and accurate representation of the phenomenon being studied. 
 
 
 
Purposive sampling was the most appropriate and only method that could be applied in 
this study. The sample for this study was reduced to a single nurse, since the other 
personnel succumbed to the virus and died. This is therefore an extreme case of sampling 
but as Patton (2002) explains when defending deviant case sampling, “extreme case 
sampling is that lessons may be learned about unusual conditions” 
 
 
 
3.4.2   Data Collection 
 
Data collection supplies the substance with which the researcher will work in order to have 
an understanding of what the participant is experiencing. An informal approach was 
considered appropriate to allow the participant freedom to give in-depth and rich 
descriptions. 
 
 
 
The data collection plan for this case study included 
 
- Informal conversational interviews 
 
- Analysis of case notes recorded daily 
 
- Review of the diary kept by the coordinators of the event 
 
 
 
 
 
Approval of the University Human Research Ethics Committee was granted (Appendix A) 
for  the  study.  In  addition,  permission  was  obtained  from  the  Hospital  manager,  the 
Nursing Executive of the private hospital (Appendix B and C) and the members of the 
coordinating team to carry out the study. 
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The  participant  was  given  a  verbal  and  written  explanation  about  the  study.  The 
participant gave a letter of consent for the interviews as well as permission to record and 
use the data from the interviews. (Appendix D and E). The interviews were carried out at a 
setting convenient to the participant. This was usually in an empty office in the HR 
department of the hospital in which the participant worked. The meetings were set up on 
days when she was off duty to prevent any interference and distraction from the work 
environment.  Each  interview  was  recorded  and  transcribed  by  me  personally.  This 
afforded me the opportunity to become fully immersed and comfortable with the content 
as well as giving me an opportunity to interpret the ‘voice nuances’ with which the 
comments were made. 
 
 
 
In keeping with Colaizzi’s method, these transcriptions were verified at a later interview 
 
session. This prevented me from imposing any personal views. 
 
 
 
 
Daily case notes documented by the nursing staff caring for the patient were analyzed 
together with the outbreak diary to complete the triangulation. 
 
 
 
 Planning the interview 
 
 
 
 
The data collection plan for this case study included a number of unstructured interviews. 
As the researcher had no preconceived views of the information that would be offered the 
questions were open ended and the interviews were approached as much like a 
conversation as possible. “The informal conversational interview is the most open-ended 
approach to interviewing (Patton 2002). The intention was to understand the experience in 
the participant’s own words. 
Beeby (2000) is of the opinion that people’s accounts are reconstructions of their 
experience  influenced  by  their  perceptions.  The  informal  conversational  interview 
technique is used as suggested by Patton (2000). This type of interview is similar to 
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casual conversation on a topic. It allows for depth of probing and questions flow easily. 
The interviewee is made to feel at ease and ‘owns’ the interview. The interviewer plays a 
more passive role, however, needs to apply attentive listening skills to keep the interview 
on track. 
 
 
 
Each of the interviews were given a timeframe in order to probe a different period of the 
event . They included 
- the period of admission and initial care of her patient, 
 
- the period of contact monitoring until her own admission, 
 
- the hospitalization and recovery period 
 
- her feelings and experience presently. 
 
 
 
 
 Conducting interviews 
 
 
 
 
Four initial in-depth unstructured interviews of one hour each were carried out. Using the 
informal  conversational  technique  of  interviewing  allowed  the  researcher  flexibility  to 
probe the information in order to obtain depth and clarity. In each interview, the participant 
was encouraged to share her experiences by recalling the incidents and timeframes. The 
questions were developed according to the content and context as the interview played 
out with the researcher ensuring that the interview remained focused. The interview 
method provided the researcher the chance to ensure that the participant remained within 
the topic. The intention was to understand the experience in the participant’s own words 
as the researcher had no preconceived views of the experience. 
The interviews were carried out at a setting convenient to the participant. This was usually 
in an empty office in the HR department of the hospital in which the participant worked. 
The meetings were set up on days when the participant was off duty to prevent any 
interference from the work environment. Once the participant was ready the following 
questions were asked: 
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Interview 1. Tell me what it was like nursing Mr X from admission to his death. 
 
Interview 2. Tell me about the period when you were on the contact list and 
being monitored. 
How did you experience the admission into isolation and what were 
your feelings particularly as you did most of your own care for a 
while? 
Interview 3 Tell me what you remember about being the patient including the 
period you were in ICU and ventilated. 
How did you experience the period of recovery? 
 
Interview 4 Looking back years later what do you feel? 
 
What advice do you have for coordinators of future outbreaks? 
 
Interview 5 The  contents  of  the  transcriptions  were  verified  according  to 
 
Colaizzi’s framework. 
 
 
 
 
The participant was allowed to reflect on the content of the previous interview and add 
anything considered important. She was allowed to speak at her own pace and use her 
own expressions. Facial expressions, body language and language nuances and tones 
were used as cues for interpretation and depth of meaning. Probing took place if there 
was any uncertainty and clarity was established. Reflection of key statements was used to 
enhance reliability. The interviews were recorded and field notes were kept. 
 
 
 
 Additional data 
 
 
 
 
In addition, the case notes documented on a daily basis by the nursing staff caring for the 
patient were analyzed. This was deemed necessary for reflection of the event in relation 
to the context to be considered. Of particular interest was the medication prescribed and 
the response to visitations by family members as these may have influenced the overall 
experiences and possibly the need to survive. Lastly the outbreak diary, a document 
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compiled  day  and  night  over  the  full  period  of  the  outbreak,  by  members  of  the 
coordinating team, was used as reflection of the event. 
 
 
 
 Managing the researcher’s role 
 
 
 
 
In qualitative research, the researcher becomes the instrument and is “typically involved in 
a sustained and intensive experience with the participants” (Creswell, 2009) 
In case study approach to research the position of the researcher plays an important role. 
Rule and John (2011) point out that the researcher should be “constantly aware of how 
you are positioned in relation to the study context and participants”. This positioning, they 
suggest, may influence the data collection, particularly if the role of the researcher is one 
of seniority. 
 
 
 
My  role  was  complex.  I  was  regarded  as  a  nurse  with  knowledge  and  previous 
experience. I had been directly involved with the outbreak as one of the coordinating team 
members in a private hospital in the Northern suburbs of Johannesburg. As a nurse 
manager, I had previously been a member of a coordinating team in the same company 
when a staff member had contracted Ebola virus from the admission of a foreign patient. 
Since this latest outbreak had occurred in the same hospital group, I was asked to assist. 
Initially the diagnosis was not known, however all concerned understood that we had an 
outbreak of ‘something’.  Entries in a diary regarding personal concerns will be included 
when appropriate. 
 
As one of the coordinators of the outbreak I was only in close contact with other members 
of the outbreak team during this time. My contact with the participant was a more formal 
relationship during this period. As an expert nurse and ethical practitioner, I deemed it 
important to illicit the patient’s subjective understanding in order to improve nursing 
management of future cases and to deepen my ethical awareness and practice. In basic 
terms, we know about the management of outbreaks but do we place sufficient attention 
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on supporting the staff and patients in these circumstances. 
I discussed my relationship with the participant both as a staff member and a nursing 
colleague with my supervisors and was advised to write a diary in which I could document 
my knowledge of and interaction with the participant for the duration of the outbreak.   
 
 
 
3.4.3   Data Analysis 
 
Data analysis is the process of structuring and organising information collected. It is both 
objective and systematic (Jolley, 2010). The aim of this process is to identify trends and 
patterns that occur in the data. In qualitative research it is important to be open and non-
judgemental  about  the  experience  of  the  participants  thus  allowing  an  unbiased 
interpretation. 
 
 
 
 Method of data analysis 
 
 
 
 
The conversational interviews are transcribed verbatim and verified at a later interview 
session according to Colaizzi’s method. This prevents the researcher from imposing any 
personal views. 
 
 
 
In this study data are analysed using Colaizzi’s method of thematic analysis. As Colaizzi’s 
framework has been used in two recent studies examining the experiences of health 
personnel during an outbreak of SARS in Hong Kong (Chung et al. 2005) and the H1N1 
influenza  pandemic  in  Australia  (Corley et  al.  2009),  the  researcher  uses  the  same 
framework. This allows for comparison of experiences during outbreaks and these themes 
can then be considered when creating practice recommendations for future application. 
Colaizzi uses a seven-step approach as follows: 
 
 
 
Step one: Read and re-read the transcripts several times in order  to obtain a 
general feeling and understanding of the whole content. 
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Step two: Extract the significant statements that identify and link to the phenomena 
under exploration. 
 
 
 
Step three: Formulate meanings from the significant statements. 
 
 
 
 
Step four: Arrange the formulated meanings into categories, clusters of themes 
and themes. 
 
Step five: The  results  should  be  integrated  (to  produce)  into  an  exhaustive 
description of the phenomena. 
 
 
 
Step six: Formulate this exhaustive description into an indisputable or 
unequivocal a statement of identification as possible. 
 
 
 
Step seven:        Finally, validate the findings with the participant. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 below illustrates the key tasks for each of the seven steps of data analysis. 
 
 
 
 
The intention of this approach is to obtain a description of the phenomena by recognizing 
the fundamental themes. Themes are identified from significant statements that are 
grouped together. The themes are used to examine the experiences and study the 
phenomena.  An important aspect of Colaizzi’s method of analysis and where he differs 
from the other phenomenologists is that he requires that the researcher return to the 
participants for confirmation and validation of the meanings. 
 
 
 
 Immersion in the data. 
 
 
 
 
Immersion involves the researcher becoming sufficiently familiar with the data to the 
extent that reflection and analytical insight is achieved (Polit and Beck, 2012). This is 
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particularly important in qualitative research as immersion and familiarity allows for more 
accurate thematic interpretation. Reading and re-reading the interview transcripts allow 
the process of immersion to begin. Data collection and data analysis occurred 
simultaneously. Examining the nursing records and correlating the information with diary 
entries and interviews adds deeper understanding thus increasing the immersion. 
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Figure 3.1 Summary of stages of Colaizzi’s data analysis framework. 
 
Step one Transcription 
of interviews (5) 
Step two Significant 
statements extracted 
(282) 
Step three Formulate 
meanings from the 
significant statements 
(40) 
Step fiveOrganising 
emergent themes into 
exhaustive description 
(4) 
Step four Arranging 
sub- themes and 
developing themes 
Step six Rich 
indisputable description 
of  the phenomenon 
 
Step seven Return of the 
rich description for 
validation by the 
participant. 
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3.4.3.1   The practical approach employed for data analysis in this study. 
 
Before commencing the data analysis, the transcriptions of the interviews were cross- 
checked with the recordings downloaded on my computer. 
 
 
 
Step one: Transcription of the interviews. 
 
During this step, each audio-taped interview is played back on the computer and 
transcription takes place. Following the transcription, the recording is replayed whilst the 
transcribed  data  is  read  simultaneously  for  verification.  Once  the  transcriptions  are 
deemed correct, they are replayed and read simultaneously in order to confirm voice 
nuances. These are noted. My own assumptions and views about the narrative, which 
resulted from my role as a key member of the coordination team, were set aside and 
noted. These views will be removed from the analysis by bracketing, a process used to 
identify and withhold any preconceived opinions about the study phenomena (Polit and 
Beck, 2012). 
 
 
 
Step two: Extraction of significant statements. 
 
This step requires identifying significant statements from the transcripts that link to the 
phenomena under investigation. Two hundred and eighty two significant statements were 
extracted from the five transcripts. 
Below  is  an  example  of  how  significant  statements  related  to  the  admission  of  the 
 
participant’s patient are extracted. The statements are underlined for further analysis. 
 
 
 
 
A patient from Zambia with a diagnosis of Thrombotic Thrombocytopenic Purpura (TTP) 
 
was being flown in for admission. 
 
 
 
 
Participant:  It was my weekend on. I can recall it was a patient from Zambia. He was 
awake and with it. We connected him to the monitor. I remember his temp[erature]  was 
very high. I think that it was like 40C. We were wearing.. at that time, we had gloves on 
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and we had aprons on.  W e  didn ’t  have  gow ns  on  (sounded guilty). He had a  
headache and was nauseous. He had a rash, when we took his T shirt off you could see 
the rash,like this generalised rash. 
 
Participant continued: His wife had come in and she was worried that he was not eating. 
 
She said to me [How do you give that ABC food, you know, apples, bananas and carrots 
 
for diarrhoea’?] (Laughing) He had diarrhoea as well now and vomiting. I remember I 
 
mashed up the banana and he had eaten it. She (his wife) phoned to ask how he was 
doing. I told her that he was much better and lo and behold just after that he went and 
vomited all that banana (laughing). Sunday we put in a central line. His platelets were low. 
 
On Saturday we were wearing gloves, gowns and masks. 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: What was the reason you decided to change? 
 
 
 
Participant: Probably we should have before we started ‘cause he came from out of Africa. 
We should have been wearing gloves, gowns and masks since [from the time] he arrived. 
 
He was perspiring profusely all the time, not on admission but after.  Af t er  w e ’d  given  
him Perfalgon his temp[erature] came down. It was never high again. 
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Below is a table of how the statements are coded. 
 
Table 3.1 Significant statements 
 
Significant statements from transcript 1 Page No. Line No. 
He was awake and with it. T1 L15/16 
His temp[erature] was very high. I think that it was like 
40C. 
T1 L17/18 
We were wearing, at that time, we had gloves on and we 
had aprons on. We didn’t have gowns on 
T1 L19/20 
He had a headache and was nauseous. He had a rash. T1 L21 
He had diarrhoea . T2 L43 
We put up a central line. His platelets were low. T2 L53/54 
We were wearing gloves, gowns and masks. T2 L55 
We  should  have  been  wearing  gloves,  gowns  and 
masks. 
T3 L60 
He was perspiring profusely all the time. T3 L62 
(See appendix F) 
 
 
 
 
Step three: Formulate meanings for the significant statements. 
 
During this step, meanings were formulated from each of the extracted significant 
statements within the context and timeframe under consideration. Forty meanings were 
formulated  from  the  statements.  Table  3.2  provides  examples  of  how  significant 
statements were converted into formulated meanings. 
 
 
 
Step four: Arranging cluster themes and themes. 
 
After identifying the formulated meanings these meanings were arranged into categories 
with each category reflecting a unique character pertaining to the phenomena, thus 
forming cluster themes.  Fifteen theme clusters were generated. Each theme cluster 
includes all formulated meanings related to the phenomenon in question. The table below 
gives examples of how some of the formulated meanings were grouped together and the 
cluster theme that evolved. 
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Table 3.2 Formulation of meanings from the significant statements. 
 
Significant statements Formulated meanings 
[It  may  have  been]  “Something  we  could  have 
 
contracted” 
Concern  and  realization  that  the 
 
staff could be at risk of contracting 
the disease. 
“I got comfort from everybody knowing” Relationship   between   colleagues 
 
was important. Colleagues would 
look out for each other and share 
information. 
“ I went and told everybody. I had to come in …I 
 
was being observed” 
Fear and denial. This admission is 
 
only   for   observation.   Nothing is 
really amiss. 
“We weren’t definitely sure. What were we dealing 
 
with”? 
Fear  and  anxiety  related  to  the 
 
unknown. 
“Sometimes you run and you feel like your leg just 
 
gives in beneath you…there was a lot of that”. 
Recollection   of   the   participant’s 
 
dreams experienced during her time 
of ventilation. This is a common 
phenomenon in intensive care units. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 Cluster themes and themes. 
 
Formulated meanings Cluster themes Emergent 
 
themes 
(1)“Because my temperature had gone up.  ..it wasn’t 
 
high, 37 or 38 but it had gone up.” 
 
(2)“ I had a headache during that week. I wanted 
someone to give me a second opinion….it happened 
to be you”. 
(3) “Something going on…..a big unknown 
 
disease was happening”. 
Reality hits. 
 
Realisation that 
there is chance 
that the 
participant has 
the disease. 
Initial contact 
 
with source 
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Formulated meanings Cluster themes Emergent 
 
themes 
(1)“and the family came in all dressed up. I might 
 
have had all these symptoms but I wasn’t sick”. 
 
(2)“I had water in a polystyrene cup. I felt, was this 
really necessary?” 
Sick  but  not  ill. 
 
The participant 
has some 
symptoms but 
does not feel ill. 
Admission is 
 
inevitable 
(1)“They were all put onto this contact list because of 
 
me.” 
 
(2)“Imagine if something did happen to her 
 
[daughter] and she really got it.” 
Guilt. 
 
Feelings of guilt 
in case she may 
have spread the 
disease. 
Admission is 
 
inevitable 
Key: bracketed numbers are used to indicate different statements from the same 
 
participant. 
 
 
 
 
Step five: Organising emergent themes into an exhaustive description of the 
phenomenon under study. 
This step requires merging of the themes into an exhaustive description of the 
phenomenon, the experience of a nurse who survived a highly pathogenic novel 
arenavirus. Two research experts were consulted, one, a critical care expert researcher 
and the other, a well respected qualitative research nurse, to review the themes and make 
amendments where necessary. 
 
 
 
Step six: Developing a rich undisputable description of the phenomenon. 
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The findings that resulted in four emergent themes are scrutinised for misinterpretation, 
misuse or redundancy.  These findings form the fundamental basis for the description of 
the phenomenon. 
 
 
 
Step seven: Return of the description to the participant for validation. 
 
 
 
 
This step involves returning the findings of the data analysis to the participant and 
discussing the results in order to verify that the results are a true reflection of the 
participant’s experience. 
 
 
 
3.5      MEASURES OF TRUSTWORTHINESS 
 
 
 
 
Measures of trustworthiness are aspects of qualitative research that confirm the validity 
and reliability more commonly used in quantitative studies. Positivists often question the 
trustworthiness  of  qualitative  research  (Shenton,  2004)  possibly due  to  the fact  that 
validity and reliability in naturalistic research differs from the positivists’ concept. 
Sandalowsky (1993) argues that achieving trustworthiness requires good scientific 
practices in which the researcher makes the research methods clear and thus auditable. 
Naturalistic researchers, Lincoln and Guba, (1985) identify four criteria that they suggest 
would confirm trustworthiness in qualitative research.  These are credibility, transferability, 
dependability and confirmability. 
 
 
 
3.5.1 Credibility 
 
Credibility or truth-value is the ultimate goal for those doing qualitative research according 
to Lincoln and Guba (1985).   In qualitative research credibility refers to whether the 
findings of a study are true and certain (Guion, Diehl, and McDonald, 2002). Credibility is 
obtained when the researcher is able to establish “confidence in the truth of the data” 
(Polit and Beck, 2012) and the ensuing interpretations of the data. Creswell (2009) argues 
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that the researcher must verify qualitative validity by making use of certain processes that 
confirm the accuracy of the findings.   In order to ensure credibility certain strategies 
should be enforced.  Some of these include transcription checking, code verification and 
crosschecking, member checking, triangulation and auditing. 
 
 
 
In this study, in order to enhance credibility, method triangulation was applied. 
Triangulation is a method used in qualitative research to enhance trustworthiness by using 
more than one data source to support the research problem. (Patton, 2002; Polit and 
Beck, 2012; Yin,2009) “Triangulation refers to the use of multiple referents to draw 
conclusions about what constitutes truth.” (Polit and Beck,2010). The method used should 
reinforce the accuracy of the reality. Method triangulation uses two or more methods of 
collecting data in respect of the same phenomenon in order to obtain a true and 
comprehensive understanding. Triangulation contributes to the depth and richness of the 
study, not because the sources of data necessarily give the same result, but because the 
differences from the sources create a better understanding of the study. (Patton, 2002) 
 
 
 
In an attempt to obtain in-depth information about the experience of living through and 
surviving  infection  by  a  deadly  haemorrhagic  fever,  recordings  of  conversational 
interviews with the participant together with the clinical nursing data of the period of 
admission of the participant were scrutinized    In addition, the data is augmented with 
excerpts from a diary maintained by members of the coordination team, thus ensuring 
data source triangulation as well. 
 
 
 
In this case study, the main arm of triangulation is the conversational interviews. The 
nurse’s experience is divided into four time frames. The first time frame captures her 
experiences during the period when she was a ‘high risk contact’ being monitored daily 
along with colleagues who were included in the high risk group. The second portion deals 
with the experience of being in isolation, very aware that she probably has contracted this 
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deadly condition, to the point where she becomes critically ill and the diagnosis of a novel 
arenavirus, Lujo, is eventually established. Thirdly, the recovery period and return to 
health more than four weeks after admission, is interrogated. Lastly, her reflection on the 
event is explored. Tape recordings and accurate transcription provide a record. Probing 
and crosschecking are used to confirm her perceptions of the experience. Meanings 
obtained from the conversation with the participant is confirmed at a further meeting and 
amended where necessary. 
 
 
 
The second arm of triangulation includes the nursing documents. All relevant nursing 
documents completed whilst the participant was hospitalized are scrutinized. These 
documents include the nursing care from the time of admission to the self-care section of 
the outbreak ward, through the period of ventilation and intense critical nursing to the 
period of recovery. 
 
 
 
The third arm of triangulation includes the reflection and examination of the contents of a 
diary kept by the hospital coordinators of the outbreak. Entries are made daily and include 
various daily duties, patient admissions and results. Concerns of the coordination team 
are recorded for entire event. 
 
 
 
In order to ensure rigor, the study must reflect the participant’s experiences and not the 
researcher’s. Since the nurse who experienced the condition gave the account, it is 
considered a true reflection of her experience and therefore credible. 
 
 
 
[In this study the researcher used the approach of conversational interviews that allowed 
for clarification and confirmation by the participant throughout the interviews. After the 
fourth interview the meanings and interpretations extracted during data analysis, were 
verified for correct interpretation by the participant. The researcher also kept field notes 
during the interviews and these were consulted during the analysis phase. 
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3.5.2   Transferability 
 
Transferability is the qualitative equivalent of the criterion, applicability. 
 
Applicability refers to the extent to which the “findings can be applied to other contexts 
and settings” (Krefting, 1991; Shenton, 2004).   In other words, can the findings be 
generalized?  Krefting (1991) refers to two perspectives of applicability that are suitable in 
qualitative research. Firstly, she posits that generalization is often irrelevant in qualitative 
studies since many research studies are deemed to be unique attempting to describe the 
phenomena under study, thus generalization is not possible. Krefting (1991) states that 
Guba(1981) offers a second perspective. This is transferability. Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
suggest that the naturalist researcher has a duty to supply sufficient information with 
respect to the data in order to allow other researchers to weigh up the possibility of 
transferability. Shenton (2004) however believes that transferability is seldom possible as 
the context in which a study takes place is seldom replicable. 
Detailed  information  on  data  collection  and  data  analysis  is  included  to  afford 
opportunities for readers and future researchers to apply to similar outbreaks. 
 
 
 
3.5.3   Dependability 
 
Dependability refers to stability (Polit and Beck, 2012) or the notion of trackable variability 
(Guba, 1981). Lincoln and Guba (1985) emphasize the close relationship between 
credibility and dependability. To deal with dependability, processes used in the study 
should be adequately detailed to allow future researchers to replicate the work (Shenton, 
2004). 
 
 
 
 
3.5.4   Confirmability 
 
“Confirmability refers to objectivity” (Polit and Beck, 2012, p539). This strategy aims to 
establish that the data are a true reflection of the participants and that the researcher has 
not introduced any personal bias or influence (Polit and Beck, 2012; Shenton, 2004). In 
quantitative research, objectivity requires maintaining a respectable distance between the 
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researcher and the subjects in order to minimise bias  (Krefting,1991). Patton (2002) 
argues that the researcher’s intrusion is to be expected. This is in agreement with Krefting 
(1991) who describes the narrowing of distance between the investigator and the 
participants in qualitative research as improving the “worth of the findings”. 
 
 
 
Table 3.4 Measures applied for ensuring trustworthiness 
 
 
 
 
Strategies Criteria Application 
Credibility 
 
(truth value) 
Triangulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reflexivity 
Gabby was not feeling well. She had red 
 
gums  and  a  sore  throat  although  her 
temperature was within normal range. 
Interview  two:   Gabby’s   narrative- “I 
wanted my platelets to be checked 
because to me that would be one of the 
signs that there was something wrong”. 
 
 
Nursing documents: Temperature – 36.4 
 
C; Platelets – 91,000 /mcl. 
 
 
 
Diary entry: She is on the contact list. We 
need to admit her. She probably is 
infected. 
 
 
I believe she was showing clinical signs 
and expressed symptoms in keeping with 
those of the previous patients. I agreed 
that her bloods should be drawn and sent 
to the laboratory for analysis. 
Transferability 
 
(Applicability) 
Dense description A  detailed  description  of  the  interview, 
 
transcription and preparation for analysis 
is presented. E.g. Each interview was 
recorded  and  transcribed  by me 
personally. This afforded me the 
opportunity to become fully immersed and 
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  comfortable with the content as well  as 
 
giving me an opportunity to interpret the 
 
‘voice nuances’ with which the comments 
were made. Future researchers can 
prepare their data in a similar manner. 
Dependability 
 
(Consistancy) 
Dense description of 
 
methods 
 
 
 
 
Triangulation 
Qualitative   research   will   address   this 
 
research question: The experience of a 
nurse who survived a highly pathogenic 
novel arenavirus. 
Informal conversational interviews 
triangulated with case notes and a diary is 
appropriate to enable dependability. 
Confirmability 
 
(Neutrality) 
Triangulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reflexivity 
Gabby’s temperature was rising. 
 
 
 
Gabby’s narrative: “That explains why I 
took my temperature so many times that 
day”. 
 
 
Nursing protocol: A rise in temperature 
requires that the contact should monitor 
the temperature four hourly. 
 
 
Diary: Although Gabby’s temperature is 
within normal limits it is climbing with each 
measurement. We must continue to watch 
it. 
 
 
I think we should prepare her for 
admission. I will take her home and bring 
her back to make sure that she does 
return. 
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3.6      ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Throughout research projects it is imperative that nurses maintain ethical principles. This 
concept is underwritten by both the International Council for Nurses in their Code of 
Ethics, as well as the South African Nursing Council in their Ethic Principles. 
 
 
 
3.6.1   Permission to Conduct Research 
 
The proposal for this research was submitted for peer review within the Department of 
Nursing Education before being submitted to the Human Research Ethics Committee of 
the University of Witwatersrand. Ethical clearance from the Human Research Ethics 
Committee of the University of the Witwatersrand was granted (M130432) along with 
permission from the Faculty of Health Sciences Post Graduate Committee to continue 
with  the  study.  Written  consent  was  obtained  from  the  Company  and  the  Hospital 
Manager of the Private hospital where the event occurred, for use of the nursing 
documents. 
 
 
 
3.6.2   Informed Consent 
 
Written informed consent (Appendix G) was obtained prior to the interviews from the 
outbreak coordination team to explore the contents and reflections of the diary. They were 
informed that this information would be used in the research.  The participant was handed 
an information sheet (Appendix H), the contents explained and discussion invited to 
exclude any concerns. Informed consent from the participant was granted for use of the 
interviews as well as permission to tape record the conversations during the interviews. 
Recordings  were  downloaded  to  the  researcher’s  computer.  The  researcher  herself 
carried out the transcriptions. The transcriptions were returned to the participant for 
approval. 
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3.6.3   Anonymity and Confidentiality 
 
Maintaining complete anonymity of the site and the participant will not be possible. Because  
of  the  nature  of  such  an  outbreak,  where  five  patients  developed  an undiagnosed 
illness that resulted in the death of four, there was heightened international media interest 
and reporting at the time of the outbreak.  The participant and hospital will however remain 
anonymous in the research documents and any publications during or following the 
completion of the study. Anonymity and confidentiality will be afforded to the health care team 
who were involved with both the management of the outbreak and the care of the participant. 
The management and storage of all data collected will be held in confidence with both the 
computer and backup devices being password protected. The documents and data will be 
held for a period of five years in compliance with University requirements. Only the 
researcher and supervisors will have access to the documents. 
 
 
 
3.7      SUMMARY 
 
 
 
 
This chapter has presented the research design, the population and sample, the research 
setting. A case study design with a qualitative multi-method approach using exploratory and 
descriptive approaches was selected for this study.   Conversational interviews are used 
for the data collection and Colaizzi’s seven-step method is employed for analysis of the data. 
Trustworthiness of the study is established by the methodology meeting the criteria of 
credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. 
The next chapter presents the findings of the data analysis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
 
 
 
4.1      INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
This chapter presents the findings of the study. The aim of the study was to explore and 
report  the  experience  of  a  nurse  who  contracted  a  highly  pathogenic  novel  viral 
haemorrhagic fever (VHF) and survived as well as to integrate the management and caring 
throughout. This was achieved through exploration, description and interpretation using the 
informal conversational interview technique together with triangulation using the patients 
documents and a dairy which was maintained by members of the coordination team. Patton 
(2002) suggests that this method of interviewing which uses open-ended questions offers 
the most freedom to explore the answers. Using this technique of interviewing allows the 
researcher flexibility to probe the information in order to obtain depth and clarity. The study is 
reported  in  the  form  of  a  complex  and  richly  annotated  narrative.  The  questions  are 
developed  according  to  the  content  and  context  as  the  interview  plays  out  with  the 
researcher ensuring that the interview remains  focused and assisting the participant to 
remain within and fully explore the topic. 
 
 
 
Four  initial  in-depth  unstructured  interviews  of  one  hour  each  were  carried  out.  The 
interviews continued until saturation was achieved in terms of the participant’s experience. 
The fifth and final interview was carried out for verification purposes according to Colaizzi’s 
method of analysis. 
The study population included all health personnel who contracted the virus, later named as 
the Lujo virus. This included the index patient, a paramedic, two qualified intensive care 
nurses and a cleaner, totalling 5 (N=5). 
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During 2008, two patients were air lifted from Zambia ten days apart and brought to a private 
hospital in Johannesburg. The initial patient, a female was diagnosed with African tick bite 
fever, a fairly common Rickettsial infection found in grassland areas of sub Saharan Africa. 
The second patient, a male was responsible for accompanying her to Johannesburg. He was 
admitted with a diagnosis of Thrombotic Thrombocytopenic Purpura (TTP). This is a rare 
condition in which there is anaemia due to red cell fragmentation and thrombocytopaenia. If 
it is not treated early in the disease process, there is a high incidence of mortality (James 
and George, 2006). Both these patients died within days of admission. Within the next few 
weeks, three staff members came down with similar symptoms. Two died after being nursed 
in other hospitals for two to five days but the last person, a nurse, survived. She is the focal 
point of this research. 
 
 
 
This chapter presents the themes that evolved from the data analysis. Themes and sub- 
themes are presented and discussed. Triangulation with nursing case notes and a diary 
maintained  by  the  coordination  team  supports  the  themes  and  informs  results  of 
management and care. The development of the themes is substantiated by verbatim quotes 
from transcripts and field notes.  Discussion to substantiate the research findings is found in 
Chapter five using references to existing literature. Colaizzi’s method of qualitative data 
analysis was followed as described in chapter three, in order to develop a sense of the 
whole. 
 
 
 
Daily case notes  documented by the nursing  staff  caring for the patient  are analyzed 
together with the diary to complete the triangulation 
 
 
 
4.2      ENSURING ANONYMITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
 
 
 
I have chosen to call the participant ‘Gabby’. Gabby is the shortened version of Gabriel. Gabriel 
 
is the archangel and served as the “Messenger of the Lord”. Perhaps Gabby’s role is intended 
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to show us how to bring together all aspects of care of these horrific diseases. Perhaps 
this event is to offer those of us involved with managing outbreaks, a learning opportunity 
and a refresher course in preparation for what was to come. At the time of writing, the worst 
outbreak ever of another VHF, Ebola, is out of control to the north of our borders and the 
entire world is on alert. 
 
 
 
For easy identification, to ensure a measure of anonymity and to facilitate the unfolding of 
these interviews, I have named the key persons with pseudonyms. In doing so I 
selected names close to the meaning or interpretation of their given names. The name 
by which a person is known identifies the energy and character with which this person 
is associated. (Mehrabian, 1992).  I do not wish to make these colleagues strangers and 
so an attempt is made to retain their character in the selection of pseudonyms. 
 
 
 
I have used italic font when quoting verbatim from the interview script. Sections of the 
transcript that have been omitted are indicated in this manner ……… .To enhance the 
ease of reading, where I have applied triangulation and different sources to reconstruct 
the story, I have used different colours to differentiate between the coordinating team’s 
diary and the data obtained from the records. Blue indicates the data obtained from the 
nursing notes and the colour red indicates notes from the diary. As one of the 
members of the coordination team, I participated in decisions and had access to 
important information known only by the coordination team. I have permission to share this 
information. I have included some of the information and decisions where applicable. As I 
was deeply involved with the management of many facets of the outbreak, I developed 
my own personal opinions and concerns. In order to highlight these for the reader and 
prevent them from influencing the study I have bracketed myself. 
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4.2.1 Description of the participant: The “nurse patient” 
 
Gabby, the nurse was 47 years old at the time. She is a Registered Professional Nurse who 
has 29 years experience and holds a Diploma in Intensive Nursing Science. She had spent 
20 years working in both Cardio-thoracic units and General Intensive Care units when this 
event occurred. Aside from her duties as a senior member of the staff and her shift leader 
responsibilities, she has held the portfolio of Infection Control representative as well as 
Health and Safety Officer for the unit during the time that she worked there.  On the day that 
the second patient, the paramedic, was admitted, Gabby was allocated to look after him. 
Because this patient was admitted from outside the borders of South Africa with a fever, the 
patient was isolated according to the protocol of the hospital. This protocol is explained later 
in the chapter. TTP was the suspected diagnosis with Malaria as an alternative. Gabby cared 
for this patient for the next two days and assisted with the insertion of an arterial and a 
dialysis line. Her shifts ended and she was off duty for the next few days. When the second 
patient died, the outbreak coordinators placed Gabby on the list of contacts as a high-risk 
contact. 
 
 
 
Just eleven days from the first contact and nine days after the last contact with her patient, 
Gabby reported a sore throat, red gums and a single episode of diarrhoea.  She had also 
had a dull headache for the previous two days. She was admitted to the isolation area of the 
outbreak ward. 
 
 
 
4.3 DISCUSSION OF THEMES EMERGING FROM INTERVIEWS 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of the study is to explore the experience of a nurse in a private sector hospital 
after contracting a highly pathogenic novel haemorrhagic fever from a patient as well to 
describe the management and care of the person and the environment. Each interview is 
considered within its own timeframe. Before commencing the next interview, Gabby had 
time to reflect on the previous interview and add important omissions. 
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To interpret Gabby’s experience of the entire incident, the interviews are divided into four 
timeframes - her initial contact with the virus source, her illness timeline, her experience of 
extreme fragility and the care she received, then finally her continued involvement with this 
disease. 
 
 
 
To facilitate readability, excerpts from the narratives will be quoted in each theme and sub- 
theme. They are discussed and re-contextualised with references to relevant literature. 
All names and identifying particulars of Gabby and other individuals mentioned have been 
altered in order to maintain a semblance of anonymity and confidentiality, bearing in mind 
that this incident was extensively reported in the media, both locally and internationally, at 
the time of the incident. A table guides this discussion. 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 . List of themes and sub-themes 
 
Theme Sub-theme 
4.3.1 Initial contact with the source.  Handing over 
 
 A growing index of suspicion. 
 
  Collegiality networking and 
support. 
 Reality hits 
4.3.2 Admission is inevitable.  Preparation for admission. 
 
 Sick but not ill 
 
 Phases of emotion. 
4.3.3 Moments of care.  Loss of memory, confusion 
 
and dissociation 
 
 Spiritual connections 
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  Communication challenges 
 
 Kindness of colleagues 
4.3.4 Always involved.  Being in control 
 
 Forgiveness 
 
 Rituals with the patient’s wife 
 
 Gratitude yet unfinished 
business 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.1 Theme One. Initial contact with the source 
 
The first timeframe explains the initial contact with this deadly disease. It includes the 
handing over and admission of Gabby’s patient, the suspicion of a connection to a patient 
admitted one week earlier, the importance of collegial support and finally the period during 
which reality sets in and Gabby becomes symptomatic. 
 
 
 
Anton, a paramedic working in Zambia has been flown to Johannesburg after developing 
symptoms similar to Emma, a patient he had treated one week earlier. Emma, the index 
patient had fallen ill with a fever and flu like symptoms. Emma had not responded to 
treatment in Zambia and was airlifted to South Africa for further treatment. Anton requested 
to be brought to the same hospital, as he was confident that the staff would know what to 
do. Anton’s paramedic colleagues handed him over to Gabby together with the reports 
documenting his medical status during the trip. The doctor gave an admission diagnosis of 
TTP . 
Gabby carried  out the routine assessment. During  our  interview she told  of  the many 
physical signs present during her assessment of her patient. Physical means pertaining to 
the body (Dorland’s Pocket Medical Dictionary, 2012) and together with physiological signs, 
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form the basis of a nursing assessment upon which the diagnosis and management of the 
patient is built. 
 
 
 
4.3.1.1 Handing over 
 
Handing a patient over is an important start to treatment and nursing. It forms the basis from 
which further nursing care is planned.  Chaboyer, McMurray and Wallis (2010 p27) quote 
the Australian Medical Association’s (2006) definition of clinical handover as ”the transfer of 
responsibility and/or accountability for patient care from one provider or team of providers to 
another”. 
 
 
 
During the initial interview, Gabby spoke about her patient, Anton, a male healthcare 
professional  as  well  as  the  index  patient,  Emma,  whom  he  had  accompanied  as  the 
attending paramedic, to the private hospital a week earlier. Typical of a conscientious 
intensive care nurse, Gabby’s handover was extensive. She needed to make sure that all 
the details were included, particularly as the diagnosis was not confirmed on admission. 
This information therefore made up a large portion of the initial interview and is revisited 
during the interviews that follow. Clearly these signs and symptoms were very general and 
have many differential diagnoses. Gabby made sure that she mentioned each one. 
 
 
 
“His temp was very high… like 40” 
 
[He had] “a sore throat……you could see the rash. Like this generalized 
rash…….. and he was pyrexic”.. 
(He)“had diarrhoea as well……and vomiting.” 
“he was perspiring profusely all the time” 
“he bled profusely” 
 
“His platelets were low, he probably had malaria” 
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Generally patients in intensive care units are critically ill. Frequently invasive procedures are 
carried out along with activities such as the invasive insertion of long lines with the 
accompanying blood spillage, that increase the risk for infection to healthcare professionals 
since VHF is blood borne (Centers for Disease Control, 2014; Colebunders, Van Esbroeck, 
Moreau et al. 2002; Ergönül, 2006; ). Gabby remembered this. 
 
 
 
“We  put  in  a  central  line,  we  put  in  a  dialysis  line.  We  had  to  give 
 
platelets…these jolly platelets. He bled a lot”. 
 
 
 
 
4.3.1.2   A growing suspicion 
 
From time to time nurses working in an intensive care environment are exposed to disease 
conditions that are contagious such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Bird flu 
and  VHF  (Joynt  and  Gomersall,  2008).  The  risk  of  secondary  transmission  is  high 
particularly when aggressive procedures such as insertion of long lines are required. The 
practice of infection prevention plays an important role in containing infection and preventing 
further nosocomial spread (Daugherty, et al. 2009). Knowledge and correct use of personal 
protective equipment (PPE) is imperative to prevent or minimize spread to health 
professionals as well as other patients. (Daugherty et al. 2009). It is the role of the nurse to 
keep a close watch on any development of infections and act timeously. Because Anton had 
some signs and symptoms similar to Emma, Gabby was suspicious that the medical 
diagnosis of her patient Anton was possibly incorrect and that there could be the chance of 
cross infection between her patient and Emma. This suspicion grew as Anton deteriorated. 
Anton was admitted with a diagnosis of TTP, a rare disorder in which thromboses form in 
small blood vessels. Petechiae develop and appear as a rash. As TTP is not contagious, no 
special infection precautions are required. 
 
 
 
Gabby reported that standard precautions were immediately put in place in keeping with the 
initial medical diagnosis. Standard precautions for non-infective patients included strict hand 
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hygiene, use of masks, gloves and aprons (Table 2.2) to prevent the transmission of 
pathogens from patient to patient (Eggimann and Pittet, 2001; Siegal, Reinhart, Jackson et 
al. 2007 ).  Infection prevention had been part of Gabby’s unit portfolio at one stage and so 
she was familiar with diagnosis dependant precautions. She noted that standard precautions 
were in place on admission. 
 
 
 
“Gloves and masks on…… aprons on. Didn’t have gowns on”. 
 
 
 
 
Once the link to the index patient was considered, Gabby was concerned that the 
precautionary measures were insufficient. 
 
 
 
“We should have been wearing gloves, gowns and masks”. 
“PPE’s”. [Protective personal equipment] 
[It may have been] “Something we could have contracted”. 
 
 
 
 
Data from records 
 
Many foreign patients are referred to this hospital as there are world renowned doctors who 
practice there and it is considered a centre of excellence in Africa. There is thus the 
possibility of importing contagious diseases. This private hospital group has policies in place 
to address admission of patients with fevers. The policy (Appendix I) requires any patient 
from outside South African borders who is admitted with a fever, to be nursed in isolation 
until the diagnosis is confirmed. This practice helps to prevent the spread of contagious 
disease. Both Zambian patients have been isolated according to the policy. Anton is the 
second  patient  to  be  admitted  from  Zambia  with  similar  signs  and  symptoms  but  an 
unrelated medical diagnosis to that of Emma, the index patient, who had been admitted with 
African Tick Bite fever. They have, however, been in contact with each other. 
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Coordinators Diary 
 
[As a member of the coordination team, I am aware of the protocols already in place]. In 
keeping with the initial history, there is no reason to call for any precautions other than what 
was in place on admission. Isolation and standard precautions are commenced in line with 
the Company Policy and these are considered adequate. Anton’s doctor insists that the 
diagnosis is TTP, a non-contagious condition. 
 
 
 
When in doubt it is good nursing practice to report the possibility of a contagious condition in 
a patient to the infection prevention authorities, before all who are in contact become 
infected. Gabby’s concern and sense of responsibility drove her to contact the Nurse in 
charge of Infection Prevention for the hospital. 
 
 
 
“I should notify the nurse in charge of infection prevention”. 
“I just felt I had to tell her”. 
 
  
 Coordinators Diary 
 
Because of previous experience and awareness that persons who travel in Africa may 
contract contagious diseases that are uncommon in South Africa, the nurses in this private 
hospital monitored and are alert to such possibilities. Gabby had been one of the nurses in 
this hospital when a colleague contracted Ebola from a foreign patient some years prior to 
the present outbreak. She was aware of the need in that outbreak to trace and monitor all 
the contacts of the patient who had Ebola. 
 
 
 
Not  only  were  the  nurses  concerned  about  the  similarities  between  the  two  Zambian 
patients, Anton’s wife also made the link between Emma and her husband. Gabby tells how 
the wife was insistent that there was a connection. 
 
 
 
“She wanted to see the admitting doctor”. [of the initial patient] 
 
“She wanted to speak to him. She didn’t think things were right”. 
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Data from Records 
The admission documentation of both Emma and Anton are scrutinised by members of the 
coordination team in order to compare any similarities between the two and to obtain a 
history particularly related to hobbies and travel. Zambia is not a country associated with 
VHF.  The search is an attempt to link Emma to a possible source of a contagious disease. 
It is already established that Anton, a paramedic, had intubated Emma before evacuation to 
South Africa and had possibly become contaminated during the process. Emma lived on a 
smallholding and participated in Polo cross. She may have come into contact with the host 
during riding or feeding of the horses. 
 
 
 Coordinators Diary 
 
When, after four weeks, a diagnosis of a previously unknown Arenavirus is confirmed, the 
possibilities of contact with a rodent or rodent excretion are considered. To date the host 
has not confirmed (Bird et al. 2012; Paweska et al. 2009). 
 
 
 
Similarities in the presentation of the condition between Anton and the index patient Emma 
soon became evident creating the suspicion and suggesting the possibility of a contagious 
disease. Gabby’s concern increased. 
 
 
 
“He might have been connected to that previous patient”. 
 
[We checked off duties] “So we knew who had been in contact with both 
patients”. 
 
 
Data from Records 
Emma and Anton both lived in Lusaka, Zambia. Both had report a headache and flu like 
symptoms. They both complain of sore throats and diarrhoea and both present with a rash. 
Tests  for  malaria  return  negative  and  later,  the  blood  tests  for  VHF  also  come  back 
negative. Both Emma and Anton had died. From the documentation on the admission of 
Emma, we know that Anton has been responsible for the intubation of Emma, which he had 
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described at the time as difficult and traumatic. He had then accompanied Emma in an air 
ambulance to South Africa. 
 
  Coordinators Diary 
This is a new VHF, the “first hemorrhagic fever-associated arenavirus from the Old World” 
 
(Briese et al. 2009 p 1) 
 
Since Anton describes the intubation as traumatic, perhaps the point when Anton contracted 
the “disease” was during the intubation procedure. The face of the person intubating a 
patient is very close to that of the patient during the procedure and unless a mask and 
goggles are worn, the risk of contamination by secretions is high. 
 
 
 
4.3.1.3. Collegiality, networking and support 
 
Collegiality is the cooperative relationship between colleagues (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 
 
2004).  Effective networking is about a two way sharing of information. The team that had 
been  put  together  to  manage  this  outbreak  was  multidisciplinary  and  multi-skilled.  It 
consisted  of  hospital  management,  nursing  management,  the  treating  physician  and 
selected experts which included a microbiologist and me.  We shared a good collegial 
relationship and respect for each other.  Sharing of information is extremely important to 
maintain current knowledge and to add to it. Collegiality requires trust and should be inter- 
professional. It is crucial in order to stay abreast of new knowledge and changes. Dense 
networks of information were built up in this shared endeavour. 
 
 
 
As the evidence unfolded and the connections between the patients were confirmed, the 
situation moved from one of infection prevention to management of an outbreak. 
Gabby remembered being asked to help with tracing staff that may have been in contact 
with either or both Emma and Anton. 
 
 
 
“We got all the contacts out. Everyone who had worked with both patients” 
 
[was included]. 
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She recalled that I gave instructions about temperature monitoring. 
 
 “we [the contacts] were told to take our temperatures. I’ve got them written 
down”. 
[and she said]“because at this stage you must have been aware” 
 
 
 
  
Coordinators Diary 
[I had been called in to assist with the investigation]. I suggest that since we have no 
diagnosis and based on the similarities of this condition to that of VHF, we should manage 
this condition as an outbreak of VHF. Contact tracing and self-monitoring of persons who 
had been in contact with infected patients is carried out to contain any further spread. We 
start with Contact Tracing. All Health Care Workers and family members both in South 
Africa and Zambia who had been in contact with either Emma or Anton are placed on the 
list. There are just over 200 persons. They are asked to monitor their temperature twice 
daily and phone or mail it through to the nurses responsible for monitoring the contacts. Any 
other symptoms such as headaches, nausea, sore throat or diarrhoea are also to be 
reported. 
 
 
 
On occasions, medical colleagues of the intensive care team appear to ignore the concerns 
of their nursing colleagues. They sometimes question the nurses’ judgement and also may 
argue that certain nursing procedures are not necessary. Gabby experienced this and was 
subjected to anger from the physician who admitted Anton, when he discovered that Gabby 
had informed the Nurse in charge of infection prevention about her concerns that this patient 
might have been contagious. 
 
 
 
“I got a call and he was very very angry with me”. 
 
“He yelled at me”. 
 
 
 
 
This physician argued that nurses should not be suggesting the type of infection protection 
to be used. He maintained… 
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…“We didn’t have to wear any kind of protective clothing because it was 
 
TTP”. 
 
 
 
 
He questioned Gabby’s knowledge and authority with regards to the appropriate nursing 
 
care. 
 
 
 
 
“Who did I think I really was”? 
 
 
 
Data from Records 
The reprimand has a definite effect on the infection prevention carried out in the unit and the 
level drops from the barrier nursing that had been instituted to standard precautions only. This 
is indicated in Figure 4.1 
 
 
 Coordinators Diary 
 
He appears to be angry that Gabby has used her initiative and reported the possibility of a 
similarity between the disease processes of two patients. Perhaps this doctor doesS not 
realise the extent of the nursing Scope of Practice and that infection prevention is a primary 
function of the nurse (South African Nursing Council: Scope of Practice, 2013). 
 
 
 
Included in the network was Anton’s wife. Gabby told how she insisted that Anton had a 
serious disease that was the same as the patient he had brought down to South Africa. 
 
 
 
“She didn’t think things were right. She [Anton’s wife] said “I don’t think it’s 
malaria, I think it’s something else”. 
“She was really worried”. 
 
 
 
Data from Records 
Although she is not one of our professional colleagues, Anton’s wife shares her husband’s 
concerns with Gabby, about the patient Emma whom he had intubated in Zambia. She 
believes very strongly that there is a connection between these two illnesses. 
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This constant insistence on the part of Anton’s wife remained with Gabby and so Gabby 
sent her to the consulting rooms of Emma’s physician. She was influenced by the strong 
belief of Anton’s wife. 
 
 
 
Collegial support enhanced the interaction between the members of the coordination team 
as well as the staff being monitored. 
 
 
Data from Records 
Between the co-ordination team and management, there is a permanent ‘open door’ policy 
for all the staff that are affected by this outbreak. All hospital staff are encouraged to attend 
information meetings and questions are answered. We called in Academic experts who 
share their opinions and resources. A psychologist is appointed to offer staff and their 
families counselling. Some group therapy is arranged for the intensive care staff. Anton’s 
wife and children are also offered this therapy at the expense of the hospital. The therapist 
went to the home of Anton’s wife for these sessions. 
 
 
 
Sharing gives one a feeling that everybody is looking out for each other. We all shared the 
responsibility and the load. Gabby expressed it when sharing her feelings after being told 
that she would have to be admitted. 
 
 
 
“I got comfort from everybody knowing” 
 
“ we[are] all going to be fine. We’ll be alright” 
 
 
    
 
 
  Coordinators Diary 
  At this stage Gabby presents with signs and symptoms. Her temperature is rising, her gums 
  are red and she has a sore throat. Her platelets are low and we were concerned. 
 
 
 
Collegiality and networking between the members of the co-ordination team is good. 
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Hierarchical traditions within the team are dropped. This enables honesty, communication 
and interactions to flow freely. It also reinforces respect and creates a real sense of “looking 
out” for the welfare of other members on the team. Use of collegial networks resultes in 
sharing of information and opportunities for colleagues from various professions. When faced 
with a situation such as our outbreak, we all need to learn from each other. We need to 
expand our knowledge base and become the experts that our colleagues depend on. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Graphic descriptions of changes in Infection control practice in 
relation to collegial reprimand. 
 
 
4.3.1.4   Reality hits 
 
Gabby had difficulty considering the possibility that she might have contracted the condition. 
She believed she had adhered to the infection prevention rules and did not need to be 
concerned. However as the days pass the reality of possible contamination became more 
evident. Whilst on the contact monitoring list, Gabby reported some signs similar to those of 
Anton. She reported this to the coordination team and wanted advice. 
 
 
 
“Because my temperature had gone up.  ..it wasn’t high, 37 or 38 but it had 
gone up. I had looked at my gums…. they looked a bit red. …the temp and 
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the sore throat. I wanted my platelets to be checked …..one of the signs that 
there was something wrong”. 
 
 
 
Gabby was worried. She wanted verification of her suspicions. 
 
 
 
 
“I was worried then. If there was (sic) something abnormally wrong…the 
results would be abnormal. I had a headache during that week. I wanted 
someone to give me a second opinion….it happened to be you”. 
 
      
Coordinators Diary 
I examine Gabby’s gums, oral mucosa and throat at her request. Her throat is slightly 
swollen and her gums do appear red. She also tells me about an episode of diarrhoea 
during the night, [although she does not recall this now]. I feel that these symptoms together 
with the fact that she is a high-risk contact are reason enough to draw a full blood count and 
refer her to a physician. 
 
 
 
After her bloods were drawn, Gabby related that, while on duty she was asked to step aside 
by  two  doctors  who  were  part  of  the  outbreak  team.  They  wanted  to  ask  her  some 
questions. 
 
 
 
“He asked me about ritualistic slaughtering….had any of this taken place at 
my house? I couldn’t understand”. [Surprised] Asking me if I had monkeys in 
my back yard”. [Laughing.] [Gabby lives in the suburbs of a city.] 
 
 
 
Although amusement was evident in the interview, she told how these questions confused 
her. 
 
 
 
“I thought… what is he going on about? Why does he keep asking me”? 
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During the first week of being monitored as a contact, Gabby did not believe that she would 
contract the disease, however she was concerned that there was no confirmed diagnosis. 
 
 
 
“We weren’t definitely sure. It was…..it was unknown”. 
“Something going on…..a big unknown disease was happening”. 
“They still didn’t have a definite diagnosis”. 
 
 
She fully understood that she was most at risk. 
 
 
 
 
“I knew....I would be the most likely…….I had had three consecutive days 
with him”. 
 
 
 
In spite of being aware of these possibilities, she was confident that she had adhered to the 
policies and thus felt that the chances of her contracting the disease were remote. 
 
 
 
“I definitely didn’t think I would get it. I still don’t think I really really believed 
 
that I had it”. 
 
 
 
Data from Records 
Gabby is on the contact list as a high risk due to the fact that she was in direct contact with 
Anton and his secretions. She presents with a rising temperature, diarrhoea and a sore 
throat. Her blood results show an infection and low platelets and she was at risk of 
haemorrhaging. The clinical picture is in keeping with VHF. There is no doubt that she has 
to be admitted and isolated. The bloods that were sent for VHF return negative. 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
Theme one deals with the handing over and admission of Gabby’s patient, Anton. The link 
 
to Emma, the index patient and the growing suspicion that Anton might have had the same 
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contagious condition, emerges.  Experts set up a collegial group consisting of the doctor, 
hospital management, which included a multi-skilled group of administrative and nursing 
managers, support groups and regional management.  After a few days reality set in and 
Gabby presented with a similar clinical picture as exhibited by both Emma and Anton had. 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Theme Two.  Admission is inevitable 
 
Given that both Emma and Anton had died with similar clinical manifestations, when Gabby 
presented with some of the symptoms it was imperative that she be closely monitored. This 
meant that admission and isolation became inevitable. In the days to come Gabby would 
move from being the intensive care sister in charge of caring, to a helpless patient who 
would need dedicated help from her colleagues for her survival. 
This theme describes the preparation for admission, Gabby’s conflicting experience of 
informing the family of her hospitalisation whilst she herself did not feel sick and lastly 
Gabby’s emotions during this period. 
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ANTE-ROOM
 
Figure 4.2 The isolation suite – a converted ward. 
 
 
4.3.2.1 Preparation for admission 
 
After confirmation that Gabby’s haematology results were abnormal, the physician told 
 
Gabby that she has to be admitted. She felt the need to share this information. 
 
 
 
 
“I went and told everybody. I had to come in….I was being observed”. 
 
 
 
 
She explained… 
 
 
 
 
“I wanted to go home”. 
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“You said you would take me home…. you weren’t too sure if I would come 
back. I thought if you want me to come back then I’ll come back because it’s 
just for observations.” 
 
Coordinators Diary 
I am a little concerned that once she realises the implications of the admission, she will 
refuse to return to the hospital. I offer to accompany her home and bring her back. I am not 
concerned about my own safety as I firmly believe that this is a condition that is spread by 
contact. My experience leads me to believe that even though we had no diagnosis, there 
would be more staff infected if it is an airborne infection. Gabby declined my offer and 
returned of her own accord. 
 
 
 
Before  returning  to  hospital  Gabby  prepared  her  family  and  particularly  her  young 
daughters. She explained that she would be admitted to hospital for observations. 
 
 
 
[It will] “just be an in and out….don’t need much clothing”. 
 
 
 
Data from Records 
In spite of no laboratory evidence of a contagious disease including negative testing for 
known viral haemorrhagic fevers in Emma and Anton, the coordination team commences 
outbreak protocol. According to the CDC definition, an outbreak is the occurrence of more 
cases of a disease than normally expected within a specific place. It is therefore considered 
appropriate to set up a ward and assume full outbreak response. This includes a suite that 
allows for triaging and separating suspect patients according to the degree of risk. High-risk 
patients such as Gabby are to be placed in private holding wards with an en-suite bathroom. 
The entire suite is separate from any other hospital patients and access to the suite is 
limited to specific nursing staff and members of the coordination team. A security officer is 
placed in position to assist with access control. 
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Coordinators Diary 
Due to the fact that Gabby’s temperature has continued to increase during four hourly 
monitoring, the presence of a sore throat and an episode of diarrhoea, her blood is sent to 
the laboratory for haematology and biochemical screening. The results show a rise in white 
cell count (WCC), a drop in platelets, and an elevated D-Dimer. The tests for Ebola, Marburg, 
  Lassa  fever,  CCHF  and  Rift  Valley  fever  return  as  negative  (WHO,  Global  Alert  and 
 
 Response, 
2008). 
 
 
 
 
4.3.2.2 Sick but not ill 
 
This period began to be a situation of opposites. Things seemed so normal yet were so 
abnormal. Initially Gabby displayed the disbelief. 
 
 
 
“It wasn’t like I was sick. I was wearing normal clothes. I was sitting on the 
bed wondering what I was going to do” 
 
 
 
The isolation seemed unnecessary to Gabby. She laughed when recalling… 
 
 
 
 
“I had water in a polystyrene cup. I felt, was this really necessary?” 
 
“and the family came in all dressed up. I might have had all these symptoms 
 
but I wasn’t sick”. 
 
 
 
Data from Records 
Her only symptoms are a headache, sore throat and diarrhoea. The signs are revealing but 
possibly not sufficient to require a medical examination if she had not been on a monitoring 
list. Her gums are a little red and her throat is swollen. Her abnormal blood results are the 
most alarming sign (See Table4.2). 
 
 
 
[Because Gabby was being monitored, her signs and symptoms were detected early. If we 
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had not been monitoring the contacts, there was a good possibility that Gabby would have 
been more severely ill before detection.] 
 
Table 4.2. Blood results on admission 
 
LABORATORY  
RESULTS 
GABBY’S VALUE NORMAL VALUES  
PLATELETS  
(x 10 glL) 
91 140-400 
WCC 
(10g/L) 
18 3.9-10.7 
CRP  
(mg/dl) 
51 0.5 mg/dL 
D-DIMER  
µ/ml 
2.8 300 
PTT (seconds) 60 2-35 
 
Coordinators Diary 
Whilst Gabby does not feel ill her blood results show a different picture. Her platelet levels, 
D-Dimer and PTT show that she is at risk of haemorrhage. The WCC and CRP levels 
indicate inflammation. 
 
 
 
In spite of reassuring her family, her actions displayed the uncertainty. Gabby complained 
that she only had two pairs of old pyjamas to take. She made sure that she packed her 
photographs to take along. Her daughter was confused and points out “but Mom you said 
you were just going for overnight.” Although Gabby did not think that she was infected with 
the disease, she was worried. 
 
 
 
“ I was worried at that stage. I didn’t want to have it”. 
 
 
 
 
And in a moment of common sense she submitted herself to reality. 
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“Maybe I knew because why else would I make out a will” 
“If I did die, I wanted there to be a will”. 
 
Coordinators Diary 
Gabby shows considerable trust and confidence in the ability of the admitting physician, the 
coordination team and me.  She accepts that we would do our best for her. 
 
 
 
4.3.2.3 Phases of emotion 
 
Gabby went through stages of emotion similar to the stages of grief described by Kubler– 
Ross (1969) in her book, On Death and Dying. As explained by Kubler-Ross(1969) in her 
writing one does not necessarily follow these stages in a particular order nor will everyone 
experience all of the stages. Gabby did not follow any particular pattern. 
 
 
 
    Guilt 
 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (2012) guilt is a feeling or perception of making 
an error, or miscalculating the accuracy of an action or decision. 
Gabby had emotions, which may have been guilt, about the day Anton was admitted. Anton 
was perspiring profusely and after washing him, she noticed that he was “glistening”. 
Wondering what this was, she felt him with the back of her arm and said in amazement, 
 
 
 
“you’re perspiring again”! 
 
 
 
 
In a quiet voice, Gabby expressed her suspicion that perhaps this action had led to her 
contracting the disease. She cannot remember any cuts or abrasions on her skin at that 
time but she stated reassuringly… 
 
 
 
“I know that I did that. I’m very aware of that.” 
 
 
 
 
She felt responsible for the inconvenience to her friends and colleagues. 
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“They were all put onto this contact list because of me.” 
 
Coordinators Diary 
This includes me. At her request I examine her mouth and throat on the morning of her 
admission. I look for signs similar to those that Anton had presented with. I note that her 
gums are red and her throat slightly swollen. It is time to step up the monitoring. I request 
that she take her temperature hourly. The protocol that the coordination team has decided 
on was influenced by Emma and Anton’s condition and the experience gained by those of 
us who had participated in the Ebola outbreak in Johannesburg in 1996. It states that the 
temperature is to be done daily. In the event of a fever, rise in temperature or any other 
signs and symptoms, the taking of temperature is to be increased to four hourly. Gabby’s 
temperature had been 36.4ºC at home. It climbes to 36.7ºC as she arrives at work and four 
hours later it is 37.4º C. An increase in monitoring and requesting blood samples is the 
correct decision. 
 
 
 
[Our protocol does not require a high temperature to increase the surveillance, but rather a 
rising temperature even if it remains within normal limits, together with any symptoms.  The 
Ebola surveillance guidelines published by the Centres for Disease Control in 2013 
suggested that the temperature should be elevated however in the latest update (November 
2014) this has been amended to either an elevated temperature or other symptoms.] 
 
 
 
 
During the interview Gabby expressed guilt about having been thoughtless and perhaps 
defiant on the day of her admission. During a visit from her daughters she admitted.... 
 
 
 
[Her daughter] “Actually lay on top of me. How crazy was that.” 
“Who in their right minds….I mean that was really silly” 
“Imagine if something did happen to her and she really got it.” 
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Perhaps the most profound statement indicating her guilt was when Gabby told me about 
 
her meetings with Anton’s wife. She revealed… 
 
 “I feel so sad for her….I’d survived and her husband hadn’t”. 
 
 
 
 
    Fear and anxiety 
 
Initially the fear was related to uncertainty and the unknown. 
 
 
 
 
“We weren’t definitely sure. What were we dealing with?” 
“It was a worry”. 
 
 
 
Gabby related the response of a colleague upon hearing the concerns of the coordinating 
team about Emma and Anton. 
 
 
 
“She took her bags and left. She got such a fright when she realised what was 
 
happening.” 
 
 
 
 
During a counselling session in which all the intensive care  staff was present, Gabby 
recalled that each person present was reflecting on whether they were scared. When it was 
her turn she remembered saying... 
 
 
 
“I’m not scared; I’m sh- t scared” 
 
 
 
 
Coordinators Diary 
Although Gabby does not recall this, during this period when the members of staff were 
being monitored, Gabby speaks to some of the coordination team about her fear of not 
knowing what this disease is. She is concerned about how to manage and contain this 
outbreak if we do not know what it is. 
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 Shock 
 
The loss of a colleague, Gloria who had been in contact with Emma was a nasty reminder of 
the lethal effect of this disease. 
 
 
 
“It  was  such  a  shock,  Gloria  dying  like  that.  I  didn’t  know  what  was 
happening. Could it really be something that we could’ve contracted from 
somebody else?” 
 
 
Data from Records 
Gloria an ICU colleague is working an extra shift on the day that Emma dies. Although she 
is not allocated to Emma she assists her colleagues to wash Emma’s body after Emma had 
died. She too is a stickler for correct standard precautions. A diagnosis of Tick bite fever 
does not require anything more that standard precautions. This shift is the last time Gloria 
will work with these colleagues. She is on leave the next day and is going home to her 
family in a town about 200kms away. When contact monitoring is commenced after Anton’s 
death, she is traced to a hospital in her hometown. She has been admitted with flu – like 
symptoms and a very swollen throat. I and the nurse in charge of infection prevention 
request for Gloria to be strictly isolated. 
 
 
 
Coordinators Diary 
Various members of the hospital staff, her colleagues and the coordination team ask her to 
transfer to our hospital so that we can take care of her. She refuses as she feels that it is too 
far for her family to be able to visit. We speak to her daily on the telephone until she is too ill 
to talk. Sadly she is the third patient to die from the then unknown disease. 
 
 
 
    Denial 
 
 
 
Fear and denial are closely linked.  On reflection, Gabby admitted that there was a lot of 
denial. At the time however she refused to believe that she might become infected. She 
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definitely did not want to get it. Even considering it she said... 
 “It would be a disaster…. so you pushed it aside. You knew all the signs and 
 
symptoms and you thought, okay, I’m not going to get it.” 
“I definitely didn’t think I would get it.” 
 
 
 
Coordinators Diary 
This statement is repeated frequently during the interviews and I believe at that moment, 
Gabby really does not believe that she will contract this condition. She has followed the 
necessary precautions set down for standard infection prevention. 
 
 
 
She was more concerned about what the disease was. 
 
 
“…it was unknown. What were we dealing with?” 
 
 
 
 
    Acknowledgement 
 
In spite of this outward denial, subconsciously she must have realised that there was a 
possibility that she had contracted the disease. 
 
 
 
“I didn’t want to admit it, like a real ostrich mentality” [ostriches are said to bury their 
heads in the sand] 
“I  must  have  been  really  worried  to  express  that  to  you” [about  an  episode  of 
diarrhoea]. 
“Thank goodness I did tell you” 
 
“I didn’t think I had it but I must have been ready”. 
 
 
 
 
Coordinators Diary 
Gabby shows an attitude of disbelief and denial throughout the initial period of admission. I 
don’t think she accepts that she has developed this disease until she is in the recovery 
phase. She does eventually acknowledge that there is something amiss and that she needs 
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help. 
 
Summary 
 
Theme two dealt with the period before hospitalisation and Gabby’s preparation for 
admission. It also describes how Gabby is confused when being told that she is sick in spite 
of not feeling ill. She does not accept that all is not well. Lastly, the stages of emotion 
experienced by Gabby are described as she experiences emotions similar to those of grief 
as described by Kubler-Ross(1969). 
 
 
 
4.3.3 Theme 3. Moments of care 
 
This theme includes the memories of care including the loss of memory and confusion 
during  the  period  of  critical  illness  and  ventilation.  Challenges  in  communication  from 
Gabby’s perspective, dreams, hallucinations and what appeared to be spiritual experiences 
are detailed. The kindness portrayed by colleagues is included. 
 
 
 
Gabby was admitted to a single ward initially. As she deteriorated she was transferred to an 
intensive care cubicle. 
 
 
 
4.3.3.1 Loss of memory and confusion. 
 
Patients with loss of memory and confusion are frequently seen in the ICU setting (Roberts 
and Chaboyer, 2004; Samuelson, Lundberg and Friedland, 2007; Zetterlund, Plos, Bergbom 
et al. 2012 ). Some patients will recall the loss of memory whilst others have no recollection 
of this phenomenon at all. ( Lof, Berggren and Ahlström, 2006; Magarey and McCutcheon, 
2005) 
 
 
 
 
After Gabby’s hospital admission she could not recall very much of what she did during the 
day. 
 “I don’t have a clue what I did. …The girls [daughters] told me all I did was 
sleep. I don’t recall any of this, did I brush my teeth,[and] did I wash my 
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face?” 
“I used to ask Mary [a colleague] what I did”. 
 
 
 
 
When her physician told her to wear support stockings on discharge, she was surprised that 
he knew about her varicose veins. She could not recall that the physician had carried out an 
admission examination and had taken a lengthy history. 
 
 
 
“I must admit that I cannot recall clearly after that” [ her admission]. 
 
“I must have told him all that [the history] when he came but I don’t remember 
him coming”. 
 
 
 
Confusion is more common in the elderly and often occurs during a hospital stay. It is also 
seen in patients who are under great stress. (Jones, Bäckman, Capuzzo, et al.2007) 
 
 
Data from Records 
Once Gabby has been admitted, the Physician prescribes Lorazopam. Lorazopam belongs 
to the benzodiazepine family and is a drug used to treat anxiety.  At this point we are 
increasing the dosage of Lorazepam as Gabby deteriorates. This is done in order to reduce 
her anxiety particularly about her own state of health. 
 
 
 
 
Patients receiving lorazapam don’t have a sharp recollection (Samuelson et al. 2007). The 
depth of sedation may influence the perception of the stressful experience. 
 
Gabby’s confusion continued and on reflection she admitted… 
 
 
 
 
“ I didn’t know why I was there. I know you came and explained to me, I know 
doctor explained to me ….I don’t think I put two and two together”. 
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  Coordinators Diary 
The Physician is concerned about the psychological trauma that living this disease “blow by 
blow” will have on an intelligent, highly skilled intensive care nurse. Her lack of memory of 
some of the events may be influenced by the administration and dosage of Lorazopam. This 
is the effect that was hoped for. 
 
 
 
4.3.3.2 Spiritual connections 
 
Delirium, hallucinations and dreams are well-described phenomena in patients who have 
been admitted to intensive care (Capuzzo, Pinamonti, Cingolani et al. 2001; Ely, Shintani, 
Truman et al. 2004; Roberts et al. 2004; Roberts, Rickard, Rajbhandari et al.2005).  First, 
Francis  and  Pincus,   (2004)  describe  delirium  as  a  sudden  event  of   changes  in 
consciousness during which awareness and understanding are altered. In the intensive care 
units, delirium is linked to sleep deprivation, acidosis, fever, electrolyte imbalances and drug 
administration. 
 
 
 
Hartmann (2011) suggested that dreams have a quasi-therapeutic function. He described 
dreams as being linked to the dominant emotions and in patients who have had a traumatic 
experience,  dreaming  provides  connections  to  the  traumatic  event  which  renders  the 
emotion less powerful thus allowing the event to be integrated into regular life. 
Gabby recalled that she had dreams.    She described them as being “quite bizarre” and 
“quite frightening”.   When asked, she agreed to share them with me. She explained that 
some of the dreams occurred frequently. This was one of them. 
 
 “Sometimes  you  run  and  you  feel  like  your  leg  just  gives  in  beneath 
 
you…there was a lot of that”. 
 
 
 
 
She remembered that her dreams had “a lot to do with babies” and children. Another 
frequent dream described babies on a conveyer belt. 
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“they (the babies) were all in coffins…….on a conveyer belt going round and 
round and all of a sudden it was like a garage door would open and there 
would be a light inside and when it closed again, the babies were gone”. 
 
 
 
Dreams of babies are sometimes likened to the end of life. On the other hand, they are 
considered by some to bring new beginnings. Hartmann (2011) associates dreams about 
children and babies with the helplessness and vulnerability of the dreamer. 
 
 
 
The next narrative of her dreams appeared to show a ray of hope. 
 
 
 
 
“my mother had given me pearls and [in the dreams] there were these 
handicapped children in wheelchairs all looking for pearls” 
 
 
 
Although during the interview Gabby expresses that this is bizarre, the tone of her voice 
lightens when talking about the pearls. 
 
 
 
Roberts et al (2004) describe how patients may have distortions of body sensations when 
dreaming.  Gabby  emphasised  that  during  these  dreams  she  was  always  hot.  She 
mentioned this sensation on a number of occasions while relating the dreams. 
 
 
 
“I remember being very very hot”. 
 
A dream that seemed to bother her relates to the source of her viral illness. She recounts 
the dream. 
 
 
 
“John or Mark [she does not remember the name] had come to visit me. He 
was going to look for a virus in Africa……There was a woman in a cocoon 
and (laughing) she was with this Mark and he asked me if he could leave her 
here with me. He said that her name was [Gabby] and I thought that if her 
107  
name was [Gabby] then she could stay with me”. 
 
 
 
Gabby was amused by the fact that the woman shared her name. This dream was told with 
warm feelings, amusement and light heartedness. 
 
 
  Coordinators Diary 
I am not sure whether this is a dream or a vague memory of reality.  A doctor from the World 
Health Organisation visits her on a number of occasions. There is a discussion at the 
bedside about where the virus has originated.  The nurses working in close contact with 
Gabby are wearing full protective clothing. This clothing is a full HAZMAT® [hazardous 
material] bodysuit and may well resemble a “cocoon” to Gabby (see figure 4.2). Whether it is 
a dream or a vague memory of reality, it appeares that Gabby saw herself as “good” or 
“acceptable” and another person with the same name should also be good. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Nurses wearing Hazmat® suits 
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Not all Gabby’s dreams occurred during the period that she was sedated or ventilated. One 
of the dreams she recalled occurred during her recovery period. At this time she had been 
moved from the intensive care unit to the private ward where she was originally admitted. 
“This happened when I was better”.  She recalls that she had visitors in this ward. During a 
visit from her sister and a friend, she told them the following. 
 
 
 
“There was a Taiwanese woman in charge of the toilet [the toilet in her 
private bathroom”] [This woman] “ was telling me that her husband had died 
and she was now in charge of the toilet. Some mornings I could use the toilet 
first and some mornings I had to wait until after she was finished”. 
 
She emphasised that she was awake and fully aware of what she was saying. She did not 
however understand why she was thinking this or why she told anybody. 
 
 
4.3.3.3 Communication challenges 
 
Communication with patients in the ICU has long been an area of concern. There are a 
number of reasons for this. Sedation and mechanical ventilation are two obvious reasons. 
In spite of much research the literature suggests that nurses continue to have difficulty when 
communicating with the ICU patient (Halligan, 2006; Magnus and Turkington, 2006). Gabby 
explained that whilst on the ventilator the inability to communicate frustrated her. 
 
 
 
“I was trying to speak to them [the nurses]. I wanted them to phone my sister. 
I was going like this. 
 
 
 
Gabby demonstrated by putting her hand to her ear to make a telephone and then tapping 
on her shoulders.  In South Africa, Registered Nurses are referred to as Sisters and wear 
distinguishing devices on their shoulders which confirm their qualifications. Tapping on the 
shoulders indicated the word sister. When the nurse failed to understand Gabby attempted 
to write it down. She laughed and said, 
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“I did what everybody does who is ventilated, I wrote round and round and 
 
round. I couldn’t get the name [written] down.” 
 
“I wanted the tube out [endotracheal tube]. It made me nauseous and I 
 
couldn’t tell them”. 
 
 
 
 
The inability to communicate created difficulties for both the patient and the nurses. In 
Gabby’s situation communication was even more difficult since the staff were wearing 
HAZMAT® suits during this period. Lip reading and listening to the patient was extremely 
difficult. 
 
4.3.3.4 Kindness of colleagues. 
 
Löf  et  al  (2006),  comment  on  how  patients  in  their  study  felt  that  some  of  the 
unpleasantness of the admission could be partially lessened by the “caring relationship and 
nursing  actions”  during  the  period  in  ICU.  Although  Gabby  related  that  she  did  not 
remember  large  periods  of  the  time  before  she  became  critically  ill,  she  had  distinct 
memories of some incidents in which her nursing colleagues showed immense kindness 
beyond the call of duty. 
 
 
 
“Then I can clearly remember Denise [a colleague and friend] coming 
 
[to see me]. I remember her standing at the door and she had a basket with 
her. She had a basket of McDonald’s breakfast…but I can’t remember what 
she spoke about”. 
 
 
 
Gabby deteriorated and was moved into the intensive care section of the outbreak suite. 
She was intubated and totally dependent on nursing colleagues as many critically ill patients 
are. She did however remember this: 
 
 
 
“I remember everyone standing there, standing and singing to me. I didn’t 
know why…but they used to sing. 
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[The nurses sang hymns and religious songs at the change of each shift. Management and 
members of the coordination team joined in sometimes. Although this happened outside the 
isolation area, Gabby was able to see and hear through the glass and plastic partitions]. 
 
 
 
Gabby was clearly moved by the kindness of a male nurse colleague. This incident took 
place during the period after she had been extubated. In a soft voice she said, 
 
 “Max, he used to play things [music and videos] for me….and he would sit 
with me and chat….then he used to switch the lights off and I had to go to 
sleep”. 
 
 
 
During this interview it is clear that the kindness of her colleagues in spite of a very difficult 
nursing situation touched Gabby. 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
Different dimensions of care and collegial kindness are addressed in theme three. Gabby’s 
loss of memory and confusion may be caused by a number of factors including the 
medication  that  was  prescribed.  During  this  time  Gabby  experienced  dreams.  These 
spiritual connections are well described in the ICU setting. Communication is a fundamental 
part of nursing. Communication in an ICU has its challenges. Communication through a 
bodysuit takes this challenge to new heights.  The last theme refers to the extreme kindness 
received from colleagues. This was not part the caring aspect of nursing. This kindness 
came from the heart. 
 
 
 
4.3.4 Theme four. Always involved 
 
Theme four mainly describes Gabby’s experience within the final timeframe. This was the 
period of recovery and beyond. The theme includes Gabby’s attempt to control her own care 
as she resumes her role as an ICU nurse. Her forgiveness of the doctor who criticized her is 
disclosed and rituals that continued with Anton’s wife are revealed. Finally Gabby shares her 
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gratitude but is left with unfinished business. 
 
 
 
4.3.4.1 Being in control 
 
Nurse led care concerns the role that the nurse plays in patient care.  It uses “well defined 
protocols” to ensure care that is of the highest quality (Albarran, 2005; Cullum, Spilsbury 
and Richardson, 2005). Nurse led care is commonly used in the intensive care setting. 
 
Weaning from mechanical ventilation is nurse led in many ICU’s as is extubation and the 
need for physiotherapy. 
Gabby had been a shift leader for many years and it was natural for her to take control of 
patient care and therefore initiate nursing and nurse led care. She questioned the care that 
she was receiving. 
 
 
 
“Where was the physiotherapist? Why didn’t I have a physiotherapist”? 
She was also frustrated at not being able to remember. 
 
 
 
 
“I can’t remember all these things I should remember. The vital data – they 
were shouting out the patient’s obs [observations] and writing it down 
somewhere else. We don’t do that. ……I didn’t realise that it was my 
observations”. 
 
 
 
During this period Gabby seems to be disconnected with reality and resumed her role as a 
nurse. 
 
 
 
I didn’t realise they were doing it on me ‘cause I thought I was part of the 
staff.  ….. I thought I was working and I was helping her [the nurse] doing all 
these things. I was part of it all. I wanted to organise the physiotherapist for 
the patient not knowing I was the patient”. 
This extended to duties other than patient care. 
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I can remember wanting to go home to sleep at night and then come back 
 
early for the doctor’s rounds. I thought I was nursing a surgical patient”. 
 
In spite of her illness Gabby remained a nurse and continued to care for patients. 
 
 
 
 
4.3.4.2 Forgiveness 
 
The doctor who admitted Anton was very angry with Gabby and had an argument with her 
for reporting that Anton had signs and symptoms similar to Emma, the index patient. Gabby 
recalled  that  although  initially  she  was  extremely  cross  with  this  physician  he  had 
apologised. 
 
 
 
“When I was sick he phoned me. I didn’t want to speak to him”. 
 
 
 
 
Later she relented and did take his call. She paused and then continued... 
 “He asked for forgiveness. He apologised for the way he spoke to me. He 
apologised for the fact that he didn’t believe in what I’d said [about the 
connection between the two patients]. He had been praying for me….if 
something happened to me it would be his fault. I heard him,  [pause] I 
listened. [Longer pause] I never did speak to him again. Let things be….he 
had his day. I don’t want to badmouth him now. He apologised. 
 
 
 
[Shortly after speaking to Gabby, this physician died of a Myocardial Infarction]. 
 
 
 
 
During this interview, Gabby appeared to have let go of the anger displayed during the first 
 
interview when she spoke about the doctor’s anger and accusations. 
 
 
4.3.4.3 Rituals with the patient’s wife. 
 
Gabby maintained a good relationship with Anton’s wife after his death. The wife telephoned 
Gabby each year on the anniversary of Anton’s death. 
 
Gabby identified a degree of apprehension with the initial meetings. 
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“I felt sorry for her”. 
 
[In the beginning] “It was nerve wracking…I’d survived and her husband 
hadn’t survived. We couldn’t save him. We didn’t actually know what we were 
dealing with”. 
 
 
 
This ongoing relationship seemed to satisfy needs in both women. 
 
 
 
 
“She’s [the wife] [has] been to visit me. I actually have quite a good 
relationship with her. I feel it’s her way of coping”. 
“I just like to find out how she’s doing, how the children are doing. I feel sad 
 
for her”. 
 
 
 
 
It would appear as though Gabby had some feelings of guilt that she survived. She felt a 
sense of responsibility towards Anton’s family and liked to make sure all was well with them. 
This is similar to the nurses who work in Neonatal and paediatric units. They are known to 
maintain contact with the babies and their families for many years. Macdonald, Liben, 
Carnevale  et  al.  (2005)  describe  how  parents  of  children  who  have  died  appreciate 
continued support by the staff particularly “during the bereavement period”. 
 
 
 
4.3.4.4 Gratitude yet unfinished business 
 
“Gratitude is the sign of noble souls.” (Aesop, 2002) 
 
It is “the quality of being thankful” (Oxford  Dictionaries, 2012). 
 
Throughout the interviews Gabby expressed how grateful she was for the help and concerns 
of all who cared for her. 
 
 
 
‘I’m very thankful and I have a lot of people to be thankful to. 
 
I am just thankful that I am alive”. 
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During the third interview we had a discussion about the nursing staff. I asked whether she 
knew that the staff had all volunteered. 
She replied in a soft voice… 
 
 
 
 
“They [the nursing management] did tell me that they’d [the nurses] 
volunteered and I just say thank you to them. I will be forever grateful to 
everybody for what they’ve done”. 
 
 
 
In the final interview I wondered whether there was anything in particular that Gabby felt had 
contributed to her positive outcome. I asked Gabby if she could identify anything. Without 
hesitation she said… 
 
 
 
“The temp[erature] monitoring. I am so grateful for the fact that we started 
monitoring our temperatures when we did, [I am] very thankful about the temp 
monitoring”. 
 
 
 
She continued… 
 
 
 
 
“ ..And I was supported all the way……all the time”. 
 
 
 
 
A diary that the hospital staff had put together particularly touches Gabby. She wanted me to 
read it. 
 
 
 
“That book that everybody gave me, which was such a nice thing to have 
done. They made the most beautiful book for me. I just look at what people 
have written to me and sometimes I just feel so emotional. It was just such a 
special thing to receive”. 
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Coordinators Diary 
During the period of Gabby’s illness, the hospital staff creates a diary for her. A notice is sent 
to all the departments and anyone who wishes to write a note to Gabby is invited to do so. 
This diary is then handed to Gabby on her discharge. It contains daily wishes and comments 
from many staff members. Friends and colleagues draw pictures, paste photographs, 
comment on newspaper articles and generally wish her a speedy recovery. Gabby treasures 
this diary. 
 
 
 
In spite of Gabby’s sincere gratitude towards all who participated in her care and successful 
recovery there remains one aspect of the experience that Gabby cannot come to terms with. 
She expressed her feeling of guilt. This is said in a sincere manner and she clearly means 
every word. She had difficulty telling me and I believed she had not shared this information 
with too many people. 
 
 
“I really and truly felt that um…it was my fault. I had ended up with VHF 
because  I  had  ……  [A  long  pause]  …  well  I  had  got  it  due  to  my 
negligence…..I actually got it and I cost the clinic so much money. And then 
we were all in the news and it was due to me. It was something that I had 
done wrong along the way with that patient….in my nursing and I had got it”. 
 
 
 
I asked her whether she did not consider that lack of a diagnosis and ignorance about the 
disease was the reason that she contracted the virus. She replies…. 
 
 
 
“Well ignorance or wrong……I had caused all of this and I really did feel 
responsible for it”. 
 
Coordinators Diary 
After Gabby has recuperated we need to integrate her back into the workplace. The 
coordination team together with the nursing management decide that she should work three 
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half days for a three week period to allow her to time to adjust to being back at work.  She 
was allocated to the Training department as this was considered less stressful and would 
hopefully not trigger negative memories. 
 
 
 
Before returning Gabby was nervous and said … 
 
 
 
 
“I really didn’t want to come back and nurse. I don’t really know what I wanted. 
I didn’t want to go back to ICU”. 
 
 
 
Gabby returned to her previous statements and feelings of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
“I thought how can people look up to me?  This nursing sister who has been 
nursing for so long. She actually made a mistake, did something 
wrong….um…negligence….um….and here I’m back again”. 
Coordinators Diary 
 
After about three months Gabby is placed back in ICU. 
 
 
 
 
“I  did  some  billing  at  first  and  only  after  a  while  I  got  given  a  patient. 
 
Everything came back and I knew what I was doing”. 
 
 
 
 
Coordinators Diary 
Allowing Gabby to slowly re-integrate into the ICU setting is deliberate. The coordination 
team are aware that, like Emma and Anton, Gabby has had a difficult intubation and has 
been critically ill. We want to ensure that she is able to carry out her nursing duties 
competently before taking responsibility for full patient care. 
 
 [Gabby has resumed her duties as a fully competent ICU nurse and shift leader. She keeps 
herself informed about VHF and particularly the Ebola outbreak. Although she would not 
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volunteer to nurse patients with VHF, she confirms that if such a patient is admitted to the 
ICU where she works, and she is allocated to the patient, she would be fully committed to 
the nursing care.] 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
Theme four discusses how Gabby regains control of her situation and resumes managing 
patient care. Initially she did not realise that she herself was the patient that she was 
attempting to “care” for. As she recovered and resumed work, she maintained a relationship 
with her patient, Anton’s wife. [In 2014, Anton’s wife tells Gabby that she is involved in a 
meaningful relationship and is happy. This may be the end of the annual ritual that these two 
women have shared].  Gabby did not wish to retain any negative feelings towards anyone 
who may have contributed to the outbreak and spoke of forgiving all who may have played a 
role. Gabby’s overwhelming gratitude for colleagues and friends was strongly expressed. 
She was very aware that nurses had put their own lives at risk to save her and she 
expressed her gratitude. However there was one aspect that Gabby had difficulty letting go 
and that was her belief that she was negligent. This will be dealt with by means of 
counselling. 
 
 
 
Literature. 
 
Very little literature on nursing of patients with Viral Haemorrhagic Fevers is available and 
most of it reports the period from 1985 to 1995. In 2009, Ippolito, et al. (2009) reported 
cases of Lassa fever and Crimean-Congo fever that were imported into London, United 
Kingdom and Turkey respectively. As in our case, these patients did not have a diagnosis of 
VHF and thus were admitted without appropriate isolation precautions in place. Whilst there 
were no further cases, Ippolito et al. (2009) revealed that weaknesses in the system were 
exposed thus placing staff at risk.   Our experience supported this and is evidence of the 
unnecessary loss of life. Honey and Wang. (2012) in their report of an H1N1 study in New 
Zealand, confirmed that their participants were concerned about the risk of cross infection to 
team members when observing non-compliance mainly among medical registrars. 
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Figure  4.1  shows  how  an  unfortunate  comment  changes  the  trajectory  of  a  deadly 
contagious disease. 
 
 
 
The second theme discussed Gabby’s preparation for admission and the confusing 
dichotomy of her early days in hospital. The phases of emotion are well described by 
Kubler-Ross and the findings in this study were similar. As indicated by Kubler-Ross, there 
was  no  set  pattern  in  which  these  emotions occurred.  Gabby did  not  express  all  the 
emotions however she experienced most of those described over the full period of her being 
a patient. 
 
 
 
Theme three dealt with the most vulnerable period of her illness. This was the point at which 
Gabby became a patient requiring intensive care however because of the nature of her 
illness, she would receive care with a difference - minimal contact. As frequently reported 
(Lof et al. 2006; Roberts et al. 2004; Samuelson et al. 2007; Zetterlund et al. 2012) and 
many others describe the loss of memory and confusion experienced by patients in an ICU. 
This study observed the same phenomena. The fact that the patient was given anti-anxiety 
drugs will have had an effect on the memory. 
 
 
 
An interesting aspect of this period of illness was the dreams. This is well documented 
(Capuzzo, 2001; Ely et al. 2004; First et al. 2004; Roberts et al. 2004; Roberts et al.2005) 
Hartmann, (2011) viewed dreams in a slightly different manner and believed that they have 
a therapeutic effect and reduced the emotion attached to the traumatic event. All the dreams 
related during the interviews were recalled with clarity. 
 
In this study kindness was reported however the meaning was not connected to the manner 
in which nursing care was carried out. This kindness was described by the participant as 
exceptional and beyond that expected during rendering of care. There was mention of this in 
the literature reviewed. 
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The  last  theme  dealt  with  the  final  timeframe  and  extended  beyond  the  participant’s 
recovery. Nurse led care is frequently used in the ICU and protocols ensures that a high 
standard of care is maintained (Cullum et al. 2005).  The participant remained a nurse 
throughout her illness. Unaware that she was the patient she attempted to deliver holistic 
care to the patient in the bed. After her discharge, the participant maintained a relationship 
with the wife of her patient. This is not commonly reported in care of adults but is seen in the 
neonatal units. Macdonald et al. (2005) describe the importance of this continued support 
during the mourning period of the parents. Finally, the participant expresses her gratitude to 
those who put themselves at risk for her. However as described by Kubler-Ross, the 
participant shares her unfinished business and explains that she continues to feel guilty. 
 
 
 
4.4 SUMMARY 
 
 
 
 
This chapter has discussed the themes and findings of the data analysis. Colaizzi’s 
qualitative  data  analysis  was  used  to  develop  the  themes  and  subthemes.  Fifteen 
subthemes were extracted from the transcribed interviews. Four themes evolve from the 
subthemes. Triangulation with nursing documents and a diary supported the themes where 
possible. My privileged information as a member of the coordination team is bracketed. 
Discussion  to  substantiate  the  research  findings  is  found  in  the  next  chapter  using 
references to existing literature. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
DISCUSSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, LIMITATIONS 
AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses the findings of this study followed by conclusions deduced from 
the findings and recommendations. The limitations will be identified and commented on. 
 
 
 
This research describes an unusual event in which a novel VHF caused an outbreak 
amongst healthcare workers and resulted in a mortality rate of 80%. The significance of 
this study was to develop an in-depth understanding of the experience of a nurse who 
contracted a highly pathogenic novel arenavirus and survived and in so doing, improved 
the knowledge of caring for patients with VHF. Integration of the management and care of 
the patient added to the significance and completed the information.  In this instance, the 
opportunity to view the experience from both a nurse’s perspective as well as the patient’s 
perspective offered an additional unique opportunity. These goals were achieved by 
conducting interviews (Appendix F) using the informal interview technique. The study 
described a patient’s attempt and ultimate success in responding positively and adapting 
to changes in the environment on the health and illness continuum as described by Roy 
(2008). 
 
 
 
This chapter reflects on the lessons learned and identifies the gaps. Literature was used 
to compare and support the interpretation of the participant’s experiences. This included 
relevant  literature  available  from  the  West  African  Ebola  experience.     The  most 
significant findings from the study were influenced by the four timeframes in which they 
occurred  –  Gabby’s  initial  contact  with  the  virus  source,  her  illness  timeline,  her 
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experience of extreme fragility and the care she received and then finally her continued 
involvement with this disease. 
 
 
 
The  limitations  of  the  study  are  highlighted.  Implications  of  this  study  have  been 
discussed. The conclusions of the study end this chapter. 
 
 
 
5.2 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of the study was to explore and describe the experience of a nurse in a 
private sector hospital after contracting a highly pathogenic novel haemorrhagic fever 
from a patient and to provide a detailed description of the management of the person and 
environment through the stages of her illness, with a view to offering a baseline from 
which nurses and hospital management can prepare for an admission of a patient with 
suspected or confirmed VHF. 
The objectives of the study were: 
 
 To explore the experience of a nurse during the monitoring, admission, disease 
and recovery phases, of a novel arenavirus outbreak. 
 To triangulate the information with 
 
- Documented nursing care of this patient using nursing records and daily 
documents. 
- Analysis of the “outbreak diary”, compiled by the hospital coordinating team. 
 
 To consider the relevance of the experience during an episode of critical illness 
 
and its importance in rendering support of health care workers in similar situations. 
 
 To make recommendations for the care of a patient who has contracted or is 
suspected of having contracted a VHF. 
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5.3 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
 
 
 
In the previous section, themes identified have been discussed and excerpts given to 
illustrate the content. The findings were grouped into four themes. Fifteen sub themes 
were extracted and grouped from the main themes. It was difficult to collapse the themes 
any further since the interviews covered Gabby’s experience over a two-month period and 
pertained to Gabby’s time as an intensive care nurse, a contact on the monitoring list and 
finally as a patient. Her experience as a patient took her from admission into an isolated 
suite, then into the intensive care isolation area to be ventilated and lastly into a recovery 
ward before discharge. She returned to work after a period of three months but was 
monitored in the workplace before being allowed to resume her duties as an intensive 
care nurse. Once again, Gabby needed to undergo adaptation as described by Roy 
(2008) in order to resume her original role as an ICU nurse (Figure 5.1). Roy’s adaptation 
model was found to be very relevant in this context. This complex journey from nurse 
to patient and back to a nurse, created a variety of experiences, each of which added to 
the richness of this study. I have identified the main concepts that emerged from each of 
the four themes. In this section I provide a thick description of these concepts which 
underpin the themes discussed. The description is supported by references to relevant 
literature. 
 
 
 
Attention to detail 
 
The first concept that came through strongly was the attention to detail in the transfer or 
handing over of the patient and the history. Transfer of a patient occurs at change of shift 
when the nurse caring for the patient hands over the care to a nurse from the next shift. 
Bruce and Suserud (2005) and Chaboyer et al. (2010) both describe the handover as 
passing the information to the next team. In their study Chaboyer et al. (2010) drew 
attention to the fact that it was more than just information that was handed over. In fact it 
included responsibility and accountability for the patient. Details of the care given during 
that shift and the patient’s response generally formed the core of the handover.   
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Figure 5.1  Modes of adaptation according to Roy’s adaptation model  (2008)
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An equally important period occurred in this study, during the admission period when the 
patient was admitted and handed over from the ambulance and air evacuation transfer 
team. 
 
 
 
Anton had arrived by air from Zambia and was admitted to the intensive care unit. Gabby 
demonstrated the importance of attention to detail in her account of the hand over. She 
was very particular with the details of the clinical manifestations. The way that she 
described them emphasized the fact that they were important to her. Bruce and Suserud 
(2005) and Philpin, (2006) agree that this information forms the baseline from which future 
treatment will be established thus resulting in continuity of care. As confirmed by Bruce 
and Suserud (2005) the clinical presentation and the interpretation thereof would be the 
starting point for the care plan that Gabby would put in place. 
 
 
 
Along  with  the  need for  an  accurate  and  detailed  handover  was  the  importance  of 
obtaining a relevant history. Jarrett (2015) confirmed that a history linking the patient to 
VHF was essential. Reaves’ et al. (2014) however considered a case to be suspect if 
there was an acute fever together with three other symptoms was present. One must bear 
in mind that the criteria in Reaves et al. (2014) study was set during outbreak conditions 
in countries with limited resources and therefore the risk was significantly greater than in 
the Northern suburbs of Johannesburg. Similarly Frieden, Damon, Bell et al. (2014) 
highlighted the importance of history taking to avoid continued spread of the Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa. Another example which confirmed the need for delving into 
history was described by Richards et al. (2000) when extensive history was required in 
order to trace the index patient and the exposure of the first Ebola patient in South Africa. 
She had never been outside the borders of this country. Weaknesses in the system of not 
recognizing and therefore not isolating patients remain a concern (Ippolito et al, 2009). 
With the chance of VHF in mind Gabby was asked about possible contamination by blood 
of slaughtered animals. She was also asked whether she kept primates on her property. 
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To control the transmission of a fatal virus depends on vigilance and was another aspect 
of  attention  to  detail.  The  two  initial  patients  who  were  admitted  from  Zambia  had 
unrelated medical diagnoses and thus a contagious condition was not considered. This 
put the healthcare workers at risk of cross infection particularly when the correct infection 
control  and  use  of  PPE  was  not  in  place.  This  concern  was  confirmed  in  Gabby’s 
narrative.     Similarly,  Mailles  et  al.  (2013)  described  an  outbreak  of  Middle  East 
Respiratory Syndrome Corona virus (MERS-CoV) in France in 2013 and highlighted the 
challenges that staff faced when patients presented atypically. They stated that this 
increased the risk of staff contracting the illness and that it pointed to the need for more 
knowledge about the particular virus and disease. Corley et al (2010) found during an 
H1N1 pandemic in Australia in 2009, that the staff responsible for patient care was 
confused about when the patient was infectious or non-infectious. They also reported that 
nursing staff perceived that there was no policy to guide the confirmation of the patient’s 
infectious status and advice was sometimes conflicting. Infection prevention requires 
distinct actions in order to diminish the chances of cross contamination. Daugherty et al. 
(2009) described the importance and the use of PPE in controlling the impact of infection 
among ICU staff in respiratory diseases such as SARS and influenza and in doing so, 
maintaining a healthy workforce.  These researchers pointed out the importance of using 
the correct PPE, in the correct manner for each transmissible disease. In contrast to 
Daugherty’s et al. study, the hospital group in which the Lujo outbreak occurred had 
policies that guided practice both for patients admitted with a fever from beyond South 
African borders as well as patients with suspected VHF. The policy relating to patients 
from beyond the South African borders was put in place but it was insufficient to control 
the spread of VHF. 
 
 
 
The  findings  in  this  study  suggested  that  managing  contagious  outbreaks  required 
specific skills and input from senior staff that were in a position to make decisions or 
change policy should this be necessary. A number of researchers managing outbreaks of 
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SARS or influenza agree strongly. Hospital preparedness for outbreaks of infectious 
diseases is questionable in any setting. This is highlighted by the international media in 
the recent Ebola outbreak, not only in West Africa but in Europe and America as well. 
Maunder  et  al  (2003)  report  an  outbreak  of  SARS  in  Toronto,  Canada  in  which  a 
command centre is established with “key senior administrators”. A senior nurse and the 
“Chief Information Officer” led the team. Medical staff was also represented by a senior 
member. These researchers explain how additional experts, such as microbiologists, 
were included as the need arose. 
 
 
 
Control of outbreak diseases included contact tracing. No outbreak can be brought under 
control if it cannot be contained. Very little appears in the literature about contract tracing 
or surveillance. Maltezou, Andonova, Andraghetti et al. (2010) mentioned that in 2010 
there were no details for contact tracing of CCHF in Europe. Van der Wal et al.(1985) 
offered one of the earliest and possibly most descriptive procedures of contact tracing. 
This procedure was very similar to the way in which contact tracing and surveillance was 
carried out in our outbreak study. These authors described how a team of senior nurses 
were responsible for controlling a list of persons who were in contact with known patients 
and the ward area. They carried out daily screening on an “outpatient” basis and arranged 
for symptomatic contacts to be examined and admitted to a “high security” area, until 
diagnosis was confirmed. The timeframe for this monitoring was not discussed. 
 
 
 
Mailles et al. (2013) has offered a definition of “contacts” used in the MERS-CoV. This 
differed from the definition used in the Lujo study as transmission of MERS-CoV is 
airborne.  These contacts measured their own temperatures twice daily.  Frieden,  et al. 
(2014) and Reaves et al.(2014) mentioned that the contacts were traced and monitored 
for 21  days after exposure to an infected person. This is what is considered correct for 
VHF contacts and it was what was done in this study.  Jarrett (2015) and Sewlall et al. 
(2014) simply mentioned that name taking and contact tracing was carried out. The 
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manner in which contact tracing and surveillance should be done needs more research. In 
the present Ebola outbreak some countries wish to quarantine all health care workers 
returning from duties in West Africa. Dr Craig Spencer, a survivor of the West African 
Ebola outbreak believes this is over stepping the mark since only symptomatic patients 
are contagious (Spencer, 2015). The threat of quarantine may drive people underground 
(Kerstiëns and Matthys, 1999; Jarrett, 2015), a dangerous possibility since as Frieden et 
al. (2014) point out, only one missed case may start “another chain of transmission”. 
 
 
 
Fortunately the hospital in this study has a nurse at management level whose main 
responsibility included infection prevention and it is this nurse to whom Gabby reported 
her concerns. The coordination team was assembled consisting of the hospital manager, 
a senior nursing manager, the infection control manager, an intensivist physician, myself 
as the expert nurse, managers to deal with hospital communication, clients, media, 
finances, and senior nurses to drove the contact tracing. 
 
 
 
Support and criticism - the good and the bad 
 
Collegial support and advice was considered another important aspect in this study. 
Collegiality implies equal power is given to all members of the collegial group and this was 
how the coordination team in this study operated during the outbreak. 
 
 
 
Sharing of information is cornerstone to the smooth running and successful management 
of an outbreak. Multi-disciplinary and cohesive teams are necessary to make decisions 
which are sometimes difficult and may result in ethical dilemmas. 
 
 
 
Sewlall et al. (2014) confirmed when reporting on the Lujo VHF outbreak, that a decision 
“not to admit to ICU” was made by the treating doctors of Case 3 in the outbreak because 
of the limited facilities and circumstances available at that hospital. Ethical dilemmas 
relating to withholding of treatment are not addressed in literature discussing outbreaks. 
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Just as the staff need support in caring for patients with VHF, this study showed that 
support was equally important to the patients. 
 
 
 
The need for sharing was displayed by Gabby when, prior to admission, she told all her 
friends and colleagues about her situation. She was comforted by their rallying around 
her.  Maunder  et  al.  (2003)  confirmed  this.  They  studied  the  psychological  and 
occupational impact of the SARS outbreak in Toronto in 2003 and stated that just knowing 
that your friends were there for you was sufficient to get through the crisis. 
 
 
 
Support and encouragement resulted in positive outlooks. Criticism breaks down the 
morale and drive of the staff. This was shown clearly in Figure 4.1 when there was 
questioning and criticism by a doctor related to the infection prevention and use of PPE 
initiated by the nurses. This reprimand had a negative effect on the management of 
infection prevention resulting in the prevention regime being reduced to standard 
precautions and as noted by Ergönül, (2006) and Jansen van Vuren, (2011) staff are 
placed at risk of infection. Ergönül (2006) described how hospital health care workers are 
at “serious risk of transmission” during an outbreak of CCHF in South Africa as they were 
exposed to bleeding patients. 
 
 
 
Emotional passage 
 
The findings in this study suggested that fear of the unknown influenced the nurse’s ability 
to control and thus rendered the nurse powerless for a while. These findings were 
consistent with Chung et al. (2005) and Corley et al. (2010). In their study on caring for 
SARS patients, Chung et al. (2005) discussed the nurses’ account of “the sense of 
powerlessness” as a central element of emotion and related this to the fact that they were 
dealing with was unknown. Corley et al. (2010,) on writing about the experiences of health 
care workers during the H1N1 influenza outbreak, identified that there was fear of the 
disease  itself.  This  resulted  in  the  staff  feeling  vulnerable.    Maunder  et  al.  (2003) 
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described how uncertainty influenced and increased the perception of “personal danger”. 
As in the Lujo outbreak, the perceived danger was heightened by the dramatic reporting 
in the media (Maunder et al. 2003). 
 
 
 
Loss  of  control  appeared  to  be  an  important  finding.  This  feeling  was  possibly 
exaggerated by the fact that ICU nurses were more comfortable being in control of their 
environments and patients. Admitting that she had made out her will was a sign that 
Gabby acknowledged both fear and the fact that she was no longer in control. As an 
extremely good and competent ICU nurse with many years experience, it was strange for 
her not to be controlling the situation. This need to control emerged again in the final 
theme when Gabby was ventilated She shared with me that on a number of occasions 
she thought she was nursing the patient (herself) and questioned why the patient was not 
receiving  physiotherapy.  Anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that  health  care  workers  are 
difficult patients because they judge the care that they receive. This may be their attempt 
at being in control. This concept of loss of control could not be found in the literature. 
 
 
 
Guilt is a feeling that patients express usually in relation to inconveniencing family and 
staff. This was confirmed in these findings. Gabby had guilt feelings for a number of 
reasons. Initially she believed that it was her own fault that she contracted the disease. 
The inconvenience to her family and friends added to her guilt and this was increased 
when all her contacts were placed on a list and monitored for 21 days. 
 
 
 
Chiang (2011) examined the perceptions and experiences of ill patients and “their main 
family carers or support persons” in an ICU setting. Chiang’s (2011) study suggested that 
there was involvement with the patient and their carers which continued after discharge 
from hospital. In this study Gabby told how she continued seeing Anton’s wife for a period 
of nearly five years after his death. This practice of reunions with family of a patient is 
common between the parents and neonatal nursing staff but not commented on in the 
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literature concerning adult patients. When asked why the contact continued, Gabby 
immediately mentioned that she had survived and Anton had not. She maintained that 
she felt sorry for his wife who had to raise small children. This symbiotic relationship 
seemed to have benefited both women and may have decreased the guilt Gabby was 
feeling thus resulting in a mutual healing process. 
 
 
 
In this study an additional cause of guilt to Gabby was the cost of the outbreak and she 
expressed that she still felt this guilt.  Although Gabby was referring to financial loss to the 
company as a result of her illness the real cost of outbreaks of VHF is far larger. The 
outbreak in this study occurred in the private sector and thus the costs of equipment and 
supplies were borne by the hospital group. The only literature contributing to financial 
costs discussed the opportunistic response of a pharmaceutical company who charged 
Gabby $ 45 000 for the intravenous Ribavirin course (Richards et al, 2009). However as I 
was part of the coordination committee, I am aware that an amount of close to R2, 
000,000 was spent. This does not include loss of earnings due to the decrease in 
admissions and theatre business for the duration of the outbreak nor the cost of additional 
staffing. The cost of outbreaks such as the latest Ebola outbreak in West Africa is 
multifaceted and includes loss of other medical treatment such as malaria prevention, 
(www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2014/malaria-control) due to closure of clinics 
and hospitals, loss of trade resulting in “catastrophic” economic hardships (World Bank 
Group,   Press release, 8 October 2014) and worst of all great loss of life amongst 
healthcare workers. 
 
 
 
Finally after a period of nearly four months, Gabby was able to return to the ICU and take 
full charge of both patient care as well as managing the unit. 
 
 
 
Kindness 
 
This study identifies kindness as one of the actions of key importance to the critically ill 
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patient. Kindness is a word not often used in nursing literature. Good nursing care is 
considered to be in place if competence, compassion and commitment to the patient is 
present. There is an abundance of literature describing compassion and empathy in ICU 
patients particularly if they are ventilated (Granberg, Bergbom  Engberg, and Lundberg, 
1998;  Hofhuis, Spronk, van Stel et al. 2008; Magnus and Turkington, 2005. Samuelson et 
al. 2007). 
 
 
 
In these findings the use of the word kindness did not relate to good nursing care. The 
examples used by Gabby imply a much deeper meaning and include actions way beyond 
the call of duty. Gabby’s examples of this kindness include a colleague bringing a 
McDonald’s breakfast in a basket, the hymns sung daily outside her ICU ward by the staff 
at change-over and the soft music played to her by a colleague whilst chatting at her 
bedside. This made a lasting impression on Gabby. 
 
 
 
In literature on the caring of patients with cancer, kindness is linked to spiritual care. 
Johnston Taylor, 2003 states that when giving patients spiritual assistance, the initial 
response should be “kindness and respect”. In her study, the participants felt spiritually 
nurtured when kindness was shown. They maintain that “this kindness and respect is 
shown in very simple ways”. 
 
 
 
5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 
 
This chapter makes recommendations based on the findings of the study. This research 
examined the experience of a nurse who contracted a deadly novel VHF and attempted to 
identify some of the unique challenges for management and the care team that arise from 
the admission of such patients to a hospital. It explores the particular needs of patients 
who are nursed in strict isolation and thus totally dependent on the nurse for survival. The 
study  identifies  the  importance  of  infection  prevention  and  suggests  that  nurses  at 
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management level should ensure that these policies are available and that these are 
available to nurses at ward level. The recognition of needs and support given to the staff 
at the bedside includes frequent visits by a management or coordination team members 
who play a supportive role in the bigger picture of the outbreak. 
 
 
 
The recommendations have been grouped into three sections, those that will influence 
direct nursing care, those that require decisions and assistance from managers or require 
insertion into a training programme and lastly those that beg more research. 
 
 
 
5.4.1 Recommendations for Nursing Practice 
 
The nurse’s role in this study emerges as multifaceted. Routine and basic nursing 
principles are highlighted as turning points in outbreak control. The experience in this study 
emphasizes the importance of history taking, patient assessment and the handover when 
dealing with the unknown. Care plans based on the information acquired assist with 
improving the condition of the patient.   Patients may present with what appears as 
harmless symptoms if early monitoring is in place. This study revealed significant changes 
to the patient’s blood profile when very few symptoms were present reinforcing the need 
for accurate monitoring. 
 
 
 
The study suggests that use of correct infection prevention techniques was central to the 
control of the outbreak. Infection control policies should be available at ward level and 
staff needs to be aware of standard procedure. Special training is required for donning the 
Hazmat® suits and re-training should continue throughout the outbreak. Isolation and 
limiting the number of staff exposed results in less contacts and thus less possibility of 
infecting HCW. 
 
 
 
5.4.2 Recommendations for Nursing Management 
 
Lack  of  hospital  preparedness  was  identified  as  a  serious  concern  in  the  SARS 
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outbreaks. Policies should be put in place that address managing and guiding practice in 
the event of an outbreak. The hospital in this study fortunately had a policy in place. 
Selecting a coordination team to address the day to day managing of the outbreak is 
important. This team forms the core of the many arms of outbreak management. The 
findings of this study suggest that the members should be selected for their skills and 
should include  members of  hospital and nursing management, medical practitioners, 
technical staff communications personnel and a financial manager. They should be 
senior enough or be given the authority as a result of experience, to make decisions 
regarding patient treatment and isolation, placement of suspected and confirmed patients, 
maintaining a supply of PPE, arranging support for staff such as counseling, attending to 
communication  both  within  the  hospital  as  well  as  supplying  Media  with  accurate 
information managing the deceased and the list grows. 
 
 
 
One of the earliest responsibilities is to trace and monitor contacts. This requires a 
dedicated group who will be solely responsible for identifying all contacts and maintain the 
surveillance. They should report to the coordination team. 
 
 
 
This research identified many emotions that caring for patients with VHF had induced. 
The uncertainty of the diagnosis prompted anxiety and fear. This was followed by a 
feeling of loss of control and powerlessness. Guilt was a prominent emotion that was 
complex. This guilt was still present at the time of the interviews.  Some comfort was 
achieved by sharing the information with colleagues and family. Counselling is 
recommended from early in the outbreak and as the findings of this study show, this 
should continue for some time after the event. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4.3 Recommendations for Nursing Research 
 
Viral haemorrhagic fevers are uncommon and in that lies their greatest impact. The 
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majority of countries will never experience these dreaded diseases. However it only takes 
one patient with VHF to create devastation in the health system. This study has explored 
the softer and less dramatic side of outbreaks, the patient’s experience, as well as the 
important aspects of successfully managing and resolving an outbreak. The findings 
exposed areas that require further studies. 
 
 
 
Ethical dilemmas will arise during outbreaks. The countries most affected are under 
resourced and many do not have facilities to care for the critically ill patient with VHF. 
Supplying  PPE  takes  funds  that  would  normally be  used  for  maintaining  the  health 
system. Should treatment be withheld in the critically ill patient? 
 
 
 
The literature reports that visitors should not be allowed in or should be restricted. This 
study allowed the family including teenage children to visit, provided that they were 
dressed in PPE. The benefits of visitation were considered important for both the patient 
and the family. Did this put them at unreasonable risk? 
 
 
 
Literature studied does not describe the concept of kindness as expressed in this study. 
The closest comparison was identified in oncology literature however it remained good 
nursing care rather than caring beyond nursing. This warrants further study as I believe it 
does exist when the patient and nursing staff share a special relationship. 
 
 
 
5.4.4 What this study adds. 
 
The results of this study reveal some aspects which are important to managers and 
nursing staff dealing with outbreaks of VHF. The fear of contracting and transmitting the 
disease, adequate infection control measures, morale levels, availability of counselling, 
education and communication are highlighted. 
The findings and recommendations will provide valuable information for health care 
workers and policy makers in assisting them to plan adequately for future outbreaks. 
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5.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
This study was a case study with a single participant. This method may be criticised for 
various reasons including that one cannot generalise from a case study, however, it offers 
depth  of  information  and  thick  description and herein lies it’s strength.  This  information  
will  help  fill  the  gap  in literature. 
 
 
 
The fact that the patient was strictly isolated with minimal contact by nursing staff resulted 
in the reduction of some nursing activities. There was therefore less data collected in the 
early stages before a diagnosis was confirmed and this had an impact on the process of 
triangulation. 
 
 
 
The researcher accepts that there may be different interpretations and thus different 
themes extracted from the narratives in other contextual settings. 
 
 
 
5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
Because viral haemorrhagic fevers are contagious diseases with a high mortality, 
particularly among healthcare workers, it is essential that the diagnosis is confirmed 
without delay. Appropriate PPE should be commenced even if evidence is not available 
but a high index of suspicion is present. Infection prevention and isolation is part of 
nursing care and policies should be in place to guide nursing practice. In this study, the 
nurse became the patient and so valuable information was able to be obtained from the 
participant in real time settings. The participant’s experiences in the four timeframes give 
valuable information about aspects of outbreaks of VHF that are seldom shared and shed 
light on how the patients live through the event. 
 
 
 
This study shows the importance of paying attention to the smaller details particularly 
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during history taking. Misdiagnoses and atypical presentations may and do occur and this 
places  healthcare  workers  at  risk.  The  knowledge  and  then  wearing  of  the  correct 
personal protective equipment is paramount and hospitals should set down policies in line 
with WHO and CDC guidelines. Policies however are meaningless if not accompanied by 
training. 
 
 
 
Tracing of contacts of confirmed cases is important to contain the outbreak. Once 
identified, surveillance, which requires monitoring of temperatures twice daily, is carried 
out for a period of 21 days. The idea of quarantining contacts tends to drive the suspected 
cases underground and may start a fresh transmission. 
 
 
 
Collegial support was identified in this study and the contribution to the success of 
managing the outbreak is highlighted. Ethical dilemmas could be addressed collectively 
and reduce the burden carried by individuals. Support for the patients is also important. 
The role of family, friends and colleagues and contact with them becomes important. 
Allowing  access  to  these  support  groups  in  patients  isolated  for  VHF  needs  to  be 
explored. 
 
 
 
Emotional upheaval in ICU patients is well documented in the literature. This applies to 
any critical illness even if the patient is not in an ICU environment. Fear of the unknown, 
feelings of powerlessness and loss of control were central elements in this study as was 
feelings of guilt. The findings suggest that the guilt may linger on for years and patients 
may require further assistance. Kindness beyond that expected as part of good intensive 
nursing care, was a novel finding in this study and is worthy of future research. 
 
 
 
The 2014 outbreak in which over 23,000 persons have contracted Ebola, just under 
 
10,000    have    died    and    more    than    3000    HCW    contracted    the    disease 
 
(www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/health) is a reminder of how devastating a VHF outbreak can be. 
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Although the outbreak started in West Africa, Spain, United Kingdom, America, Nigeria 
and Senegal were affected by imported cases, proving the need for preparedness. 
 
 
 
This study has shared the experience of a colleague who contracted a deadly disease 
and survived. It confirms that she behaved as one would expect many ventilated ICU 
patients to behave. The study however exposes the gaps in the literature when the ICU 
patient has contracted a VHF and nursing requires skills that are not necessarily taught 
during nursing training. The unique findings in this study include the need for more 
research on the perception of kindness and methods of dealing with a wide display of 
emotions whilst nursing in extremely difficult conditions of isolation.  Ethical dilemmas 
related to admitting this type of patient to ICU in resource poor countries can be debated. 
However, how can you refuse admission when in Gabby’s own words, “your normal daily 
job becomes deadly”. 
 
 
 
In order to fulfill the purpose of this study four objectives were set and they have been 
achieved. 
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5.7 ADDENDUM 
 
Because, VHF outbreaks generally occur in the tropical regions, it is unusual to admit a 
patient to a hospital in other geographical areas. For completeness and because of my 
experience with outbreaks, I have included a guide in the form of a checklist (Appendix J) 
for readers who may be required to assist in outbreaks. It can be altered to suit the 
situation and context. This guide did not form part of the study but has been added to 
assist in containing future VHF outbreaks. 
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1 
2 TRANSCRIPT ONE 
3 SIGNIFICANT STATEMENTS 
4 
5 
Appendix I 
6 A. Ok Gabby, I think lets start and you can stop if you need to or if you 
 
7 want a break. Let’s start with your experience of the admission of Anton. 
 
8 You admitted him didn't you? 
 
9 G. Yes. 
 
10 A. So lets start from there. 
 
11 G. Okay. Um..he was admitted on the Saturday. We were expecting him. 
 
12 It was Dr XXXX’s patient. I think it was just after lunchtime I can recall. 
 
13 The patient was from Zambia and he was coming in with what he'd 
 
14 [doctor] said was a septicaemia.  He came on the 27th of September. I 
 
15 remember it was my weekend on [duty]. He [patient] was awake, was 
 
16 with it. The paramedics brought him in. He...we connected him to 
 
17 the monitor. I remember…… his temp[erature] was very high. I think 
 
18 that it was like 40 C . 
 
19 We were wearing, at that time, we had gloves on and we had aprons on. 
 
20 We didn't have ....gowns on [maybe a bit of guilt] . He still said he' d had 
 
21 a headache and was nauseous.  He had a rash. Those are the things 
 
22 that I can recall. I didn't write those notes down on admission 
 
23 A.  That doesn't matter for this interview. 
 
24 G. He did have a rash when we took....... we took the t shirt off...you 
 
25 could see the rash. Like this generalized rash on his body and ...and he 
 
26 was pyrexic..and that's all that I can really remember from when he first 
 
27 got there. His wife was there later on. But she was just worried about 
 
28 him and that's it. She didn't think that things were right and she was 
 
29 really worried that he might have been connected to that previous pt that 
 
30 he'd brought down to South Africa. Who [hesitated] was diagnosed with 
 
31 tick bite fever.[smiled].... who had passed away.. who was diagnosed 
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32 with tick bite fever.  She[wife] was worried that there was this 
 
33 connection. I must admit that I hadn't seen the patient that he brought 
 
34 down. I was nursing another patient when she was here, I was looking 
 
35 after a ventilated baby so I didn't have much to do with her at all other 
 
36 than the fact that I was there. Dr XXXX did that brain death test ...the 
 
37 students were there and they wanted to see it and ........I was there when 
 
38 that was done. 
 
39 A That was on the woman ? 
 
40 G...yes.. what was her name... 
 
41 A. Emma 
 
42 G. And then for him I was there that Friday, Saturday and Sunday that 
 
43 he was admitted. He was nauseous . He had diarrhea.  He didn't eat 
 
44 much...didn't want to eat, he was just nauseous all the time. Shame and 
 
45 I can remember the one day that..um.. his wife had come in and she was 
 
46 worried that he was not eating and that night she said to me...how do 
 
47 you give that “ABC” food.. You know apples bananas and carrots when 
 
48 you had diarrhoea [laughing] he had diarrhoea as well.  And vomiting 
 
49 and I remember I had mashed up the banana and he'd eaten it and she 
 
50 phoned to ask...how was he doing and I told her that he was much 
 
51 better. And lo and behold just after that he went and vomited all that 
 
52 banana and everything..[laughing] ..but  ..that was just it. 
 
53 that was the sat and the sun and I think sun we put up the central line. 
 
54 His platelets were low and then...that's right ....and then On the 
 
55 Saturday evening we were wearing gloves, gowns and masks. 
 
56 A. What was the reason you decided to change? 
 
57 G...because probably we should have[done so] before we started 
 
58 because he came from out of Africa and in actual fact it was on 
 
59 handover that night that Florence said to me.. we should have been 
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60 wearing gloves,gowns and masks since[from the time that] he arrived. 
 
61 We did that straight away then. 
 
62 Um. Another thing, he was...he was perspiring profusely all the time. 
 
63 You could see it. Not so much when he got there but after that he was 
 
64 perspiring. After we'd given the Perfalgon his temp came down. It was 
 
65 never high again. I mean as what it was on that first day, from what I 
 
66 could recall. Um...so we were wearing these PPE's and I know that 
 
67 during this time I couldn't believe.........we just washed him and we 
 
68 changed the linen and just after that he had this like glistening.. and I 
 
69 thought what is going on now and I felt him with the back of my arm. 
 
70 And I said (amazement) you're perspiring again. I can remember that...? 
 
71 A Did that worry you? 
 
72 G. Um...well after saying that, maybe...this was the way that um I had 
 
73 contracted it. Maybe it could have been. 
 
74 A. So now in retrospect do you think that might have been the contact 
 
75 point? 
 
76 G. It could've been. I know that I did that, I know that I was in 
 
77 contact...but at the same time I don't know of any cuts or abrasions that I 
 
78 could have had at that time. Um I'm very aware of that. Um that I ....that 
 
79 is what I did. 
 
80 We put in a central line, we put in a dialysis line and he bled profusely 
 
81 from those lines. I cant remember if it was with insertion or later. Um Dr 
 
82 YYYY was adamant that um it was a um what do they say....a TTP. His 
 
83 blood (the patient’s) even went up to the lab(oratory).  He ( doctor) went 
 
84 to go get it himself. To go get the platelets. That kind of thing and he was 
 
85 absolutely adamant that it was that kind of thing (TTP) that we were 
 
86 dealing with. And I know that at one stage he'd said as well that we didn't 
 
87 have to wear any kind of protective clothing because that is what it was. 
 
88 A. So what did he say it was? 
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89 G. Um....a TTP. That's what he was adamant about then, that it was a 
 
90 TTP.  In actual fact I can remember we had to give platelets before we 
 
91 put up the central line but the platelets had arrived the night before and 
 
92 we only gave them the next morning. 
 
93 It was like a whole big story….(laughs)....with these jolly platelets. 
 
94 Previously people had put them in the deep freeze …we had to leave 
 
95 this lot out so there that we could give them. 
 
96 That was Saturday. 
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RE: PERMISSION TO USE THE CONTENTS OF THE OUTBREAK DIARY. 
 
 
 
I, Andrea Hayward, would like to request permission to use the contents in the 
 
‘Outbreak Diary’ as a source of reflection as part of the research methodology for 
 
my MSc Nursing. 
 
 
 
This study pertains to the Lujo Outbreak of 2008 and the research proposal is 
attached for your perusal. I have also attached the approval from the Ethics 
Committee of the University of the Witwatersrand. 
 
 
Since Mediclinic Morningside is a referral hospital for critically ill patients from the 
whole of Africa, this research will benefit both the hospital and the community at 
large and the results will add value to the management of similar patients in future. 
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
 
Andrea Hayward 
 
 
 
Andrea.Hayward2@wits.ac.za 
 
Mobile  0824151872 
 
Work    0114884271 
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INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
 
 
Good day. My name is Andrea Hayward. I am conducting research for the purpose 
of obtaining a Masters degree in Nursing at the University of the Witwatersrand. In 
this study my focus is on the experience of Health Care Professionals when they 
have contracted a disease from a patient. In this particular instance I will report on 
the experience of you as a staff member who has contracted a highly pathogenic 
novel haemorrhagic fever virus. There are many studies that look at the disease 
epidemiology of viral haemorrhagic fevers, however, to date there is very little 
research  on  how  the  Health  Care  Professionals  experience  the  event.  This 
research project aims to explore in greater depth, this experience as perceived and 
lived by you, a front line nurse. I hope that the results of this research will identify 
issues that are important for the support of Health Care Professionals and that 
they can be included in the planning and clinical protocols of future outbreaks. May 
I  invite you to participate in this study? Should you agree, your participation will 
entail being interviewed by me at a time and place that is convenient to you. The 
interview will last for approximately 1 hour. The interview will be recorded, with 
your permission, in order to obtain maximum accuracy of the research. Your 
participation is voluntary and you may decline should you not wish to participate 
with no consequences. You may refuse to answer any question and you may 
choose to withdraw from the study at any point. An example of the type of question 
would be: “Tell me about the period that you were being monitored as a high risk 
contact”. 
Although complete confidentiality or anonymity cannot be guaranteed as the 
episode was widely published in the media at the time, every attempt will be made 
to keep your responses confidential. I intend to audio record the interview. All the 
digital audio recordings and transcripts used in this study will only be accessed by 
me and my research supervisors. The interview material will be kept in a secure 
location at all times and all electronic transcripts will be password protected. The 
nursing documents are held by the management of the hospital and I will not 
remove any from the hospital premises. Once I have written up the research, the 
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transcripts, recorded material and interviews will be retained in a secure location at 
the University 
of the Witwatersrand for a period of 6 years if no publication ensues, or for 2 years 
following publication in an accredited academic or professional journal. 
 
 
The results of this research will be reported in a dissertation. A summary of this 
dissertation will be made available to you on written request. 
 
 
Should you wish to contact me, or if you require any additional information, my 
contact details are below. 
 
 
Kind regards 
 
 
 
Andrea Hayward 
 
 
 
Contact details: 
 
Mobile: 0824151872 
 
Tel: 011 4884271 
 
Email. andrea.hayward2@wits.ac.za 
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CORPORATE POLICY 
 
MANAGEMENT OF A PATIENT WITH A VIRAL 
HAEMORRHAGIC FEVER 
 
 
 
Purpose 
 
The  purpose  of  this  policy  is  to  provide  guidelines  to the personnel  caring  for  patients  with  a 
suspected  or  confirmed  viral  haemorrhagic  fever  in order  to prevent  horizontal  transm ission  to 
other patients and personnel. 
 
The policy includes: 
• Clinical features/mode of transm ission of a viral haemorrhagic fever (VHF) 
• Guidelines pertaining to standard and transmission-based precautions 
• Guidelines pertaining to the collection and transport of specimens 
• Guidelines pertaining to the follow-up of contacts 
• Guidelines pertaining to the cleaning and disinfection of the isolation room 
 
 
Scope 
 
 
This policy is applicable to: 
• Housekeeping personnel 
• Medical practitioners 
• Mem bers of the multi-disciplinary team 
• Nurse practitioners 
• Relevant service providers 
• Visitors 
 
 
 
 
Policy statement 
Infection prevention and control precautions are to be adhered to, to prevent the transmission and 
contam ination of the environment, patients, visitors and personnel with a viral haem orrhagic fever. 
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Responsibilities 
 
Person Responsibility 
Clinical risk manager 
(CRM) 
• Assist with the identification and setting up of an area that can be 
utilised for the isolation of a patient with a VHF 
• Assist and advise on the im plem entation and adherence to 
isolation precautions in the designated isolation area 
• Inform the Department of Health telephonically of  a suspected 
and/or confirmed VHF case 
• Com plete the GW 17/5: Notification of notifiable medical conditions 
and fax to the Departm ent of Health 
• Liaise with the Department of Health regarding the m anagement of 
the patient and the follow-up of contacts (including household 
contacts) 
• Notify the Mediclinic Infection Prevention and Control Specialist 
• Ensure that all contacts are identified  and monitored 
• Provide feedback to the members of the hospital multidisciplinary 
team 
• Provide guidance to the donning and removal of personal 
protective equipment (PPE) 
• Provide “on the spot” training in collaboration with the training and 
developm ent consultant 
• Supervise personnel during the care of  the deceased, in the event 
of death 
• Supervise and advise nursing personnel when the room (s) are 
term inally cleaned and terminally disinfected 
• Assist client service manager in providing the correct information to 
the m edia 
• Contact healthcare risk waste (HCRW ) removal contractor and 
make arrangements for immediate rem oval of HCRW 
Client services 
manager (or 
delegated person) 
• Liaises with m edia 
• Prepare  media- and press releases 
• Liaise with the clinical personnel (treating medical practitioner, 
clinical risk manager or expert on VHF) involved in the treatm ent of 
the patient before providing any inform ation to the m edia 
• Coordinate m eetings with the multidisciplinary team where 
indicated 
Hospital manager • Liaise with the m edia in collaboration with the client services 
manager 
• Liaises with the client service m anager on m edia releases 
• Liaise with Mediclinic Exco if indicated 
• Support nursing team 
Continued... 
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Responsibilities, continued 
 
Housekeeping Adhere to correct cleaning methods where applicable 
• Housekeeping personnel must not take the primary 
responsibility for the cleaning of the isolation area (it is the 
responsibility of the nursing personnel) 
• Daily cleaning of the isolation room must be done by the nursing 
personnel working in the area 
• Housekeeping personnel are not responsible for the first terminal 
cleaning  and disinfection of the high risk patient area 
• Ensure that separate cleaning equipment is used and discarded 
after the final terminal disinfection 
• W ear appropriate PPE 
• Cleaning and term inal disinfection of the room must be monitored 
Infection prevention 
and control specialist 
(corporate office) 
• Assist and support the CRM 
• Acts as a resource/ reference 
• Liaises with the clinical governance committee 
• Liaises with Mediclinic Exco in the event of an outbreak 
• Liaises with the DoH and NICD if indicated 
• Monitors the process 
NICD or expert on 
VHF / Infectious 
diseases physician 
• Acts as a resource/ reference of expertise 
• Advises on the isolation precautions and duration of isolation of the 
patient [depending on the type of viral haemorrhagic fever (VHF)] 
• Advises on the duration of contact follow-up (depending on the type 
of viral haemorrhagic fever) 
• Advises doctors and personnel on the treatment of the patient and 
the contacts 
Nursing manager • Liaises between hospital managem ent and the members of the 
hospital multidisciplinary team 
• Ensures adequate personnel provision 
• Coordinates contact tracing and provide resources for the tracing 
and follow-up of contacts 
• Ensure adequate provision of PPE 
• Provides continuous information and support to personnel 
• Makes the necessary arrangem ents according to the Corporate 
policy: Care of the deceased with a communicable disease in the 
event of death 
Medical practitioner • Liaise with the National Institute of Communicable Diseases 
(NICD) 
• Contact  an expert in the field of VHF if necessary (NICD) 
• Liaise with the m embers of the hospital multidisciplinary team 
• Adhere to isolation precautions 
• Provide daily feedback on the condition of the patient to the 
multidisciplinary  team 
Microbiologist/ 
Laboratory m anager 
• Assist with the collection and transport of the specimens to the 
NICD 
• Follow protocol on VHF in own laboratory 
• Ensure that own personnel who were contacts are followed up 
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Responsibilities, continued 
 
Nurse practitioner • Adhere to IPC principles and isolation precautions 
• W earing of appropriate PPE 
• Ensure adequate cleaning and disinfection of equipment  and the 
isolation room (not to be done by housekeeping personnel) 
• Responsible for the first terminal disinfection of high risk patient 
area (not to be done by housekeeping personnel) 
• Ensure that healthcare risk waste (HCRW ) are removed and 
incinerated prom ptly by responsible persons 
• Ensure the correct managem ent of contaminated linen 
Observer /“Runner” • Needs to be a more senior member of the health care team 
• Assists the nurse practitioner in donning and removal of PPE 
• Observes the nurse practitioner regarding the safe caring of the 
patient 
• Functions as a “runner” to fetch items that are required in the 
isolation room 
• The observer plays a very im portant role: 
• Be present at all times to evaluate and comment on practices 
• Inform the healthcare worker involved of any unsafe practices 
that may place her at risk 
• Collects equipment and supplies 
• Communicates information and passes on m essages 
• Provides an important link to the outside world whilst the healthcare 
worker(s) are caring for the patient in the isolation area 
Occupational health 
practitioner or 
delegated 
responsible person 
• Assists with the identification of contacts 
• Classifies, follows up and m onitors the contacts of the patient with 
VHF 
• Informs the CRM/Nursing manager of any contacts that are 
presenting with signs and sym ptoms of the disease 
Pharmacy • Ensures adequate supplies of PPE at all tim es 
• Ensures the prompt provision of the required medication as 
prescribed by the treating medical practitioner 
Social worker/ 
Counsellor 
• Arranges for a social worker/counsellor if indicated 
• Provides emotional support to the patient, fam ily and personnel 
• Makes use of telephonic comm unication through a glass partition, 
as far as possible 
• Adheres to transm ission-based precautions and the wearing of 
appropriate PPE, under the direct supervision of the CRM or 
nursing personnel, where necessary to counsel the patient 
Training   and 
development 
consultant 
• Assists in setting up an isolation area for the patient with VHF 
• Assists with m onitoring of adherence to VHF transm ission-based 
precautions in the patient care unit 
• Assists with “on the spot” training 
• Provides information sessions to personnel 
• Assists with contact tracing 
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Responsibilities, continued 
 
Unit manager • Ensures provision of PPE 
• Ensures that there is adequate staffing to care for the patient 
• Supports personnel 
• Supervises all persons coming into contact, direct or indirect, with 
potential infectious agents or patients 
• Ensures that all personnel adhere to transmission-based 
precautions and that appropriate PPE is worn at all times 
• Ensures that the housekeeping and other non-nursing personnel 
are inform ed about the infectious status of the patient and that 
housekeeping are not responsible for cleaning the patient room 
• Ensure correct disposal of HCRW 
• Restrict visitors and control access to isolation area 
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Key principles 
1.  The m oment a diagnosis of VHF is suspected, the patient m ust be isolated in a single room 
with adjacent sluice or en-suite bathroom facilities. 
• If available, a room with negative pressure m ust be used. 
2.  If the diagnosis is confirmed and the clinical condition of the patient is stable, it is 
strongly recommended that the patient be transferred to a healthcare facility with a 
special isolation unit (P4) that is equipped to handle the case. 
3.  If the patient is a transferral or admission from outside the hospital, the hospital should be 
informed in advance that a suspected VHF case is expected.  The patient must be 
isolated in the prepared isolation area directly from the ambulance. It is preferred that 
patients suspected of having VHF are adm itted directly into a P4 unit and not transferred 
from another healthcare facility into a Mediclinic hospital. 
4.  Contact and droplet precautions must be implemented for a suspected VHF case, in 
addition to the standard precautions at all times. 
5.  Effective hand hygiene is essential at all times. 
6.  Correct rem oval of PPE is essential to prevent cross infection. 
7.  Full respiratory protection (visor and N95 respirator) is essential during invasive procedures 
due to the risk of aerosolisation of the virus in body fluids. No visible skin must be 
exposed. 
8.  Meticulous cleaning and disinfection of the environment with dedicated and disposable 
equipm ent is essential to prevent the transm ission of VHF. 
9.  Extreme caution m ust be taken when in contact with blood, body fluids, secretions and 
excretions. 
10. Extreme caution should be taken when sharps are handled to prevent percutaneous 
injuries. 
11. Lim it all invasive procedures and reduce the number of injected or intravenous medication. 
12. All blood or body fluids spillages or normal excreta (e.g. urine) m ust be covered with a 1: 
10 000 ppm (parts per million) hypochlorite solution (4 sachets in 1 litre of water) for 10 
minutes prior to being discarded. 
Note: Hypochlorite 1:1000 ppm should be used for disinfection of surfaces and 1:10 
000 ppm should be used on blood and body fluid spills. 
13. Effective and continuous communication between all relevant parties is essential at all 
times. 
14. Do not allow any patient documentation to enter the room. 
15. Each hospital m ust have a supply of FED packs readily available and all the personnel 
need to know where it can be found. 
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Management of a viral haemorrhagic fever in a healthcare setting 
 
1. Early recognition of VHF is essential utilising the reporting system of high risk factors, a 
detailed history and microbiological confirmation to ensure prom pt diagnosis. 
2. The early signs and sym ptoms of VHF are non-specific and a careful travel history is 
always very im portant. 
3. Prompt, effective isolation and implementation of VHF contact and droplet precautions in 
addition to standard precautions must be implemented. 
4. Monitor the adherence and compliance of wearing of PPE. 
5. Monitor adherence to hand hygiene. 
6. Monitor the adherence and compliance of : 
•  Environmental cleaning 
•  Cleaning and disinfection of equipment and 
•  Managem ent of used linen 
•  Healthcare risk waste rem oval (HCW R) 
7. Patient and visitor education is essential. 
8. Education of healthcare workers (HCW s) and housekeeping personnel is vital to prevent 
transm ission of the virus. 
9. It is important to follow up and monitor contacts to identify and isolate secondary cases. 
 
 
Risk factors for viral haemorrhagic fever 
Possible contact w ith the virus 
 
1. History of travel to a high risk area/endemic area for VHF. 
2. History of being bitten by a tick or having crushed a tick with bare hands. 
3. Having had direct contact with: 
• fresh blood or 
• other tissue of livestock or 
• gam e within the past ±3 weeks 
4. Having resided in or visited a rural environment where contact with livestock or ticks was 
possible, without a specific incident constituting exposure being identified. 
5. Having been camping, hiking, sleeping outside on the ground. 
6. Contact with rodents and or their excretions in endemic areas. 
7. Visiting caves or contact with bats or bat droppings in endem ic areas. 
8. Contact with a suspected or confirm ed VHF patient or contact with a person with pyrexia 
of unknown origin within the past ±3 weeks. 
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Clinical features of a viral haemorrhagic fever 
 
1. Sudden onset of sym ptoms. 
2. Abdom inal tenderness. 
3. Bleeding: (not always immediately present with all VHF’s) 
• Bleeding of eyes and/or gums 
• Epistaxis 
• Haematemesis 
• Haematuria 
• Petechiae 
• Vaginal bleeding 
• Bleeding from any orifice 
4. Fever of 38°C and above on more than one occasion. 
5. Feeling of malaise. 
6. Myalgia (muscle tenderness and pain). 
7. Gastro-intestinal sym ptoms, e.g. nausea, diarrhoea, vomiting. 
8. Presence of a skin rash. 
9. Experiencing severe headache/s. 
10. Signs and sym ptoms of renal failure. 
11. Developm ent of Leucopenia or Leucocytosis. 
12. Throm bocytopenia – Platelets: 
• More than 50% decrease in either white cell count (W CC) or platelet count within 3 
days 
13. Abnormal Prothrombin Time (PT) or INR and Partial thromboplastin time (PTT). 
14. Transam inase elevation (AST > ALT). 
 
 
Diagnosis of viral haemorrhagic fever 
 
1. A clinical diagnosis can be based upon a positive history and clinical m anifestation of the 
disease. 
2. The Criteria for Clinical Diagnosis of Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever (R. Swanepoel, 
S. Harvey. J.H. Mynhardt- 1987) m ay be used to do a risk assessment for the clinical 
diagnosis of Crimean-Congo Haem orrhagic Fever (CCHF).  See Addendum 1 
3. Patient m ust be managed as a positive VHF case and isolated until diagnosis has been 
confirmed. 
4. Laboratory diagnosis: 
• Specific diagnostic tests for Viral Haemorrhagic Fevers are only perform ed at the 
Special Pathogens Unit of the National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD). 
See Addendum 5 
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Types of viral haemorrhagic fevers 
 
Family Example of 
VHF 
Primary 
Vector 
Source 
Incubation 
Period 
Human to 
human 
transfer 
Duration of 
contact 
follow-up 
Arenaviridae Lassa Rodents 5- 16 days Yes 21 days 
Filoviridae Ebola Unknown 2- 21 days Yes 21 days 
Marburg Unknown 5- 10 days Yes 21 days 
Bunyaviridae Crimean- 
Congo 
Ticks 3- 12 days Yes 14 days 
Rift Valley Mosquitoes 2- 6 days Not recorded Not needed 
Flaviviridae Yellow Mosquitoes 3- 6 days Not recorded Not needed 
Dengue Mosquitoes 3- 15 days Not recorded Not needed 
 
 
Determining the risk level of viral haemorrhagic fever 
 
1. Blood and body fluids are an infection risk, e.g. saliva, blood, vomitus, pus, urine, stools, 
semen. 
2. High risk: 
• Severely ill and Heam odynam ically unstable 
• Fever and other signs and sym ptoms suggestive of VHF 
• Haem orrhage 
• History suspicious of VHF 
Moderate risk: 
• Febrile disease suggestive of VHF 
• Not severely ill 
• History suspicious of VHF 
Low risk: 
• Febrile disease suggestive of VHF 
• Not severely ill 
• No history suspicious of VHF 
 
 
Contacts of patients with a viral haemorrhagic fever 
 
1. Persons who have had close physical contact with the patient, especially where exchange 
of body fluids may have taken place. 
2. Personnel who had close contact with the patient and/or body fluids, especially without 
wearing the necessary PPE. 
3. Persons who were present with invasive procedures (e.g. drawing blood, insertion of lines, 
intubation etc.) 
4. Contacts are classified according to the exposure risk and followed up. See the section 
on the guidelines for the follow-up of contacts. 
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Mode of transmission 
 
The patient is adm itted to the healthcare facilit y with the VHF virus present in the body fluids. 
 
All personnel who are exposed to the patient and his/her environment in the health care facility 
are at risk of exposure to VHF. 
 
The virus is transm itted during direct/ indirect unprotected contact with a VHF patient (alive or 
deceased) 
OR 
Through the inhalation of aerosolized blood/body fluid droplets. 
 
The virus is also transmitted during unprotected contact with VHF infectious body fluids OR 
Contam inated m edical equipm ent and supplies OR 
As a result of an accidental needle stick injury or accidental exposure to infectious body fluids. 
 
The exposed person carries the virus back to the community.  Transm ission continues if there is 
Direct person-to-person contact OR 
Any unprotected contact with infectious body fluids 
 
 
Immediate actions when VHF is suspected 
Identification of an isolation area for a suspected/confirmed VHF patient 
 
1.  The m oment a diagnosis of VHF is suspected, the patient must be immediately isolated in a 
single room with en-suite bathroom facilities. 
2.  Consider a room: 
• In a private ward area, with washable floor and surfaces 
• W ith negative pressure ventilation 
• If ventilation is part of a central ventilation system, the ventilation must be 
switched off 
• W ith an adjacent sluice and/or en-suite bathroom facility 
• W ith vacant rooms on both sides 
• W ith a window (if possible) to observe the patient. 
3.  Arrange for the area to be set up as specified in “Setting up an isolation area for a 
suspected/confirmed VHF patient” in Addendum 8. 
4.  Rem ove all unnecessary furniture and equipment not yet in contact with the patient, before 
patient admission. 
5.  Seal equipm ent (e.g. telephone, electronic monitors) in the room with transparent plastic 
bags and rubber bands or tape where possible (to protect the equipm ent), before admission 
of the patient. 
Continued... 
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Immediate actions when VHF is suspected, continued 
Identification of an isolation area for a suspected/confirmed VHF patient 
 
6.  Communicate with m edical practitioners, nursing managem ent, bed bookings and nursing 
units regarding the identified area. 
7.  Ensure that a means of communication is present in the room, such as a hand bell, 
telephone or intercom. 
8.  If the patient is transferred or adm itted from outside the hospital, the hospital should be 
informed in advance that a suspected VHF case is expected. 
• The patient must then admitted and isolated in the prepared isolation area  directly from 
the ambulance. 
• Do not admit the patient in the emergency centre. 
NOTE: It is preferred that a patient with VHF is admitted into a healthcare facility with 
an isolation unit (P4 unit) specifically equipped to manage these cases. 
9.  Apply strict contact and droplet precautions in addition to standard precautions at all 
tim es. 
NOTE: These isolation precautions must continue until a diagnosis has been confirmed. 
10. Lim it the number of personnel accessing the isolation area and ensure access control with 
no contact with other patients or visitors. 
11. Arrange for adequate staffing and provide a “Runner”/Observer to help with dressing e.g. 
putting on tape and undressing. 
12. Arrange for an adequate supply of PPE from pharmacy. 
13. Send for the pre-packed FED (Form idable Epidemic Disease) packs 
• Note:  It is strongly advised that FED packs are made up and are ready in a designated 
place (e.g. emergency centre or emergency cupboard) for personnel to call for. 
• The Management team and all personnel must be aware of where to locate the packs 
if required. This avoids confusion and time wastage. 
• All hospitals must have at least 3 FED packs and more in areas were VHFs are 
endem ic or in rural hospitals, where it will be problem atic to source additional PPE on 
short notice. 
• See Addendum 7 for suggested contents. 
14. Note:  Collection and transport of specimens 
• NB: Avoid unnecessary invasive procedures if not extremely necessary (e.g. drawing of 
blood). 
• Inform the laboratory m anager or clinical microbiologist on call of the suspected VHF. 
• All private laboratories have systems in place and are able to collect, pack and transport 
the specim ens to the NICD. 
• The private laboratories communicate with the NICD. 
• The treating physician needs to communicate with the NICD about which specimens 
should be collected. (Use NICD Hotline to enquire: see Addendum 5 for contact 
details) 
• In the event of specimens already being sent to a private laboratory, the 
laboratory manager must immediately be informed about the potential risk. 
• It is important to notify the blood bank if a blood sample of a suspected VHF patient is or 
was sent for cross matching. 
• See the section on drawing of blood, handling and transportation of specimens. 
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Notification and communication related to the suspected/confirmed VHF 
patient on admission 
 
1.  The unit manager or person in charge of the nursing unit notifies the following people: 
• Nursing manager  or person in charge of the hospital 
• CRM 
• Hospital manager 
• Occupational health practitioner 
• Client services manager 
• Catering departm ent 
• The rest of the m ulti-disciplinary team where necessary at the time. 
2.  The clinical risk manager notifies: 
• Housekeeping department. 
• Department of Health (DoH) – telephonically and complete the GW 17/5: Notification of 
Notifiable medical condition form and fax to the DoH. 
• National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD) after consulting the admitting 
doctor (to inform them of the specimen and the condition of the patient). This should 
preferably be done by the treating medical practitioner. 
• Infection prevention and control specialist of Mediclinic Southern Africa. 
• Refer to Addendum 5 for telephone num bers. 
• Confirm all telephonic conversations with fax or e-mail. 
3.  Classif y all patient contacts based on their level of exposure and follow up.  Use the 
associated docum ents as a guide. 
• Addendum  2, 3 & 4 
4.  The occupational health practitioner (or delegated personnel) and training and development 
consultant completes the Communicable Disease Exposure Register (N3485) of all 
personnel contacts immediately. 
5.  Identify an area where the Occupational health practitioner or delegated person classify and 
follow up personnel contacts. 
• This includes an area where fam ily/close contacts other than personnel can be 
counseled and educated. 
6.  Inform client service manager or delegated person of the management team to prepare a 
press release if necessary and m anage media queries. 
7.  If possible, take an adequate history of the patient or ask a fam ily m ember. 
• Pay special attention to the travel history and possible exposure. 
8.  Avoid hysteria as far as possible; arrange and make use of counselors timeously if 
indicated. 
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Communication guidelines 
 
 
Effective communication to personnel, fam ily, doctors and all other services is of utmost 
im portance in case of admitting a patient with VHF. 
 
1.  Information to all personnel (including technical departm ent and subcontractors e.g. 
housekeeping, catering). 
 
2.  Daily communication and updates to: 
• Personnel in the form of a newsletter and visits to the units (during both shifts) 
• Heads of departments 
• Medical practitioners 
• MCSA IPC specialist 
• DoH 
 
3.  Good record keeping of dates and time of conversations. 
• Keep record of all faxes, e-m ails and telephone calls 
• Follow telephonic conversations up with an e-mail. 
 
 
 
Education of personnel before entering the isolation area 
 
1.  Clinical risk manager to liaise with the training and developm ent consultant to provide 
training and education to personnel involve in the management of the patient on the following 
matters: 
•  Donning of PPE 
•  Rem oval of PPE 
NB: Observers/runners must be included in the training 
2.  All personnel need to receive training on the risks involved in non-adherence to isolation 
precautions and the wearing of PPE. 
3.  Provide personnel with VHF fact sheets. 
4.  It is advised that hospitals where VHFs are endemic and where there are regular transfers 
from other African countries should have dedicated personnel who are trained in the 
management of patients with VHF and donning and rem oval of PPE. 
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Setting up of an isolation area for a suspected/confirmed VHF patient 
 
 
Selection of an isolation area 
 
1.  Consult other members of the nursing m anagement team to select an isolation area 
(restricted area) which ideally has three cubicles: 
• A “clean change” area for the health care worker team to change into PPE before going 
into the isolation room. (This area must not be directly accessible from the post-contact 
area) 
• A “patient care” area (high risk area), preferably with negative pressure ventilation 
facilities 
• If ventilation is part of a central ventilation system, the ventilation should be 
switched off 
• A toilet/sluice adjacent to or leading off the “patient care” area 
• NB: A “post contact” change area where the healthcare workers can remove and 
disinfect (e.g. re-usable visors, plastic boots), where applicable, the protective equipment 
after caring for the patient 
• This room must have a hand wash basin to perform hand hygiene and privacy for 
undressing 
2.  NOTE: If structural problem s m ake the above impossible, one room can be used and 
divided into a pre- and post- contact area. 
Work on the principle of separation between clean and dirty. 
• Personnel can dress into scrubs prior to entering the pre-contact area where the PPE is 
donned. 
• Rem oval of the PPE must take place in the post-contact area. Nobody that exits the 
isolation area is allowed to remove PPE in the pre-contact area. 
Note: The room should preferably have window through which the patient and healthcare 
worker can be monitored 
3.  Ensure the emergency trolley is accessible, but is not positioned in the restricted area. 
4.  Set up a security barrier - “Restricted area” to cordon off the isolation area. 
• Entry m ust be restricted 
5.  Use the pre-packed FED packs. 
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Plan and stock the isolation area as follows: 
Clean change area 
 
 
This area may be off-site, if there are not three dedicated cubicles available 
 
Make nine stations in sequence from entrance to the room 
• Place adequate supplies of PPE at each station. 
• Place a notice for reminding personnel to wash hands prior to entering the area. 
Station 1: 
• Scrub suits (various sizes) from theatre. 
• Provide an area for outer clothes of personnel. 
Station 2: 
• Theatre balaclavas/caps (if full body suits are not used). 
Station 3: 
• Gloves for under the gown/suit – non sterile latex/latex free (not plastic). 
• Long cuffs and good quality and strength. 
Station 4: 
• Gowns  – Long sleeved, water repellent, disposable or 
• Protective suits – choose one size bigger than norm al size to ensure comfort and decrease 
restriction of movement. 
Station 5: 
• Boots / Over shoes (more than one layer, especially if the patient is bleeding). 
Station 6: 
• Long/extra length (below knee) single-use plastic aprons of good quality plastic. 
Station 7: 
• Gloves – non sterile and good quality with adequately long cuff and strength 
Station 8: 
• Masks – N95 respirators and/or surgical masks. 
Station 9: 
• Protective eye wear – full face visors / goggles- preferably disposable. 
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Patient care area (where the patient is isolated) 
 
1.  NB: Remove all unnecessary items and equipment prior to admission. 
2.  Cover and seal the necessary patient care equipment (e.g. telephone, electronic monitors) 
in the room with transparent plastic bags and rubber bands or tape where possible. 
3.  Do not allow any patient documentation to enter the room. 
• If documents were already in the room with the patient, it could be contaminated and 
must be placed in quarantine. 
• All follow-up records m ust be kept outside the room after the diagnosis was made. 
NOTE: Patient docum entation must always be kept outside of the isolation room. 
4.   Ensure the following: 
• Hand washing facilities with paper towels (hands free) and antibacterial soap 
(Chlorhexidine) 
• 70% Alcohol surface disinfectant (only for disinfection of thermom eters) 
• Baumanometer 
• Stethoscope 
• Thermometer 
• Plastic m attress and pillow covers intact 
• Condemned/disposable linen if available. 
• Oxygen and suction, patent and with necessary equipment 
• Sharps container, securely attached to the wall (Replace with disposable if re-usable us 
used e.g. Daniels Sharpsmart reusable containers for sharps) 
• W orking surface 
• W all clock with second hand 
• Bedpan/urinal/receiver 
• Use disposable if available, but do not put in macerator. It needs to be placed in 
the healthcare risk waste container after use 
• Disinfection station for boots at exit to “post contact” area, if boots are worn. Otherwise 
first layer of footwear should be rem oved and discarded 
• Cleaning equipm ent, e.g. plastic bucket and dedicated disposable cleaning cloths 
• Mop which can be disposed after use 
• Hypochlorite sachets 
• Extra roll of paper towels - to be used in event of spillage 
• Healthcare risk waste container 
• It must be rigid 
• It must have a washable surface 
• Do not use cardboard boxes (not leak proof) 
• Linen contam inated with blood and body fluids needs to be placed in the healthcare risk 
waste container to be incinerated 
• If the linen is not contaminated with blood and body fluids, it can be regarded as 
infectious linen and washed separately on a hot cycle with a disinfectant added 
Continued... 
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Patient care area, continued 
 
5.  Use a linen container with a yellow plastic bag for linen that is not contaminated with 
blood and body fluids. 
• Life support equipm ent, such as saturation monitor, ventilator, etc. (on standby outside 
the room) 
• Furniture (only essential) 
• Cot sides 
• Extra gloves 
• Aprons, extra long 
 
6.  Telephone (covered in plastic) 
 
5.  Set up the following station at the exit of the isolation room 
• Poster against wall on the decontamination steps of PPE (if re-usable visors and boots 
are used) 
• 70% alcohol hand rub 
• Container with hypochlorite 1:1000 ppm for the disinfection of boots (If rubber boots are 
used) 
• Healthcare risk waste container for used overshoes (first pair of overshoes need to be 
rem oved here). 
 
 
Post contact change area 
 
1.  Divide this room into a “clean” and “dirty” side.  The dirty side m ust be the nearest/adjacent 
to the exit from the patient room. 
• Yellow bags must be placed in a linen container for the used scrub suits 
• Red bags for contam inated waste e.g. masks/respirators, visors, disposable gowns, 
overshoes 
• Disinfectant station for boots, if rubber boots are used or goggles 
• Staff disrobe in the “dirty” side, wash hands at the basin and dress into clean scrubs or 
their own clothes in the “clean” side of the “post contact” change area (Clothes brought 
from “clean” change area by runner) 
 
2.  Set up the following stations: 
Station 10: 
• Rem oval of gowns 
Station 11: 
• Disinfect gloved (inner gloves) hands with alcohol hand rub after touching gown 
Station 12: 
• Rem ove eyewear, head cover and mask. 
Station 13: 
• Rem ove boots 
Station 14: 
• Rem ove inner pair of gloves. W ash hands 
Station 15: 
• Rem ove scrub suit and dress. If possible a shower should be taken prior to dressing 
Station 16: 
• W ash hands with an antibacterial soap (chlorhexidine) under running water and dry with 
paper towel 
• Exit from area 
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General rules 
 
1.  Adequate PPE is needed to protect the HCW against possible transmission of the disease. 
2.  The level of risk determines the level of protection. (If the patient is bleeding actively, m ore 
protection is needed.) 
3.  Place “station” signs above each item of clothing (available from FED pack). 
4.  Put up posters on the sequence of donning (to be printed from the policy and laminated 
and available in FED pack) and removal of PPE in the applicable areas. 
5.  Ensure an adequate supply of: 
• Red and yellow bags 
• Sachets of hypochlorite granules and a guide on the dilution (1:10 000 ppm for spillage 
of blood and body fluids and 1:1000ppm for disinfection of surfaces) 
• Measuring jug 
• Disposable cleaning cloths 
• Roll of masking tape (or similar product) for securing protective clothing. 
6.  Tray (stay outside of the patient care area at all times) - used to exchange goods between 
staff (inside and outside the patient care area) to prevent hand contact between personnel 
(touch free). 
7.  Support the personnel. 
8.  Arrange for the observer/runner to assist with dressing of the healthcare worker e.g. putting 
on tape, ensuring that all skin is covered, monitor practices and undressing, etc. 
9.  Rem ove watch, valuables and jewellery and put in safekeeping. 
10. Note: It is important to go to the bathroom and drink some fluid prior to dressing. 
• The HCW cannot undress or drink anything after he/she has entered the Isolation area. 
11. Duration of Isolation: 
• Once the haematological and biochem ical parameters have normalized and there is no 
longer bleeding, together with clinical im provement, the patient can be discharged from 
the hospital. 
• The virus however, rem ains detectable in hum an blood for up to 2 – 6 weeks after the 
onset of the illness (depending on the type of VHF). 
• Although there is no proof that the virus continues to be excreted in body fluids, patients 
should refrain from intimate contact with other people for 6 weeks after recovery from 
the disease. 
• Note: The patient should be isolated until discharge from the hospital. 
• Once the bleeding has stopped and the clinical picture im proves it is adequate to 
continue with contact precautions (long aprons, gloves and masks/visors when a 
procedure is performed where there is a risk of aerosolisation). 
• The patient should preferably stay in the same room until discharge. 
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Principles of Personal Protective Equipment 
 
No exposed  skin should  be visible after donning of PPE 
The layers of PPE depend on the risk of contamination 
If the patient is bleeding excessively -more protection is required 
 
 
 
First layer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High risk (Excessive bleeding) Low risk 
Theatre scrubs Theatre scrubs 
Normal shoes 
NB- no open heels or toes 
Normal shoes 
NB- no open heels or toes 
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Second layer 
 
 
 
 
 
High risk (Excessive bleeding) Low risk 
First layer PPE First layer PPE 
Balaclava Balaclava 
 
N95 Respirator with visor/ eye protection 
Surgical mask with   visor/ eye protection and 
N95 respirator when aerosolising procedures 
are performed 
Plastic apron (only if a gown is worn)  
Single-use overshoes Single-use overshoes 
Gloves: 1st pair Gloves: 1st pair 
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Third layer 
 
 
 
 
High risk (Excessive bleeding) Low risk 
First & second layer PPE First and second layer PPE 
Single-use gown/suit (long sleeved & fluid 
repellent) 
Single-use gown (long sleeved & fluid 
repellent) 
 
Full face visor (preferably  disposable) 
Full face visor only when procedures are 
performed 
Plastic apron (that can be removed and 
replaced) when soiled 
 
Plastic apron 
Gloves: 2"d pair Gloves: 2"d pair 
Plastic/ water repellent overshoes or Gum boots 
(or plastic bags followed by paper overshoes to 
prevent slipping) 
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Guidelines for the removal and decontamination of PPE 
(Single-use PPE must be used as far as possible) 
 
1. Before leaving the patient care area: 
 
1.  W ash hand with antibacterial soap (Chlorhexidine) over both pairs of gloves. 
2.  Move to exit of room. 
3.  If re-usable items are used (e.g. visor) it should be wiped with paper towel and hypochlorite 
solution (1:1000 ppm). 
4.  Rem ove plastic apron by tearing the band around the neck and remove in a rolling movement 
(without touching the outside) and discard in the healthcare risk waste container. 
5.  Rem ove water repellent overshoes (first layer) and discard in healthcare risk waste container. 
6.  Rem ove 2nd (outer) pair of gloves with cross hand action and discard. 
7.  W ash/disinfect hands with 1st pair of gloves on. 
8.  Move into post contact dirty area. 
 
 
Before leaving the post contact dirty area: 
 
1.  W ash/disinfect hands with 1st pair of gloves on. 
2.  Rem ove visor. 
3.  Place full face visor in bucket with hypochlorite (1:1000 ppm ) solution and soak for 10 minutes 
(if not single-use) or discard in healthcare risk waste container. 
4.  Rem ove gown/suit with cross-arm technique- roll-up soiled side inside and discard. 
5.  Rem ove mask/ respirator without touching the front part and discard in healthcare risk waste 
container. 
6.  Rem ove balaclava/cap and discard in healthcare risk waste container. 
7.  If an apron is worn under the gown (in the event of severe haem orrhage) remove apron by 
tearing the band around the neck and remove in a rolling m ovement with the soiled side inside 
and discard in healthcare risk waste container. 
8.  Rem ove paper overshoes and discard in healthcare risk waste container. 
9.  Rem ove gloves with cross-hand action and discard. 
10. W ash hands with antibacterial soap and water and dry with paper towel. 
11. Move into post contact clean area. 
 
 
Before leaving the post contact clean area: 
 
1.  W ash hands properly with an antibacterial soap and running water and dry with paper 
towel. 
2.  Rem ove scrubs. 
3.  Shower if possible. 
4.  Dress in normal uniform / clean scrubs. 
5.  Scrubs or uniform worn in Patient Isolation Area must be washed before re-use. 
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Disinfection of equipment and the environment 
 
1.  Use single-use items and equipment which can be discarded after use as far as 
possible. 
• Only take the most essential equipment into the Isolation room 
• Keep life support equipment on standby, but do not take it into the Isolation room 
• PPE should be worn at all times during the cleaning process 
• Rem ove all organic m atter with a detergent and water (An enzym atic cleaner, e.g. 
Endozym e
®
, m ust be used) 
• Disinfect with a Hypochlorite solution 1:1000 ppm 
• Place the equipment into double paper bags and then in a red plastic bag, marked 
‘HIGHLY CONTAGIOUS” and send to the CSSD 
• Sterilise with Ethylene Oxide or autoclave if possible (According to Manufacturers 
guideline) 
• NOTE: Notify the CSSD supervisor before the items leave the isolation area. 
The transport of the items should be supervised by a responsible person. 
Ensure that the CSSD personnel wear adequate PPE when they decontaminate the 
equipment. 
2.  Cutlery and crockery 
• Use disposable cutlery and crockery and discard into the red healthcare risk waste 
container. 
3.  Personal protective equipment 
•  Poster against wall on decontamination steps of PPE (if re-usable visors and boots are 
used) 
•  Container with hypochlorite 1:1000 ppm for the disinfection of boots (If rubber boots are 
used) 
•  Rem ove first pair of overshoes and place in a dedicated healthcare risk waste container 
for used overshoes. 
3.  Bedpans and other containers for secretions/excretions such as blood an vomitus 
•  Treat contents with disinfectant (hypochlorite 1:10 000 ppm) for at least 10 minutes and 
discard directly into a drain (toilet/sluice) 
• Care should be taken not to spill or splash 
• It is preferred to use single use containers that can be incinerated after use 
•  If Vernacare® products are used, it should not be discarded in the macerator, but 
incinerated 
•  If a single-use container is not used, the container must be washed with a detergent and 
water and then disinfected with hypochlorite 1:10 000 ppm after the content is discarded. 
4.  Ventilator 
• A closed system m ust be used and all products must be single use. 
• A HEPA filter (bacterial/viral) must be used 
• Rem ove the breathing circuit, expiration valve, flow sensor and filter at the back of the 
ventilator and treat as healthcare risk waste (to be incinerated) 
• Disinfect the outside of the ventilator with a hypochlorite solution 1:1000 ppm 
• Contact the m anufacturer of the specific ventilator for further instructions 
• The ventilator must be disinfected and quarantined according to the m anufacturer’s 
guidelines. 
Continued... 
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Disinfection of equipment and the environment, continued 
 
5.  Dialysis machine 
• In the event of dialysis, disposable components must be used as far as possible 
• Contact the Dialysis Company for cleaning guidelines of their equipment when it was 
used on a patient with VHF. 
 
6.  Disinfection of the environment 
• W ear PPE 
• Use a separate set of dedicated equipm ent for each area 
• Start at the area with the lowest risk (‘clean’ to ‘dirty’) 
• Discard cloths after use 
 
 
Concurrent 
• Disinfect the area twice a day using a Hypochlorite solution 1:1000 ppm 
• (“Patient care” area to be cleaned by nurse practitioners) 
 
 
Terminal 
• W ear full PPE and a double layer of gloves 
• The CRM m ust be present and m onitor the cleaning process 
• Note: If there are high amounts of body fluids from a patient who was haemorrhaging, 
cleaning is a very high risk procedure and extreme care should be taken. After cleaning 
the area should be disinfected with a Hypochlorite solution 1:10 000 ppm 
• A hydrogen peroxide fogger can also be used to first fog the area before the initial 
cleaning process commence, to reduce the risk of transmission of the virus. 
 
 
 
Management of healthcare risk waste 
 
1.  Treat all waste as contaminated and place in the red healthcare risk waste container. 
• Do not place cardboard boxes in patient care area, as they cannot be disinfected 
2.  Double bag waste into special container for immediate removal by service provider. 
3.  Mark “BIO HAZARDOUS”. 
4.  The person colleting the waste must wear PPE: double gloves, disposable gown and/or long 
apron. 
5.  NB: The service provider must be contacted regarding special handling and guaranteed 
immediate incineration of this waste. 
6.   An incineration certificate must be provided. 
7.  If the VHF diagnosis is only suspected, waste can be sealed and kept in the patient care 
area. 
• If the diagnosis subsequently proves to be of a non-infectious nature the waste can be 
released and processed normally. 
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Drawing of blood and handling of specimens 
 
1.  Specific diagnostic tests for viral haemorrhagic fevers are performed only by the Special 
Pathogens Unit of the National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD). 
2.  The m edical practitioner must personally consult the contact person at the NICD to confirm 
the specimen tubes to be used and that they should expect a specim en.  See Addendum 5. 
3.  The m edical practitioner must complete the NICD request form, Investigation of suspected 
viral haem orrhagic fever form. (Addendum 6) or available at the following link: 
• http://nicd.ac.za/assets/files/VHF  test   request  form.pdf 
4.  Contact the m anager or microbiologist on call to inform them of the possible VHF. 
5.  The person obtaining the blood specimen must be accompanied by som ebody that can 
assist and observe unsafe practices. 
• Droplet and contact precautions must be taken in addition to standard precautions at all 
tim es. 
6.  Take extreme care when blood is drawn, PPE must be worn. 
 
 
Packaging of specimens 
 
1.  The laboratory will collect and pack the specimens. (Specimens of suspected patients must 
never be transported in the vacuum system [“Shute”] of a hospital). 
2.  Packaging will be done by the laboratory personnel if there is a laboratory on site, and 
otherwise by a senior member of the Health Care Team. 
3.  Label all specimens clearly. 
4.  W rap each specimen tube in sufficient absorbent material (e.g. paper towel) to absorb the 
entire contents in the event of leakage. 
5.  Place each individual tube into a biohazard plastic bag and seal. 
6.  Pack tightly into a rigid walled container (Container No 1). 
7.  Seal the lid of the rigid walled container with broad adhesive tape and label as “HIGHLY 
CONTAGIOUS”. 
8.  Place one copy of the laboratory request form for suspected VHF’s in a strong plastic sleeve 
and wrap around this container (as per Addendum 6 – need two copies). 
• NICD Request form: Investigation of suspected VHF 
9.  Place the first rigid walled container into a plastic specimen container (bucket), pack tightly 
with absorbent material e.g. foam chips, shredded paper.  (Container No. 2) 
• Seal the lid with broad adhesive tape and label as “HIGHLY CONTAGIOUS” 
10. Place the sealed plastic specimen container in a polystyrene container with cold packs (the 
size used by blood banks).  (Container No. 3) 
• Place the “HIGHLY CONTAGIOUS” label on all four sides 
11. The doctor provides the clinical history of the patient (Addendum 6 – second copy) 
• Tape the completed form under the handle of the polystyrene container 
Continued... 
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Packaging of specimens, continued 
 
12. Place the polystyrene holder finally in a cardboard box (Container No 4) 
• Once again pack tightly with sufficient absorbent material.  Seal the box and label as 
“HIGHLY CONTAGIOUS”. 
13. W rap the cardboard box in brown paper.  Seal all the folds with broad adhesive tape. 
Ensure that all folds are sealed. 
14. Label parcels on top with: 
• Special Pathogens Unit (Provide name of person with whom the doctor spoke 
concerning the specimen) 
• National Institute of Communicable Diseases 
• Modderfontein Road 
• Sandringham 
• JOHANNESBURG 
• Telephone (011) 386-6000 
15. Stick a “HIGHLY CONTAGIOUS” label on all sides of the box. 
16. Indicate the topside with black arrows. 
17. The courier must sign in the patient’s records that he has taken the package and insert 
waybill num ber. 
18. It is important that the CRM/laboratory follow-up on the specim en to ensure that it arrived at 
the NICD. 
• Refer to die waybill number during communication 
 
 
Transport of blood specimens to the National Institute for 
Communicable Diseases in Johannesburg 
 
1.  The private laboratory arranges transport through their courier. 
• The driver must be made aware of the bio-hazardous nature of the contents of the 
package 
2.  The NICD laboratory request form, as well as a dangerous good declaration and a clinical 
history, completed by the treating physician m ust accompany the specimen. 
• The courier forms also need to be completed. 
3.  It is essential to inform the Special Pathogens Unit at the NICD in advance when urgent 
specim ens are dispatched. 
• Use the Hot line and supply the waybill number. (For telephone number see 
Addendum 5) 
4.  The waybill number, a flight number and the time and date that the parcel leaves as well as 
when it arrives in Johannesburg must be recorded. 
5.  The inform ation in point 4 must be faxed to the contact person who was informed about the 
sam ples at the NICD. 
27 
 
 
Management of accidental blood and body fluid exposure 
 
This includes accidental needle stick injuries, splash exposures from blood and 
body fluids, secretions or excretions 
 
1.  Encourage free bleeding and clean the injured site liberally with water where mucous 
membranes are affected by the incident. 
2.  Do not apply caustic agents or antiseptic agents to the wound, because they m ay injure the 
viable tissue and facilitate transmission. 
3.  Notif y the occupational health practitioner or nurse manager in charge and the clinical risk 
manager immediately after exposure to blood or body fluid. 
• In addition to the above steps, refer to the corporate policy: Management of blood 
and body fluid exposure 
4.  The person affected will need close follow up and m onitoring for any signs and sym ptoms of 
acquired infection. 
5.  Any injury sustained during patient care m ust be reported immediately. 
 
 
Classification and follow-up of contacts 
 
1.  The purpose of tracing all VHF contacts and placing them under observation is to prevent 
and control the spread of the infection. 
2.  Prepare a register (N3485) of all known contacts even though the diagnosis of the patient 
has not been verified. 
• List all the nursing units involved 
• Base the criteria on the case definition provided by the NICD 
3.  The duration of contact follow up is based on the incubation period of the specific VHF. 
• It is counted from the day of last exposure onwards 
• Contact the NICD for the specific time that contacts need to be followed up 
4.  Divide the contacts into high, m edium and low risk. 
• Low risk contacts have had indirect contact with the VHF patient or other source of 
infection on a single or few occasions, e.g. all the patients and personnel in the ward at 
the tim e of admission, who have not had contact with the patient’s blood or body fluids 
• Medium risk contacts have had close and prolonged contact with the VHF patient or 
other source of infection. This includes intimate friends of a VHF patient, relative and 
medical personnel 
• High-risk contacts have had definite exposure to blood and body fluids of a person 
confirmed with VHF 
• A sharps injury and contact with blood and body fluids is a high-risk incident. 
• Porters, am bulance personnel, X-ray departm ent, cleaning personnel, physiotherapists, 
blood bank and laboratory personnel are also considered to be contacts, especially if 
contact was made or specim ens were taken before verification of diagnosis.  (Use 
Addendum 4 as a guide) 
• NOTE: The risk classification will depend on the disease and case definition 
• High risk contacts should be followed up with personal interviews. Low risk 
contacts may be interviewed telephonically 
Continued... 
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Classification and follow-up of contacts, continued 
 
5.  NB: All personnel who fulfill the criteria for high risk contacts must report daily to the area 
where contacts are followed up. 
• Failure to report must be followed up 
6.   The occupational health practitioner or dedicated person records relevant information e.g. 
monitors temperatures twice a day and criteria related to signs and sym ptoms of high risk 
contacts: 
• During the period of isolation and 
• For the duration of the incubation period of the specific haemorrhagic fever 
• Low risk contacts can be followed up telephonically (Use Addendum 2) 
7.  High risk contacts m ust be kept under close observation for the duration of the follow-up 
period and monitored for any signs and sym ptoms of the disease 
• If necessary, they need to be adm itted, isolated and monitored closely 
8.  Any contact that develops fever (tem perature of 38°C or more) or any signs or sym ptoms 
suggestive of VHF, m ust be place in isolation and treated as a suspected case 
• The necessary laboratory investigations need to be done if indicated 
9.  Liaise with and notif y the Department of Health 
• Provide the names and contact details of all contacts 
• Provide a daily update of the tem peratures and condition of the contacts 
• The DoH assists with the follow-up of community contacts 
 
 
Deaths related to a viral haemorrhagic fever 
In the event of death of a suspected or confirmed case of Viral Haemorrhagic Fever the following 
must be done: 
 
1.  The doctor notifies the family of the demise of the patient and explains that the body is 
highly contagious. 
• Access to the body is not advised 
• If access cannot be avoided strict supervision by medical/nursing personnel is critical 
• The CRM m ust supervise the procedure 
2.  The hospital manager/nursing manager/clinical risk manager m ust notify the Departm ent of 
Health. 
3.  If the diagnosis of suspected VHF has not been established, the minimal specim ens such as 
needle biopsy or liver and heart blood are taken and submitted to the Special Pathogens 
unit at the NICD to confirm the diagnosis. 
•  The person collecting the specimen m ust wear full PPF 
4.  The fam ily is requested to indicate an undertaker and the Hospital Manager or the Nursing 
Manager should m ake the necessary arrangements. 
5.  The body m ust be buried or cremated immediately. 
6.  The undertakers must be informed of the infectious status of the body.  This is essential as 
they have to bring a special casket. 
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Laying out procedure 
 
1.  Lay out the body as soon as the doctor and the Departm ent of Health give their permission 
• Follow the procedure for managem ent of an infected corpse. Refer to the Corporate 
policy: Care of the deceased with a communicable disease 
• Note: It is essential that 2 persons attend the body with a “runner” available 
2.  The personnel who are to layout the body wear full PPE as were used during isolation of the 
patient. 
3.  Do not wash the body. 
4.  Seal all sites draining body fluids or likely to drain fluids with adhesive dressings. 
5.  Place the body in a shroud and then two body bags, each sealed with tape and washed 
down with Hypochlorite Solution 1:1 000 ppm.  (The first body bag should be transparent for 
identification purposes)  Apply “Hazardous” stickers and identification stickers to the bags. 
6.  The undertakers should go directly to the unit to remove the body in the special casket. 
7.  Record in the patients file to whom the body was handed over. 
• A name and signature of the person receiving the body m ust be obtained 
• Record the fact that this person was inform ed about the infectious state of the body 
8.  Discard protective clothing as per isolation protocol prior to leaving the room. 
 
 
Terminal disinfection of the room after discharge/ transfer/death of a patient w ith 
suspected/ confirmed viral haemorrhagic fever 
 
1.  W ear full PPE. 
2.  An observer (CRM) m ust be present to: 
• Monitor and evaluate the cleaning process 
• To alert the person who cleans if an unsafe practice was observed 
3.  Discard all disposable item s in the room (used and unused items). 
4.  Clean and disinfect all items being sent for sterilisation before leaving the room. 
5.  Sterilise the items that are not discarded, using Ethylene Oxide or steam, if perm itted. 
6.  Place the items in 2 paper bags and then in a red plastic bag, m arked ‘HIGHLY 
CONTAGIOUS” and send to the CSSD. 
• Notif y the department supervisor before the items leave the isolation area. The 
transportation of the items should be supervised by a responsible person 
7.  Discard all linen into contam inated waste containers. 
• Linen contam inated with blood and body fluids must be incinerated 
8.  W ash equipment and furniture that cannot be sterilised with an enzym atic detergent 
(Endozym e
®
) and water and then disinfect with a hypochlorite solution 1:1000 ppm. 
9.  W ash the walls and floor with hypochlorite 1: 1000 ppm solution. 
10. Disinfect equipment according to manufacturer’s instructions. 
11. Technical to replace the filter in the air-conditioner and clean the socket. 
• Full PPE m ust be worn when the filter is replaced 
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Definitions 
 
Term Definition 
Body fluids Any substance/ fluid from the body, including: blood, 
excretions, secretions, exudates or biological samples. 
• Excretions: urine, stools, vomit, m econium, Lochia 
• Secretions: saliva, mucous, sperm, m ilk and colostrum, 
tears, wax, caseosa (until first bath) 
• Transudate/exudate: pleural fluid, cerebrospinal fluid, ascites 
fluid, synovial fluid, am niotic fluid, pus, with the exception 
of sweat 
• Biological sam ples: samples taken from the body (including 
tissue sam ples, the placenta, cytological sam ples or bone 
marrow) 
Communicable disease Transm ission of an infectious agent or its toxic product from an 
infected person, animal or reservoir to a susceptible host (a 
disease that can be communicated from one person to another). 
Contact It is a person who had contact with the affected patient at any 
tim e for the duration of the disease, from the onset of the 
disease. Contact can be in the following ways: 
• Sharing the same residence 
• Face-to-face contact (within one m eter) 
• Skin or m ucous membrane contact or 
• Penetrating injury with the patient’s secretions, excretions, 
blood or other tissues 
• This would include sim ilar exposure to anim al tissues in 
situations where such exposure is considered to be the 
source of infection 
Contact precautions Precautions to prevent the direct or indirect transm ission of 
micro-organism. 
• Direct-contact transm ission involves skin-to-skin contact and 
physical transfer of m icro-organisms to a susceptible host 
from an infected or colonised person or source e.g. when 
health care workers perform patient-care activities that 
require physical contact, such as turning or bathing the 
patient 
• Direct-contact transm ission can also occur between two 
patients 
• Indirect-contact transm ission involves contact of a 
susceptible host with a contaminated object in the patient's 
environment e.g. equipment or contam inated wash basins 
Contamination The presence of a potentially infectious agent on a surface. 
Decontamination Decontamination is a general term for the destruction or removal 
of m icrobial contamination to render an item safe. 
• It can also cover removal of non-m icrobial matter. This will 
include methods of cleaning, disinfection and sterilisation as 
appropriate 
Continued... 
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Definitions, continued 
 
Personal protective 
Equipm ent (PPE) 
Equipm ent used to protect the user from transm ission of 
infection. 
• This includes the use of a mask/respirator, plastic apron, 
protective eyewear, disposable gloves and boots, where 
necessary, to protect from potential contamination or spills 
Standard precautions Routine precautions that reduce the risk of transmission of 
micro-organisms from both recognised and unrecognised 
sources of infection in healthcare settings. 
Precautions to be applied in all patients and in all situations, 
regardless of diagnosis or possible infectious status to protect 
the health care worker from occupational exposure to patient’s 
blood and/or body fluids. 
 
 
Includes the following: 
• Optimum hand hygiene (Hand wash or alcohol hand rub) 
• Use of appropriate PPE (e.g. gloves, aprons, etc.) when 
there is a possibilit y of exposure to blood and body fluids 
• Safe injection practices 
• Safe, immediate discard of used hypoderm ic needles and 
sharps 
• Healthcare risk waste management (colour coding and 
disposal) 
• Maintaining a clean environment 
• Handling of used linen 
• Decontamination and sterilisation of m edical devices 
between patient use 
Viral hemorrhagic fevers 
(VHFs) 
It refers to a group of diseases that are caused by several 
distinct families of viruses, namely: Arena viruses, Filo viruses, 
Bunya viruses and Flavi viruses. 
• The term "viral hemorrhagic fever" is used to describe a 
severe multisystem syndrome and therefore m ultiple organ 
system s in the body are affected 
• The overall vascular system is usually dam aged and the 
body's ability to regulate itself is impaired 
• These sym ptoms are often accompanied by haemorrhage 
(bleeding) 
• The bleeding is itself rarely life-threatening 
Som e types of hem orrhagic fever viruses can cause relatively 
mild illnesses, but many of these viruses cause severe, life- 
threatening disease. 
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Associated documents and records 
 
Title Number Location 
Mediclinic infection prevention and control policies  Intranet 
Mediclinic corporate policy:  Care of the deceased with a 
communicable disease 
 Intranet 
Mediclinic corporate policy:  Isolation precautions  Intranet 
GW 17/5 Notification Report  DoH 
Communicable Disease Exposure Register N3485 Intranet 
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Addendum 1 
 
 
Criteria for Clinical Diagnosis of Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever 
(R. Swanepoel, S. Harvey, J.H. Mynhardt – 1987, reproduced with permission from Prof. R. Swanepoel, 
National Institute Virology) 
 
 
History of Exposure Less than 
one week 
Score 
More than one 
week / 
undetermined 
 
Bitten by tick/s or crushed tick/s with bare hands 3 2* 
 
Had direct contact with fresh blood or other tissues of 
livestock or game anim als 
 
Had direct contact with blood, secretions or excretions of 
confirmed or suspected CCHF patient (including needle 
pricks) 
 
Resided in or visited a rural environment where contact with 
livestock or ticks was possible, but a specific incident 
constituting exposure cannot be identified 
 
Signs and Symptoms 
 
3** 2*** 
 
 
3 2 
 
 
 
2 1 
 
Sudden onset 1 
 
Fever m ore than 38°C on at least one occasion 1 
 
Severe headache 1 
 
Myalgia 1 
 
Nausea and / or vomiting 1 
 
Bleeding tendency: Petechial rash, Ecchym osis, Epistaxis, 3 
Haem atemesis, Haematuria or Malaena 
 
Clinical pathology during the first 5 days of illness 1 
 
Leucopoenia or Leucocytosis W CC <3 x 109/L or >8 x 109/L 1 
Throm bocytopenia Platelets <150 x 10
9
/L Platelets <100 x 2 
10
9
/L 
 
More than 50% decrease in either W CC or platelet counts 1 
within 3 days. 
 
Abnorm al PT/ INR 1 
 
Abnorm al PTT 1 
 
Raised Transam inase 
AST>100 IU/L 1 
ASL >100 IU/L 
 
Explanation 
*    South African tick-borne Typhus must be excluded 
**   Rift-Valley Fever must be excluded 
***  Brucellosis, Q-Fever and Anthrax must be excluded 
 
 
A score of 12 points would constitute an indication of treating the patient as a case of CCHF 
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Contact: Initial Questionnaire 
Addendum 2 
Nam e    Date of Contact      
Address    Age   Gender M F 
Telephone    
Cellular    
Date of first contact with patient 
Date of last contact with patient 
Nam e of patient 
Do you feel well?                                                                                 Yes                  No 
 
 
 
Signs and symptoms if does not feel well 
 
Fever Yes No 
Headache Yes No 
Generalised Aches and Pain Yes No 
Nausea / Vomiting / Diarrhoea Yes No 
Cough Yes No 
Conjunctivitis Yes No 
Abnorm al Bleeding (Malaena / Epistaxis/ Vaginal bleeding/ Haematem esis) Yes No 
Rash Yes No 
Other  
 
 
Degree of contact 
 
Live in same home Yes No 
W hat kind of contact did you had with patient? Specify 
W as prim ary care provided to the patient: Specif y Yes No 
 
Assisted with care: Specify Yes No 
Did you wear PPE:  Specify: Yes No 
Gloves Yes No 
Mask Yes No 
Visor/Goggles Yes No 
Apron Yes No 
Gown Yes No 
Continued… 
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Degree of contact, continued 
 
Did you assist with invasive procedures Yes No 
Direct/indirect exposure to blood / body fluids Yes No 
If “yes”, specify: 
W here you involve during resuscitation of the patient Yes No 
W hat did you do: Specify 
Sharp injury? Yes No 
If “yes” : Action taken  
 
 
Questionnaire com pleted by:    
 
• Active surveillance    
• Passive surveillance (telephonic only)    
 
 
Date:    Signature: 
 
 
On advice of NICD/medical officer/Department  of Health, identify criteria w hich indicates high risk (to 
be monitored in person) and low risk to be monitored telephonically 
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Contact: Follow-Up Questionnaire 
(To be filed behind Initial Questionnaire) 
 
 
Information is to be entered on Addendum 3 or 4 according to High or low risk. 
Addendum 3 
 
Nam e    Date of Visit    
Address:     
 
 
 
 
 Yes No 
Do you feel well Yes No 
If no: signs and sym ptoms Yes No 
• Fever Yes No 
• Headache Yes No 
• Generalised aches and pains Yes No 
• Nausea/vomiting/Diarrhea Yes No 
• Cough Yes No 
• Conjunctivitis Yes No 
• Abnorm al bleeding (Malaena/Epistaxis / vaginal bleeding /Haematemesis Yes No 
• Rash Yes No 
Other:   
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
Com pleted by:    
Action taken:    
 
 
 
Date Signature:    
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Tracing of contacts 
Addendum 4 
Com plete the following questionnaire.  Each person identified in the questions will have to provide 
further information as on the contact list. 
 
 
Date  of  adm ission: 
Tim e of adm ission: 
Escorted by whom : 
Did any adm ission officer take down his details?                              Yes             No 
 
 
If yes, please provide name?                                                                                       
 
 
Did a porter or any other person/s aid him to gain admission into the nursing unit/ 
outpatient departm ent/emergency services department? 
 
 
 
W ho received the patient in the above department? 
W ho did his adm ission observations? 
Did anybody exam ine the patient in the above department?    
 
 
W ho else had contact with the patient in that department?    
 
 
W hat treatm ent /special investigations/X-Rays did the patient have? 
 
 
 
W ho was involved in the treatment/investigations above?    
 
 
W as any blood or other specim ens sent to the laboratory?  Nam e the type of specimen. 
W hen was he transferred to the nursing unit where he is at present? 
W ho assisted in the transfer procedure? 
 
 
List all the persons known to have had direct contact with the patient and check that they are listed 
on either Addendum 3 or 4. 
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Addendum 5 
 
 
Contact telephone numbers - Management of a patient with viral 
haemorrhagic fever 
 
Contact person Location Telephone nr. Cell number 
Prof Lucille Blum berg National Institute of communicable 
Diseases 
011 386 6337 082 807 6770 
Dr Juno Thom as National Outbreak Unit, 
National Institute of communicable 
Diseases 
011 555 0392 082 940 4780 
Laboratory enquiries: 
Dr Jacqueline W eyer 
 
 
Senior Medical Scientist, Centre of 
Emerging and Zoonotic Diseases 
 
 
011 386 6376 
 
 
082 903 9131 
NICD Outbreak Hotline Available 24 hours  082 883 9920 
NICD Address National Institute for 
Communicable Diseases 
1 Modderfontein Road 
Sandringham 
2131 
South Africa 
011 386-6000  
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Addendum 6 
 
 
 
NATIONAL   INSTITUTE  f OR COMMUNICABLE  015EA5E5 
of the NATIONAL HEALTH LABORATORY  SERVICE 
 
PractiOf NO.5200768 
SPECIAL PATHOGENS UNIT 
t lllo«<tr1onttln Rd. l d Obllll\, Jolltnnt ;burg:     Prlvt!t &tg:X4,1andrlngh ¥n 2U1. Iouth  Aftlot 
 
 
 
NICO 
 
31)eda1PenUnl! 
f t100l7 t 0)11 JUIOOOitUtl 
FaJ0027 (0)11 Ill 3141 
3PUbboU!!It'/ cu,nc llc : n 3PU'"!,..., G ,nc klan 
c !I OtHOJt1l1 Ceii Ot l tc U 
 
Hea1:1 ot3PU 
Ctl Ctl to1tfl41 
 
REQUEST FORM:INVESTIGATION OF SUSPECTED VIRAL HAEMORRHAGIC FEVER 
Completed form must ;.ccompany specimens 
 
Referring doctor .•....  • Patient ...... 
 
AQe •............•....•.•.......•.Sex•.. 
 
.•...•..•..Code Hospital m. ber.•.• 
 
Tel(W ) ..• Hospital..•....•.•.•..• 
.•...• 
 
 
.•...Ward 
 
Tel(AI'Horcellular) - ··-  ···- ··- -  · Date of admission.•.·········-  · 
Fax....... ............ ...... ................... .... ....   Mecl"icJI fund .. ..... ....... ...  . . No.... ..... ... 
Account to:..... ...... ......  ...... ...... .... ........  ..... ...... ......  ....... ......  .... .......Code .....  ....... .
 
Sp.cirnenls ............. . .. ... ........... ..... ..... ...  . ..... ....  ...Oatt taktn .. .... ...  . ... .. 
OiseJse suspecte<il\ests re<f,ired....  ...... .....  
........ .......................  .... ........ ...... ........ ........  ........ Possible exposure to viralhaemorrhagic 
fever (e.g ooeup.1tion.urban or ruralresident. historyof travel.  c:on1<1Ct wi h .lnim  s or hum.ln 
pJtitnt. inseeii\X:It bilesg·ive <btu). ........ ...... ........ ........ ............. ....... 
 
 
N B. ACCURATE DATE OF ONSET OF I 
NESS...•......•.  •....•...•....  •.•..•...•....•......•.  •....  •.•..•.•......•...•.. 
Cll'lie ll history 3nd tXJml nation ............... ........ .................. ...... ........................ ..... ............... ........ .. 
 
 
Treabnent (antibiotics!antimalariJis)........................ ...... ........ ............. ......... ..... .. ..... . 
 
....... ........ ......... Resutls ofl. boratcr  investigations Jlreaclv perlonned: 
 Date    
Totalleukocytes   
Oifte' renJI%NIL   
Pb! elets   
H.1emoglobl'l   
COJgulation testfs   
A l   
AST   
MaiJna p-JrJsites   
 
Blood culture 
   
 
\\'oriel HuOl'g n!z r IMC Olollbot= lhll Ctn'n 
for Hllemo mr,  ,c  Fevtl'$& MO'IY\I$ Dl:«it1 
Mtmett Of!beI Onll Eftl li !)OI-.)'JOI'y  Ntt wot k 
1ft lflt u pu l;f ot aRIOnlll Rr.nc t lllllor¥.1 11Y 
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Addendum 7 
 
Management of patient with viral haemorrhagic fever 
Suggested contents of FED pack (formidable epidemic disease pack) 
 
Copy of the corporate policy: Management of a patient with a suspected or confirmed viral 
haemorrhagic fever. 
Signage: (Lam inated) 
• Restricted Area 
• Hand-washing before entry 
• Stations 1 - 9 
• Hypochlorite Dilution Sheet 
• Posters showing sequence for dressing and undressing of PPE 
Masks: 
• N95 respirators and surgical masks 
Gloves: 
• Sterile and disposable (good quality, longer sleeve) 
• Condemned theatre scrubs 
Gowns / Protective Suits 
• Disposable long sleeved Gowns 
• W ater repellent, with cuffs 
• Protective Suits 
Roll of tape – Broad adhesive (Masking tape/ Packaging tape) to secure gloves 
Goggles/Visors – Close fitting 
Boots/Overshoes/Knee high overshoes 
Balaclava caps 
Bio-hazardous labels/stickers 
Red and yellow plastic bags 
Red and white striped tape for demarcation of the areas 
Hypochlorite tablets/sachets (1 box) and m easuring jug 
Condemned linen (fill up when available) 
Incontinent sheets 
70% Alcohol hand disinfectant 
Disposable below knee aprons 
List of relevant telephone numbers 
Hand Bell 
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Addendum 8 
 
 
Setting up an isolation area for a suspected/confirmed  Formidable 
Epidemic Disease e.g. Viral Haemorrhagic Disease 
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Appendix J 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHECKLIST FOR OUTBREAK MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
ACTION 
 
 
 
TICK 
Identification of suspect Clinical recognition of possible case – 1st line of 
defense. 
 
Set up coordination team Outbreak coordinator (preferably a nurse); Experts 
with outbreak experience; Contact coordinator; 
Hospital Manager; Nursing Manager representative 
Medical Clinician; Laboratory Services; 
Communications; Support services; Department of 
Health; CDC/WHO representatives. 
 
Establish a working 
diagnosis 
Based on history and probability, endemic area; 
travel; occupation; lateral thinking. 
 
Infection and transmission 
Prevention 
Standard precautions; Contact precautions; Droplet 
precautions; Airborne precautions. 
 
Staff related management Volunteers; Limited rotation; Sufficient staff:- Nurse 
and relief, Buddy, Runner. 
 
Manage the rest of the 
Hospital including Doctors, 
Nurses, Cleaners; Coffee 
Shops, 
Daily meetings; Night rounds by coordination team 
Member; news brief; FAQ’s for patients/family; 
Education; Acknowledgement; Open door policy. 
 
Support of staff in isolation 
unit 
Confidentiality; Frequent visits to staff; Counselling; 
Stock levels; Special meals; Sufficient drinks; 
Leisure activities; Abandon Hierarchical platforms. 
 
Patient related management Honesty; reassurance; management visibility; 
Alternative options. 
 
Communication Staff and other patients; Other clients; Media; DoH; 
Head office liaison; Family. 
 
Contact management Operational definition of risk:- high, medium and 
low; Only aerosol exposure. 
Lists:- First contact date; Last contact date plus 21 
Days; Staff on duty; Staff not listed on allocation 
lists; Supportive services; Special investigations; 
Persons at point of origin; Family and friends. 
 
Ethical Dilemmas Whether or not to admit to ICU; When to withdraw 
Treatment. Cost of treatment. 
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